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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that 
the Commonwealth has standing to challenge the 
minimum coverage provision (as stated by the 
Secretary). 
2. Whether the district court erred in holding that 
the minimum coverage provision is not a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Article I powers (as stated 
by the Secretary). 
3. Whether the district court erred when it held 
that the unconstitutional mandate and penalty 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010, P.L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010), is severable from all the remaining 
provisions of the law. 
4. Whether the district court erred when it denied 
injunctive relief. 
 
ii 
 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 There are no disclosable entities, persons or 
interests. 
 
iii 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
BEFORE JUDGMENT 
 The Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Kenneth 
T. Cuccinelli, II, in his official capacity as Attorney 
General of Virginia, petitions for a writ of certiorari 
before judgment in a case pending on appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
OPINION BELOW 
 The opinion of the district court denying the 
Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss is reported as 
Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010). That 
decision and the Memorandum Opinion granting 
summary judgment to Virginia are reprinted in the 
Appendix (“App.”) at App. 1-53. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
JURISDICTION 
 The judgment of the district court was entered on 
December 13, 2010. Notices of appeal were timely 
filed within 60 days of judgment by the Secretary and 
by the Commonwealth of Virginia on January 18, 
2011. The appeals were consolidated and docketed in 
the court of appeals on January 20, 2011 as 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Kathleen Sebelius, No. 
11-1057. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court is 
2 
invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1) and 2101(e), and 
Rule 11 of this Court. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 Because the constitutional and statutory 
provisions involved in this case are lengthy, they are 
cited here as U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 and 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), as amended by 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
Pertinent provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. 
(See App. at 98-147). 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), (“PPACA”) 
imposes complex and significant regulatory changes 
on all 50 States. Businesses also must come to grips 
with the intricate requirements of the law and 
dramatically reorder the way health insurance is 
provided to their employees. PPACA was challenged 
from the moment it was signed. A steady drumbeat of 
new lawsuits continues to punctuate the news. 
Despite the regulatory overhaul PPACA imposes on 
the States, uncertainty surrounds the law. In 
carefully reasoned opinions, two district courts have 
found that Congress overstepped its authority in 
enacting all or part of PPACA. Other courts have 
disagreed, leaving the States and businesses unsure 
3 
whether PPACA’s complex requirements, or parts of 
them, will survive. Given the importance of the issues 
at stake to the States and to the economy as a whole, 
this Court should grant certiorari to resolve a matter 
of imperative public importance. 
 The United States Senate passed PPACA, on 
Christmas Eve 2009, on a straight party line vote 
without a single vote to spare. Cobbled together in 
secret, PPACA was passed through without 
committee hearing or report, employing such florid 
deal-making as to generate scornful popular terms 
like “the Louisiana Purchase” and “the Cornhusker 
Kick-back.” (App. at 156-57). 
 At the heart of PPACA’s financing scheme is 
§ 1501,1 which requires American citizens, with 
certain exceptions, to purchase a good or service from 
other citizens; to wit, a policy of insurance complying 
with federal standards. (App. at 102-115). Although 
Congress purported to be exercising Commerce 
Clause powers in enacting PPACA, as amended by 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010), 
this claim was known to be problematical. When 
the Senate Finance Committee had asked the 
Congressional Research Service whether a mandate 
supported by a penalty would be constitutional, the 
response was equivocal: “Whether such a requirement 
would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
 
 1 Section 1501 is now codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. 
4 
is perhaps the most challenging question posed by 
such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether 
Congress may use this clause to require an individual 
to purchase a good or a service.”2 Because an 
intervening election in Massachusetts removed the 
availability of cloture in the Senate, PPACA was 
passed by the House of Representatives unaltered, 
and then subjected to minor amendment in a 
reconciliation process dealing as much with college 
loans as with health care. 
 Meanwhile, at the 2010 Regular Session of the 
Virginia General Assembly, the Virginia Health Care 
Freedom Act, Virginia Code § 38.2-3430.1:1, had been 
enacted with the assent of the Governor. (App. at 
116). That act provides in pertinent part: 
No resident of this Commonwealth, 
regardless of whether he has or is eligible for 
health insurance coverage under any policy 
or program provided by or through his 
employer, or a plan sponsored by the 
Commonwealth or the Federal Government, 
shall be required to obtain or maintain a 
policy of individual insurance coverage 
 
 2 Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Congressional 
Research Service, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health 
Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis, July 24, 2009 at 3, 6. See 
also Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, The Budgetary 
Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance, 
August 1994 (“A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase 
health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal 
action.”). 
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except as required by a Court or the 
Department of Social Services where an 
individual is named a party in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding. 
This legislation was enacted in several identical 
versions on a bi-partisan basis, with margins as high 
as 90 to 3 in the House of Delegates and 25 to 15 in 
the Senate. At the time of enactment, the Virginia 
House of Delegates was composed of 59 Republicans, 
39 Democrats and 2 Independents, while the Virginia 
Senate contained 22 Democrats and 18 Republicans. 
(App. at 157). 
 The Attorney General of Virginia has the duty 
to defend the legislative enactments of the 
Commonwealth. Virginia Code §§ 2.2-507; 2.2-513. 
When the President signed PPACA on March 23, 
2010, the validity of both the Federal and State 
enactments were drawn into question. If PPACA was 
supported by an enumerated power, then it would 
prevail under the Supremacy Clause. If not, the 
Health Care Freedom Act would be a valid exercise of 
the police powers reserved to the States. In order to 
resolve this conflict, Virginia filed a Complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. 
(App. at 54-55). 
 The gravamen of the Complaint was that the 
claimed power to require a citizen to purchase a good 
or a service from another citizen lacks any principled 
limit and is tantamount to a national police power. 
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Virginia demonstrated below that since Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), this Court has reached 
no further than to hold that Congress can regulate 
(1) “use of the channels of interstate commerce,” 
(2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
or persons and things in interstate commerce,” and 
(3) “activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558-59 (1995) (emphasis added). Section 1501 of 
PPACA seeks to regulate inactivity affecting 
interstate commerce, a claimed power well in excess 
of the affirmative outer limits of the Commerce 
Clause heretofore recognized, even as executed by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1 (2005). This claimed power also violates 
the negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause 
identified in Lopez and in United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000). As was so clearly stated in 
Morrison: “We always have rejected readings of the 
Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that 
would permit Congress to exercise a police power.” 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (emphasis in original). 
See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 663 (recognizing that 
heightened scrutiny might be justified where 
Congress acted in haste without taking “a hard look” 
at federalism issues or if it otherwise followed 
questionable procedures.) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 On May 24, 2010, the Secretary filed a motion 
to dismiss premised upon lack of standing, the 
Anti-Injunction Act, ripeness and failure to state a 
claim. The motion was fully briefed and extensively 
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argued. (App. at 56-57). Ten amici were granted leave 
to file and did file briefs in support or in opposition. 
(App. at 194-205). 
 With respect to standing, Virginia argued that 
states suffer a sovereign injury and have standing to 
claim that the national government is acting in 
excess of its enumerated powers whenever their code 
of laws is attacked or whenever they are otherwise 
commanded to give way. See, e.g., Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992); Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (“a State clearly has a legitimate 
interest in the continued enforceability of its own 
statutes”); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62, 
65 (1986) (“a State has standing to defend the 
constitutionality of its statute”); Alfred L. Snapp & 
Sons v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 
(1982) (“[T]he power to create and enforce a legal 
code, both civil and criminal” is a core State function); 
Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 
1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (State has standing to 
defend the efficacy of its expungement statute from 
pre-emption threatened by a federal agency’s 
interpretation of federal law); Tex. Ofc. of Pub. Util. 
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(“ ‘States have a sovereign interest in the power to 
create and enforce a legal code.’ ”) (citing Alfred L. 
Snapp & Sons); Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 868 
F.2d 441, 443-45 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“pre-emptive effect 
[of federal regulations] is the injury” sufficient to 
confer Article III standing); Ohio v. USDOT, 766 F.2d 
8 
228, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1985) (“since Ohio is litigating 
the constitutionality of its own statute,” it has 
standing). 
 With regard to the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7421(a), and its parallel tax provisions in the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), 
Virginia noted that these statutes establish a “pay 
and sue” rule whereby assessed taxes must be paid 
before being challenged. Virginia argued that this 
Court has made it clear that the Anti-Injunction 
Act does not apply to non-taxpayer States. South 
Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984). This 
proposition necessitates the conclusion that there is 
similarly no bar under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2201. In re: Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. v. 
United Mine Workers of America, 99 F.3d 573, 583-84 
(4th Cir. 1996) (on this proposition, the acts are 
coextensive). 
 Virginia further argued that considerations of 
ripeness are no bar because the collision between 
PPACA and the Virginia enactment are patent. 
“Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute 
against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant 
to the existence of a justiciable controversy that 
there will be a time delay before the disputed 
provisions will come into effect.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 
(2010), quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974). 
9 
 Finally, with respect to the motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, Virginia maintained that it 
was clear Congress was claiming a power never before 
asserted and was operating beyond the affirmative 
and negative limits of the Commerce Clause as 
heretofore recognized. Under these circumstances it 
was plausible that a claim had been stated for 
violation of the Commerce Clause. Likewise, the 
Commonwealth made a plausible argument that the 
Secretary’s alternative claims based upon the taxing 
powers were unsound. 
 On the tax issue, the threshold problem for the 
Secretary is that there is a justiciable difference 
between a tax and a penalty. United States v. 
LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931). “ ‘A tax is an 
enforced contribution to provide for the support of 
government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by 
statute as punishment for an unlawful act.’ ” United 
States v. Reorganized (F&I) Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) (citation omitted). A penalty 
not supporting a tax is not a tax penalty but a naked 
penalty requiring an enumerated power other than 
the taxing power to support it. Furthermore, even if 
the penalty were a tax “there comes a time in the 
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called 
tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a 
mere penalty with the characteristics of a regulation 
and punishment.” Dep’t of Rev. of Mont. v. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994). See also United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); Child Labor 
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922). Because at this 
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point the penalty requires a supporting enumerated 
power independent of the taxing power—and the only 
possible one would be the Commerce Clause—the tax 
argument collapses back into the Commerce Clause 
argument. 
 Based upon these authorities and considerations 
the district court denied the motion to dismiss on 
August 2, 2010. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 
702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010). (App. at 89). 
 On August 16, 2010, the Secretary filed her 
Answer. (App. at 207). On September 3, 2010 the 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
(App. at 2). They were supported or opposed in twelve 
briefs amicus curiae, including briefs filed on behalf 
of former Attorneys General Barr, Meese, and 
Thornburgh, and in briefs filed on behalf of eighteen 
law professors. (App. at 209-22). On the threshold 
and merits issues, Virginia argued in conformity with 
its positions at the motion to dismiss stage. With 
respect to remedy, Virginia argued that under the 
legislative bargain prong of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987), the mandate and penalty, 
if unconstitutional, are not severable from the 
remainder of PPACA. On the second prong of Alaska 
Airlines, which turns on the ability of remaining 
provisions to function without the stricken parts, the 
Secretary conceded that changes in insurance 
regulation, such as guaranteed issue and community 
rating, were not severable from the mandate and 
penalty. (App. at 148-49, 151). Indeed, the Secretary 
asserted that the changes in insurance would collapse 
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that industry without the mandate and penalty. (App. 
at 148-49). Virginia argued in the alternative that at 
least all means of financing the PPACA scheme, 
including Medicare and Medicaid changes, had been 
intended to work together and could not be severed 
from the mandate and penalty. (App. at 46). 
 On October 7, 2010, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Thomas 
More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010), found that the private party plaintiffs 
that were before it had standing, found that their 
claims were ripe, found that the penalty was not a tax 
triggering the Anti-Injunction Act and ruled that 
PPACA is a constitutional exercise of power under the 
Commerce Clause. The Secretary filed her Notice of 
Supplemental Authority on October 8, 2010 bringing 
that decision to the attention of the district court in 
the Eastern District of Virginia. (App. at 221). 
 On October 14, 2010, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Florida in State of 
Florida v. United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 
2010), denied the motion to dismiss filed by the 
United States. In the course of its decision that court 
held that PPACA could not be sustained under the 
taxing power. Id. at 1139-40. Virginia filed its Notice 
of Supplemental Authority the same day bringing 
that decision to the attention of the district court. 
(App. at 223). 
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 On November 30, 2010, the United State District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia in Liberty 
University v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, No. 
6:10cv15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2011), found that the 
claims of Liberty University and two individuals 
conferred standing upon them and were ripe for 
adjudication. The mandate and penalty were found 
not to trigger the Anti-Injunction Act and PPACA was 
upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congressional 
Commerce Clause power. The Secretary filed her 
Notice of Supplemental Authority on December 3, 
2010 bringing this decision to the attention of the 
district court. (App. at 225). 
 On December 13, 2010, the district court granted 
Virginia’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
declared PPACA unconstitutional. (App. at 52-53). 
The Secretary filed her Notice of Appeal on January 
18, 2011. (App. at 225). Because the district court had 
ruled that the mandate and penalty were severable, 
Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal the same day. (App. 
at 225). The cases were consolidated by Order dated 
January 20, 2011 and the consolidated appeals were 
docketed in the Fourth Circuit that day. (App. at 
92-94, 95). Hence, this petition is ripe under Rule 11. 
 On January 26, 2011, the Secretary and Virginia 
filed a Joint Motion to Expedite Briefing and to 
Schedule Oral Argument for May 2011. (Case 11-1057 
Doc. 13). The Motion was Granted the same day, 
(Case 11-1057 Doc. 15), and oral argument is 
tentatively scheduled for the May 10-13 session, to be 
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conducted seriatim with argument in the Liberty 
University case. (Case 11-1057 Doc. 24). 
 On January 28, 2011, the Secretary filed her 
non-binding Statement of Issues on appeal. (Case 
11-1057 Doc. 17 at 3). That statement is repeated 
supra as Questions Presented No. 1 and No. 2. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
 A petition for writ of certiorari before judgment 
in a court of appeals will be granted “only upon a 
showing that the case is of such imperative public 
importance as to justify deviation from normal 
appellate practice and to require immediate 
determination in this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 11. 
 
A. This Case Is of Imperative National 
Importance Requiring Immediate 
Determination in this Court. 
 PPACA has roiled America. The party that 
unanimously opposed PPACA in the House of 
Representatives has just seen its largest electoral 
gains in over seventy years. With the intervention of 
six additional states in the Florida suit on January 
19, 2011, it became possible for the first time in 
American history to count a clear majority of states 
in litigation with the federal government, each 
claiming that the federal government has exceeded 
its enumerated powers. That same day the House of 
Representatives voted to repeal PPACA on a vote of 
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245 to 189. On January 21, 2011, Oklahoma filed suit 
in the Eastern District of Oklahoma to vindicate a 
recently enacted constitutional amendment which 
conflicts with PPACA. 
 Despite these developments, the States, citizens 
and the economy remain mired in uncertainty. 
Because the changes effected by PPACA are so 
massive, the States are forced to devote considerable 
resources now to meet the requirements of a 
congressional enactment that this Court may find 
invalid. In Virginia, some of the key agencies involved 
with PPACA include the Office of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Resources, the Department of 
Medical Assistance Services, the Department of 
Health, the Bureau of Insurance, and the state 
medical teaching hospitals. Virginia must assess 
whether to develop a high risk pool or default to the 
federal government, overhaul its insurance laws, and 
create a health benefit exchange. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 18001 (high risk pools); 18031 (health benefit 
exchanges). The latter entails the administrative 
costs associated with creating an entirely new agency, 
expanding an existing agency, or providing support 
for an independent entity. The General Assembly of 
Virginia is presently considering complex bills on a 
variety of PPACA-related issues.3 All 50 states 
 
 3 See House Bills 1928, 1958, (both overhauling various 
aspects of Virginia insurance law in light of PPACA); 2434 
(creating a Health Benefit Exchange), and Senate Bill 1366 
(same). Information about these bills is available at the General 
Assembly’s website, http://leg1.state.va.us/lis.htm 
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currently are undertaking similar efforts. States are 
also struggling to determine the costs of expanding 
the Medicaid program and how to cope with them. 
 Citizens and businesses are widely believed to be 
reducing spending and delaying hiring in response to 
the overhang of uncertainty. Under PPACA, effective 
December 31, 2013, hardly a distant horizon, certain 
employers with more than 50 employees who do not 
offer health insurance as a benefit will have to pay 
a fee of $2,000 per every full-time employee.4 
Any employer who employs more than 200 employees 
and offers insurance to those employees must 
automatically enroll new employees in this insurance, 
and continue to maintain insurance for existing 
employees already enrolled in this insurance.5 
Employers will have to offer vouchers allowing 
qualified employees to obtain coverage through a 
state-run insurance exchange rather than through 
the employer.6 PPACA also establishes minimum 
standards of coverage that health insurance plans 
must achieve to be considered a “qualified health 
plan.”7 What satisfies the definition of a qualified 
health plan will be determined through the HHS 
regulations. Hundreds of businesses have sought and 
 
 4 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a). 
 5 29 U.S.C. § 218a. 
 6 42 U.S.C. § 18101. 
 7 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18022. 
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obtained waivers from certain PPACA requirements, 
but those waivers are temporary.8 
 Given the burdens and uncertainties associated 
with PPACA, it is not surprising that the Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House of 
Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia have 
requested the Attorney General to seek expedited 
appeal. The Secretary herself, in her Joint Motion to 
Expedite Briefing and to Schedule Oral Argument for 
May 2011, filed in the Fourth Circuit on January 26, 
has agreed that “[t]he constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act has public policy implications of 
the highest magnitude.” (Case 11-1057 Doc. 13 at 3). 
 There is a palpable consensus in this country 
that the question of PPACA’s constitutionality must 
be and will be decided in this Court. Under these 
circumstances, the issues presented here should be 
considered to be at least as important as those 
presented in many of the cases where immediate 
review has been permitted under Rule 11 or its 
predecessors. Such cases include challenges to the 
legality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the 
reorganization of two railroads, New Haven Inclusion 
Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 418 (1970), a coal strike, United 
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 
 
 8 http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_ 
for_waiver.html (noting that 711 waivers that must be renewed 
annually were issued for FY 2011). 
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258, 269 (1947), a denial of the power of a federal 
court to enforce rent control, Porter v. Dicken, 328 
U.S. 252 (1946), a constitutional challenge to the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 285 (1936), a constitutional 
challenge to the Railroad Retirement Act, Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 340 
(1935), and the effect of a railroad dispute on the 
economy of St. Louis, Missouri. St. Louis, Kansas City 
& Col. R.R. Co. v. Wabash R.R. Co., 217 U.S. 247, 
250-51 (1910). 
 Rule 11 also has been employed to enable this 
Court to gather a number of cases so as to permit it to 
make a constitutional assessment in a wider range 
of circumstances. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
259-60 (2003). It should be so employed here. In both 
Thomas More Law Center and in the Liberty 
University cases, the Department of Justice failed to 
independently cross appeal standing. Because that 
issue is jurisdictional, it is not waivable and may be 
asserted by a party at anytime or by this Court sua 
sponte. As a consequence, it cannot be known prior to 
decision whether those cases provide a good vehicle 
for reaching the constitutional merits. Sovereign 
standing, on the other hand, is more categorically 
established than is individual standing, which in any 
specific case turns on the particular facts of that case. 
Granting certiorari in this case will ensure a good 
vehicle for merits review. Granting certiorari in this 
case and then expanding it to reach all merits 
decisions pending in the courts of appeal would serve 
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the aggregation interest recognized in Gratz, 539 U.S. 
at 259-60. 
 The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida declared PPACA 
unconstitutional in its entirety on January 31, 2011. 
Enlarging a grant of certiorari in this case to include 
that case once an appeal is docketed would further 
expand and develop the records on which the issue of 
severability can be considered. 
 
B. The Imperative Public Importance of the 
Constitutionality of PPACA and the Proper 
Scope of Severance Justify Deviation from 
Normal Appellate Practice. 
 The paradigm cases for the grant of Rule 11 
review are challenges to federal power involving 
significant national economic impact. See, e.g., New 
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392; Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1952); United 
Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258; Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238; Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330; United 
States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240, 243 (1935). 
The pending case shares both aspects of those cases: 
constitutional questions and significant national 
economic effect. Furthermore, the presence of pure 
issues of constitutional law on the merits ensures 
that normal appellate practice will not further focus 
the controlling issues, which, in any event, are 
bottomed on decisions of this Court. Indeed, because 
the constitutionality of PPACA can only be resolved 
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by determining whether and to what extent this 
Court will enlarge the existing affirmative and 
negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause, or 
overrule the Child Labor Tax Case, it is not clear to 
what extent the courts of appeal are even entitled to 
engage in independent legal development in the face 
of binding precedent from this Court. See Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 
477, 484 (1989) (this Court has the exclusive 
prerogative to reverse its own cases).9 
 
C. This Case Is “Cert. Worthy” In its Own 
Right and Is a Good Vehicle for Resolving 
Constitutional Issues Which Have Been 
Variously Decided Around the Country and 
Which Can Only Be Finally Decided in this 
Court. 
 This Court has deemed a split among district 
courts in different circuits as a factor weighing in 
favor of granting certiorari under Rule 11. Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). Such a split 
 
 9 The district courts in Virginia and Florida expressly 
recognized this point. See App. at 44 (relying on this Court’s 
cases to reject the argument that the “penalty” is a tax, while 
recognizing that the line of cases has been criticized by some 
scholars); Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 2011 WL 285683, No. 3:10cv91, slip op. 43 (N.D. Fla. 
Jan. 31, 2011) (“existing case law thus extends only to 
those ‘activities’ that have a substantial relationship to, or 
substantially affect, interstate commerce. I am required to 
interpret this law as the Supreme Court presently defines it. 
Only the Supreme Court can redefine or expand it further.”). 
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exists here and has merely been deepened by the 
Florida decision. See Florida v. United States Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., 2011 WL 285683. 
 This case is a particularly good vehicle for 
resolving the split because all of the issues raised 
by the Department of Justice—standing, the 
Anti-Injunction Act, ripeness, and the limits of the 
Commerce Clause and of the Taxing Power—have 
been raised here where they have been exhaustively 
developed. Although it appears from the non-binding 
Statement of Issues in the Secretary’s Docketing 
Statement that she does not intend to appeal the 
Anti-Injunction Act or ripeness, she is pursuing 
standing. Because the Secretary has not appealed 
standing in the Thomas More Law Center and Liberty 
University cases, they are not reliable vehicles by 
themselves for assuring merits review because 
standing is a jurisdictional issue that could be 
re-raised or raised sua sponte. Granting certiorari in 
this case will ensure that the issue will arrive fully 
briefed in this court. 
 The fact that Virginia was the prevailing party 
below is no barrier to a grant of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1) provides that “any party to any civil or 
criminal case” may petition for certiorari from 
“[c]ases in the courts of appeals” both “before and 
after rendition of judgment or decree.” See also 
United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. at 269 
(former 28 U.S.C. § 347(a), now 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), 
“authorizes a petition for certiorari by any party and 
the granting of certiorari prior to judgment in the 
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Circuit Court of Appeals.”). Furthermore, Virginia’s 
claim of error with respect to severance is derivative 
of and closely connected with the Secretary’s 
appellate issues. 
 Having correctly found that the individual 
mandate and penalty were unconstitutional, the 
district court in this case turned to the question of 
severance. The district court recognized that, even in 
the absence of a severability clause, “[u]nless it is 
evident that the Legislature would not have enacted 
those provisions which are within its power, 
independently of that which is not, the invalid part 
may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a 
law.” (App. at 47) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). It then noted that the fully operative test 
can turn on the question “whether the balance of the 
statute will function in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress in the wake of severance of the 
unconstitutional provision. . . .” (App. at 48) (internal 
citation omitted). The district court also noted that 
another reason to decline to sever an unconstitutional 
provision of a statute from the remaining whole would 
arise if a court concluded that Congress would not 
have enacted the statute “in the absence of the 
severed unconstitutional provision. . . .” (App. at 48) 
(internal citation omitted). Ultimately, the district court 
severed the unconstitutional mandate and penalty 
from the remainder of the act, writing that it would 
“sever only Section 1501 and directly-dependent 
provisions which make specific reference to Section 
1501.” (App. at 49). Because there are no such 
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provisions this was error because it failed to execute 
even the Secretary’s concessions. 
 The Secretary’s significant concession regarding 
severance was that, if the mandate and penalty were 
found unconstitutional, other “provisions of the Act 
plainly cannot survive.” (App. at 148). In saying this 
she specifically acknowledged that the “insurance 
industry reforms” contained in PPACA “cannot be 
severed from the” mandate and penalty, and therefore, 
must be stricken if the mandate and penalty are 
found to be unconstitutional. (App. at 149). Thus, at a 
minimum, the district court erred in not striking 
those elements of PPACA when it found the mandate 
and penalty unconstitutional. 
 However, the Secretary’s concession should have 
been the beginning of the severance review and not 
the end. Because all financing provisions, including 
Medicare and Medicaid changes, were intended to 
operate together, they should all fall together as well. 
Indeed, under the legislative bargain prong of Alaska 
Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 684, PPACA should have 
been stricken in its entirety because it is as certain as 
such a thing ever could be that PPACA would not 
have passed at all without the unconstitutional 
mandate and penalty. 
 The decision of the Northern District of Florida 
striking down PPACA in its entirety has engendered 
further uncertainty. This too heightens the need for 
expedited review. Finally, it should be noticed that 
Virginia satisfied all four elements bearing on the 
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propriety of injunctive relief. Because the Secretary 
apparently continues to implement PPACA despite 
two clear declarations of unconstitutionality, injunctive 
relief should also be immediately considered. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons the petition for writ of 
certiorari before judgment in the court of appeals 
should be GRANTED and then expanded to include 
all PPACA litigation pending in the courts of appeals. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Richmond Division 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA EX REL. 
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, 
II, in his official capacity as 
Attorney General of Virginia, 
  Plaintiff 
v. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
in her official capacity, 
  Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action No. 
3:10CV188-HEH 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
(Cross Motions for Summary Judgment) 
(Filed Dec. 13, 2010) 
 In this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia (the 
“Commonwealth”), through its Attorney General, 
challenges the constitutionality of the pivotal 
enforcement mechanism of the health care scheme 
adopted by Congress in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or “the Act”), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). At issue is Section 1501 
of the Act, commonly known as the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision (“the Provision”). The 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision requires that 
App. 2 
 
every United States citizen, other than those falling 
within specified exceptions, maintain a minimum 
level of health insurance coverage for each month 
beginning in 2014. Failure to comply will result in a 
penalty included with the taxpayer’s annual return. 
As enacted, Section 1501 is administered and 
enforced as a part of the Internal Revenue Code. 
 In its Complaint, the Commonwealth seeks both 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the 
Commonwealth urges the Court to find that the 
enactment of Section 1501 exceeds the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause and General 
Welfare Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is in direct 
conflict with Virginia Code Section 38.2-3430.1:1 
(2010), commonly referred to as the Virginia Health 
Care Freedom Act, thus implicating the Tenth 
Amendment. 
 As part of the relief sought, the Commonwealth 
also requests prohibitory injunctive relief barring the 
United States government from enforcing the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision within its 
territorial boundaries. 
 The case is presently before the Court on Motions 
for Summary Judgment filed by both parties 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Both 
sides have again filed well-researched memoranda 
supplying the Court with a thorough analysis of the 
controlling issues and pertinent jurisprudence. The 
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Court heard oral argument on October 18, 2010. As 
this Court previously cautioned, this case does not 
turn on the wisdom of Congress or the public policy 
implications of the ACA. The Court’s attention is 
focused solely on the constitutionality of the 
enactment. 
 A review of the supporting memoranda filed by 
each party yields no material facts genuinely in issue 
and neither party suggests to the contrary. The 
dispute at hand is driven entirely by issues of law.1 
 The present procedural posture of this case is 
best summarized by the penultimate paragraph of 
this Court’s Memorandum Opinion denying the 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss: 
While this case raises a host of complex 
constitutional issues, all seem to distill to the 
single question of whether or not Congress 
has the power to regulate – and tax – a 
citizen’s decision not to participate in 
interstate commerce. Neither the U.S. 
Supreme Court nor any circuit court of 
appeals has squarely addressed this issue. 
No reported case from any federal appellate 
court has extended the Commerce Clause or 
 
 1 The Secretary takes issue with the Commonwealth’s 
characterization of aspects of the ACA, its economic impact, and 
the legislative intent underlying Va. Code Section 38.2-3430.1:1. 
These disputed facts are neither substantive nor essential to 
issue resolution, and consequently do not preclude summary 
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 
106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 
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Tax Clause to include the regulation of a 
person’s decision not to purchase a product, 
notwithstanding its effect on interstate 
commerce. 
(Mem. Op. 2, Aug. 2, 2010, ECF No. 84.) 
 
I. 
 The Secretary, in her Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, aptly 
sets the framework of the debate: “[t]his case 
concerns a pure question of law, whether Congress 
acted within its Article I powers in enacting the 
ACA.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 17, ECF No. 
91.) At this final stage of the proceedings, with some 
refinement, the issues remain the same. 
 Succinctly stated, the Commonwealth’s 
constitutional challenge has three distinct facets. 
First, the Commonwealth contends that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision, and 
affiliated penalty, are beyond the outer limits of the 
Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and 
Proper Clause as measured by U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. More specifically, the Commonwealth 
argues that requiring an otherwise unwilling 
individual to purchase a good or service from a 
private vendor is beyond the boundaries of 
congressional Commerce Clause power. The 
Commonwealth maintains that the failure, or 
refusal, of its citizens to elect to purchase health 
App. 5 
 
insurance is not economic activity historically subject 
to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
 Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that 
the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision cannot 
be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the 
congressional power of taxation under the General 
Welfare Clause. It argues that the Provision is 
mischaracterized as a tax and is, in actuality, a 
penalty untethered to an enumerated power. 
Congress may not, in the Commonwealth’s view, 
exercise such power to impose a penalty for what 
amounts to passive inactivity. 
 Lastly, the Commonwealth asserts that Section 
1501 is in direct conflict with the Virginia Health 
Care Freedom Act. Its Attorney General argues that 
the enactment of the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision is an unlawful exercise of police power, 
encroaches on the sovereignty of the Commonwealth, 
and offends the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 The Secretary prefaces her response with an 
acknowledgement that the debate over the 
constitutionality of the ACA has evolved into a 
polemic mix of political controversy and legal 
analysis. When viewed from a purely legal 
perspective, the Secretary maintains that the 
requirement that most Americans obtain a minimum 
level of health insurance coverage or pay a tax 
penalty “is well within the traditional bounds of 
Congress’s Article I powers.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. 1.) 
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Her argument begins with an explanation of the 
reformative impact of the health care regime created 
by the Act. “[T]he Act is an important, but 
incremental, advance that builds on prior reforms of 
the interstate health insurance market over the last 
35 years.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. 1.) The Secretary points 
to congressional findings that the insurance industry 
has failed to take corrective action to eliminate 
barriers which prevent millions of Americans from 
obtaining affordable insurance. To correct this 
systemic failure in the interstate health insurance 
market, Congress adopted a carefully crafted scheme 
which bars insurers from denying coverage to those 
with preexisting conditions, and from charging 
discriminatory premiums on the basis of medical 
history. 
 In order to guarantee the success of these reforms, 
the Secretary maintains that Congress properly 
exercised its powers under the Commerce Clause, or 
alternatively the Necessary and Proper Clause, to 
adopt a regulatory mechanism to effectuate these 
health care market reform measures, namely the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision. “[B]ecause 
the Act regulates health care financing [it] is 
quintessential economic activity.” (Def.’s Reply Mem. 
3, ECF No. 132.) 
 Moreover, the Secretary rejects the 
Commonwealth’s contention that the implementation 
of the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision 
through the Necessary and Proper Clause violates 
state sovereignty. Since the penalty mechanism does 
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not compel state officials to carry out a federal 
regulatory scheme, she maintains that it does not 
implicate the Tenth Amendment. 
 The Secretary also disputes the logic behind 
the Commonwealth’s contention that the Provision 
compels health care market participation by 
individuals who do not wish to purchase insurance. 
She dismisses the notion that uninsured people can 
sit passively on the market sidelines. Her reasoning 
flows from the observation that 
the large majority of the uninsured regularly 
migrate in and out of insurance coverage. 
That is, the uninsured, as a class, often 
make, revisit, and revise economic decisions 
as to how to finance their health care needs. 
Congress may regulate these economic 
actions when they substantially affect 
interstate commerce. . . . Insurance-purchase 
requirements have long been fixtures in the 
United States Code. 
(Def.’s Mem. Supp. 2.) 
 Both the Secretary’s argument in defense of the 
Provision and the apparent underlying rationale of 
Congress are premised on the facially logical 
assumption that every individual at some point in life 
will need some form of health care. “No person can 
guarantee that he will divorce himself entirely from 
the market for heath care services.” (Def.’s Mem. Opp. 
Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 96.) “[N]o person can 
guarantee that he will never incur a sudden, 
unanticipated need for expensive care; and very few 
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persons, absent insurance, can guarantee that they 
will not shift the cost of that care to the rest of 
society.” (Def.’s Reply Mem. 2.) In the Secretary’s 
view, failure to appreciate this logic is the fatal flaw 
in the Commonwealth’s position.2 
 On a third front, the Secretary defends the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s independent authority to lay 
taxes and make expenditures for the general welfare. 
Contrary to earlier representations by the Legislative 
and Executive branches, the Secretary now states 
unequivocally that the Provision is a tax, published 
in the Internal Revenue Code, and enforced by 
the Internal Revenue Service. The Secretary notes 
that “[i]ts penalty operates as an addition to an 
individual’s income tax liability on his annual tax 
return, which is calculated by reference to income.” 
(Def.’s Mem. Supp. 2.) The Secretary also cites 
projections that it will raise $4 billion annually in 
general revenue. She takes issue with the 
Commonwealth’s position that there is a legal 
 
 2 In Florida ex rel. McCollum v. US. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Judge Vinson aptly captures the theoretic 
underpinning of the Secretary’s argument. “Their argument on 
this point can be broken down to the following syllogism: 
(1) because the majority of people will at some point in their 
lives need and consume healthcare services, and (2) because 
some of the people are unwilling or unable to pay for those 
services, (3) Congress may regulate everyone and require that 
everyone have specific, federally-approved insurance.” 716 
F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1162 (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
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distinction between penalties that serve regulatory 
purposes and other forms of revenue raising taxation. 
In her opinion, any such legal distinction has long 
been abandoned by the Supreme Court.3 
 Finally, the Secretary highlights several precepts 
of legal analysis which she suggests should guide the 
Court in reviewing the issues raised. First, she 
cautions the Court to remember that the standard for 
facial challenges establishes a high hurdle. It 
requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate that 
there are no possible circumstances in which the 
Provision could be constitutionally applied. United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 
2100 (1987). In other words, they “must show that the 
[statute] cannot operate constitutionally under any 
circumstance.” West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002). 
Proof of a single constitutional application is all that 
is necessary in her view. In summary, she explains  
for Virginia’s facial challenge to succeed 
under its theory, this Court would have to 
conclude that no uninsured individual would 
ever use or be charged for medical services, 
and that no uninsured individual would ever 
 
 3 Because the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is 
incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code, and technically 
under the purview of the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary 
Sebelius, at this late stage, maintains that the Secretary of the 
Treasury is a necessary party, whose absence as such warrants 
dismissal. This aspect of her motion was rejected by a separate 
Memorandum Order (Dk. No. 152) dated October 13, 2010. 
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make an active decision whether to purchase 
insurance. Because such a showing cannot be 
made, Virginia’s facial challenge must fail. 
(Def.’s Mem. Opp. 19.) 
 On this issue, the Secretary holds the weaker 
hand. The cases she relies upon, Salerno and West 
Virginia, which are styled as facial challenges, focus 
on the impact or effect of the enactment at issue. The 
immediate lawsuit questions the authority of 
Congress – at the bill’s inception – to enact 
the legislation. The distinction is somewhat 
analogous to subject matter jurisdiction, the power to 
act ab initio. By their very nature, almost all 
constitutional challenges to specific exercises of 
enumerated powers, particularly the Commerce 
Clause, are facial. “When . . . a federal statute is 
challenged as going beyond Congress’s enumerated 
powers, under our precedents the court first asks 
whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face.” 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743, 
123 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516, 117 
S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997). A careful examination of the 
Court’s analysis in Lopez and Morrison does not 
suggest the standard articulated in Salerno. In both 
Lopez and Morrison, the Court declared the statute 
under review to be legally stillborn without 
consideration of its effect downstream. 
 In fact, the viability of the Salerno dictum cited 
by the Secretary has been questioned by the Court in 
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City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S. Ct. 
1849 (1999). “To the extent we have consistently 
articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is 
not the Salerno formulation, which has never been 
the decisive factor in any decision of this Court, 
including Salerno itself.” Id. at 55 n.22, 119 S. Ct. at 
1858 n.22. See also Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. 
Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in denial of stay and 
injunction); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 
1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 Even if the Commonwealth is held to the higher 
standard of proof, unconstitutionality in all 
applications, it could be met if the enforcement 
mechanism is itself unconstitutional. Importantly, it 
is not the effect on individuals that is presently at 
issue – it is the authority of Congress to compel 
anyone to purchase health insurance. An enactment 
that exceeds the power of Congress to adopt adversely 
affects everyone in every application. Indeed, the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision touches every 
American citizen required to file an annual IRS Form 
1040 or 1040A.4 
 Second, the Secretary correctly asks the Court to 
be mindful that it must presume the constitutionality 
 
 4 The Commonwealth also contends that the only 
application at issue is the conflict with the Virginia Health Care 
Freedom Act. The Court, however, need not specifically reach 
this issue. 
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of federal legislation. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 
490 (4th Cir. 2000). Third, she reminds the Court that 
the task at hand is not to independently review the 
facts underlying the decision of Congress to exercise 
its Article I authority to enact legislation. Reviewing 
courts are confined to a determination of whether a 
rational basis exists for such congressional action. See 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 
2208 (2005). 
 
II. 
 In this Court’s Memorandum Opinion denying 
the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court 
recognized that the Secretary’s application of the 
Commerce Clause and General Welfare Clause 
appeared to extend beyond existing constitutional 
precedent. It was also noted that each side had 
advanced some authority arguably supporting the 
theory underlying their position. Accordingly, the 
Court was unable to conclude at that stage that the 
Complaint failed to state a cause of action. At this 
point, the analysis proceeds to the next level. To 
prevail, the Commonwealth, as Plaintiff, must make 
“a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its 
constitutional bounds.” Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490 
(internal citation omitted). To win summary 
judgment, the Secretary must convince the Court to 
the contrary. 
 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2), 
summary judgment should be granted “if the 
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pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” News & 
Observer Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 
597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)(2)). “The moving party is ‘entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law’ when the nonmoving 
party fails to make an adequate showing on an 
essential element for which it has the burden of proof 
at trial.” News & Observer Publ’g Co., 597 F.3d at 
576; see Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 
U.S. 795, 805-06, 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1603 (1999). Aside 
from sparring over representations of marginal 
consequence, there do not appear to be any material 
facts genuinely at issue. This case turns solely on 
issues of law. Both parties acknowledge that 
resolution by summary judgment is appropriate. 
 
III. 
 Turning to the merits, this Court previously 
noted that the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision appears to forge new ground and extends 
the Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high 
water mark. The Court also acknowledged the finite 
well of jurisprudential guidance in surveying the 
boundaries of such power. The historically-accepted 
contours of Article I Commerce Clause power were 
restated by the Supreme Court in Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S. Ct. 1357, 1359 (1971). 
The Perez Court divided traditional Commerce Clause 
App. 14 
 
powers into three distinct strands. First, Congress 
can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Id. 
Second, Congress has the authority to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
and persons or things in interstate commerce. Id. 
Third, Congress has the power to regulate activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. It 
appears from the tenor of the debate in this case that 
only the third category of Commerce Clause power is 
presently at issue. 
 Critical to the Secretary’s argument is the notion 
that an individual’s decision not to purchase health 
insurance is in effect “economic activity.” (Def.’s Mem. 
Supp. 35.) The Secretary rejects the Commonwealth’s 
implied premise that a person can simply elect to 
avoid participation in the health care market. It is 
inevitable, in her view, that every individual – today 
or in the future – healthy or otherwise – will require 
medical care. She adds that a large segment of the 
population is uninsured and “consume[s] tens of 
billions of dollars in uncompensated care each year.” 
(Def.’s Mem. Opp. 14.) The Secretary maintains that 
the irrefutable facts demonstrate that “[t]he conduct 
of the uninsured – their economic decision as to how 
to finance their health care needs, their actual use of 
the health care system, their migration in and out of 
coverage, and their shifting of costs on to the rest 
of the system when they cannot pay – plainly is 
economic activity.” (Def.’s Mem. Opp. 16-17.) 
 The Secretary relies on what is commonly 
referred to as an aggregation theory, which is 
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conceptually based on the hypothesis that the sum of 
individual decisions to participate or not in the health 
insurance market has a critical collective effect on 
interstate commerce. Congress may regulate even 
intrastate activities if they are within a class of 
activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affect 
interstate commerce. In support of this argument, the 
Secretary relies on the teachings of the Supreme 
Court in Gonzales, wherein the Court noted that 
“[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of 
a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may 
regulate the entire class.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 17, 
125 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, 91 
S. Ct. at 1361). In other words, her argument is 
premised on the theoretical effect of an aggregation or 
critical mass of indecision on interstate commerce. 
 The core of the Secretary’s primary argument 
under the Commerce Clause is that the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision is a necessary measure 
to ensure the success of its larger reforms of the 
interstate health insurance market.5 The Secretary 
emphasizes that the ACA is a vital step in 
transforming a currently dysfunctional interstate 
health insurance market. In the Secretary’s view, the 
key elements of health care reform are coverage of 
those with preexisting conditions and prevention of 
discriminatory premiums on the basis of medical 
 
 5 The Secretary seems to sidestep the independent 
freestanding constitutional basis for the Provision. 
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history. These features, the Secretary maintains, will 
have a material effect on the health insurance 
underwriting process, and inevitably, the cost of 
insurance coverage. Therefore, without full market 
participation, the financial foundation supporting the 
health care system will fail, in effect causing the 
entire health care regime to “implode.” Unless 
everyone is required by law to purchase health 
insurance, or pay a penalty, the revenue base will be 
insufficient to underwrite the costs of insuring 
individuals presently considered as high risk or 
uninsurable. Therefore, under the Secretary’s 
reasoning, since Congress has the power under the 
Commerce Clause to reform the interstate health 
insurance market, it also possesses, under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, the power to make the 
regulation effective by enacting the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision. United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19, 62 S. Ct. 
523, 525-26 (1942). 
 The Secretary seeks legal support for her 
aggregation theory in the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942) 
and Gonzales. She maintains that the central 
question is whether there is a rational basis for 
concluding that the class of activities at issue, when 
“taken in the aggregate,” substantially affects 
interstate commerce. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 
S. Ct. at 2208; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28. In other 
words, “[w]here the class of activities is regulated and 
that class is within reach of federal power, the courts 
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have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances’ of the class.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 23, 125 
S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, 91 
S. Ct. at 1361); United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 
180 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 
(2010). 
 In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld the 
power of Congress to regulate the personal 
cultivation and consumption of wheat on a private 
farm. The Court reasoned that the consumption of 
such non-commercially produced wheat reduced the 
amount of commercially produced wheat purchased 
and consumed nationally, thereby affecting interstate 
commerce. Wickard is generally acknowledged to be 
the most expansive application of the Commerce 
Clause by the Supreme Court, followed by Gonzales. 
 At issue in Gonzales was whether the aggregate 
effect of personal growth and consumption of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes under California 
law had a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to 
warrant regulation under the Commerce Clause. The 
Supreme Court concluded that “Mike the farmer in 
Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home 
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is 
an established, albeit illegal, interstate market. . . . 
Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding 
that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside 
federal control would similarly affect price and 
market conditions.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 18-19, 125 
S. Ct. at 2206-07. 
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 The Secretary emphasizes that the 
Commonwealth’s challenge fails to appreciate the 
significance of the overall regulatory scheme and 
program at issue. Quoting from Gonzales, the 
Secretary notes that when “a general regulatory 
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the 
de minimis character of individual instances arising 
under the statute is of no consequence.” (Def.’s Mem. 
Supp. 19 (quoting Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 17, 125 S. Ct. 
at 2206).) Furthermore, the Secretary adds that “[f]or 
the provisions of ‘[a] complex regulatory program’ to 
fall within [Congress’s] commerce power, ‘[i]t is 
enough that the challenged provisions are an integral 
part of the regulatory program and that the 
regulatory scheme when considered as a whole 
satisfies this test.’ ” (Def.’s Mem. Opp. 9 (quoting 
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497).) 
 When reviewing congressional exercise of the 
Commerce Clause powers, the Secretary cautions 
that a court “need not itself measure the impact on 
interstate commerce of the activities Congress sought 
to regulate, nor need the court calculate how integral 
a particular provision is to a larger regulatory 
program. The court’s task instead is limited to 
determining ‘whether a rational basis exists’ for 
Congress’s conclusions.”6 (Def.’s Mem. Supp. 19 
 
 6 In response to footnote 1 in the Court’s Memorandum 
Opinion denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Secretary 
addresses the effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act on the power 
of Congress to regulate the business of insurance under the 
(Continued on following page) 
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(quoting Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 S. Ct. at 
2208).) 
 Because the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision is the linchpin which provides financial 
viability to the other critical elements of the overall 
regulatory scheme, the Secretary concludes that its 
adoption is within congressional Commerce Clause 
powers. She emphasizes that Congress “rationally 
found that a failure to regulate the decision to delay 
or forego insurance – i.e., the decision to shift one’s 
costs on to the larger health care system – would 
undermine the ‘comprehensive regulatory regime.’ ” 
(Def.’s Mem. Supp. 27 (quoting Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 
 
Commerce Clause. The Act expressly declared that the 
regulation and taxation of the business of insurance, and all who 
engage in it, should be subject to the laws of the several states 
unless Congress specifically states the contrary. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1012. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 292 (4th 
Cir. 2007) cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1062 (2007). 
 The Secretary points out that where Congress exercises that 
power, its enactment controls over any contrary state law. 
Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 306, 119 S. Ct. 710, 716 
(1999). Specifically, the Secretary maintains that the ACA 
reforms the insurance industry by preventing insurers from 
denying or revoking coverage for those with preexisting 
conditions and by protecting individuals with such conditions 
from being charged discriminatory rates. These provisions, 
which are effectuated by the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision, in the Secretary’s view, regulate the business of 
insurance. 
 The Commonwealth counters, however, that an individual’s 
decision not to purchase insurance is not within the logical 
ambit of the business of insurance. 
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27, 125 S. Ct. at 2211).) Therefore, the Secretary 
posits that because the guaranteed coverage and rate 
discrimination issues are unquestionably within the 
Commerce Clause powers, the mechanism chosen by 
Congress to effectuate those reforms, the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision, is also a proper 
exercise of that power – either under the Commerce 
Clause or the associated Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
IV. 
 The Secretary characterizes the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision as the vital kinetic link 
that animates Congress’s overall regulatory reform of 
interstate health care and insurance markets. “[T]he 
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the 
Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative 
authority are accompanied by broad power to enact 
laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to 
the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’ ” United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 
(1819). The Secretary maintains that because 
Congress has rationally concluded “that the 
minimum coverage provision is necessary to make the 
other regulations in the Act effective,” it is an 
appropriate exercise of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. 29.) Again, the Secretary 
contends that the determination of whether the 
means adopted to attain its legislative goals are 
rationally related is reserved for Congress alone. 
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Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48, 54 
S. Ct. 287, 291 (1934). 
 Although the Necessary and Proper Clause vests 
Congress with broad authority to exercise means, 
which are not themselves an enumerated power, 
to implement legislation, it is not without limitation. 
As the Secretary concedes, the means adopted 
must not only be rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally-enumerated 
power, but it must not violate an independent 
constitutional prohibition. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1956-57. Whether the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision, which requires an individual to purchase 
health insurance or pay a penalty, is borne of a 
constitutionally-enumerated power, is the core issue 
in this case. As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley 
v. Valeo, “Congress has plenary authority in all areas 
in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, 
. . . so long as the exercise of that authority does not 
offend some other constitutional restriction.” 424 U.S. 
1, 132, 96 S. Ct. 612, 688 (1976) (internal citation 
omitted). The Commonwealth argues that the 
Provision offends a fundamental restriction on 
Commerce Clause powers. 
 In their opposition, the Commonwealth focuses 
on what it perceives to be the central element of 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction – economic activity. 
The Commonwealth distinguishes what was deemed 
to be “economic activity” in Wickard and Gonzales, 
namely a voluntary decision to grow wheat or 
cultivate marijuana, from the involuntary act of 
App. 22 
 
purchasing health insurance as required by the 
Provision. In Wickard and Gonzales, individuals 
made a conscious decision to grow wheat or cultivate 
marijuana, and consequently, voluntarily placed 
themselves within the stream of interstate commerce. 
Conversely, the Commonwealth maintains that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision compels an 
unwilling person to perform an involuntary act and, 
as a result, submit to Commerce Clause regulation. 
 Drawing on the logic articulated in United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 
1740 (2000), which limited the boundaries of 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction to activities truly 
economic in nature and that actually affect interstate 
commerce, the Commonwealth contends that a 
decision not to purchase a product, such as health 
insurance, is not an economic activity. In Morrison, 
the Court noted that “[e]ven [our] modern-era 
precedents which have expanded congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power 
is subject to outer limits.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608, 
120 S. Ct. at 1748-49. The Court in Morrison also 
pointed out that “the existence of congressional 
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the 
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.” Id 
at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. Finally, in Morrison, the 
Court rejected “the argument that Congress may 
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based 
solely on the conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate 
App. 23 
 
commerce.” Id. at 617, 120 S. Ct. at 1754. The 
Commonwealth urges a similar analysis in this case. 
 The Commonwealth does not appear to challenge 
the aggregate effect of the many moving parts of the 
ACA on interstate commerce. Its lens is narrowly 
focused on the enforcement mechanism to which it is 
hinged, the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision. 
 The Commonwealth argues that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause cannot be employed as a vehicle to 
enforce an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce 
Clause power, no matter how well intended. Although 
the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress 
broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of its 
constitutionally-enumerated powers, its authority is 
not unbridled. As Chief Justice John Marshall 
observed in McCulloch, “[l]et the end be legitimate, 
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) at 421. 
 More recently, in restating the limitations on the 
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
Supreme Court defined the relevant inquiry, “we look 
to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.” Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. at 1956. If a person’s decision not to purchase 
health insurance at a particular point in time does 
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not constitute the type of economic activity subject to 
regulation under the Commerce Clause, then logically 
an attempt to enforce such provision under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to 
the Constitution. 
 The Secretary, in rebuttal, faults the 
Commonwealth’s reasoning as overly simplistic. She 
argues that the Commonwealth’s theory is dependent 
on which method a person chooses to finance their 
inevitable health care expenditures. If the costs are 
underwritten by an insurance carrier, it is activity; if 
the general public pays by default, it is passivity. She 
maintains that under the Commonwealth’s reasoning, 
the former is subject to Commerce Clause powers, 
while the latter is not. The Secretary also points out 
that under the Commonwealth’s approach, “it [is] 
unclear whether an individual became ‘passive,’ and 
therefore supposedly beyond the reach of the 
commerce power, if he dropped his policy yesterday, a 
week ago, or a year ago.” (Def.’s Mem. Opp. 18.) She 
characterizes the Commonwealth’s logic as untenable. 
 The Secretary also rejects the notion that the 
imposition of a monetary penalty for failing to 
perform an act is outside the spirit of the 
Constitution. She offers two examples to highlight the 
point. In the context of Superfund regulation, a 
property owner cannot avoid liability for allowing 
contamination on his property by claiming that he 
was only “passive.” Mere ownership of contaminated 
property under the Superfund Act triggers an 
obligation to undertake remedial measures. Nurad, 
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Inc. v. Wm. E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 
(4th Cir. 1992). Moreover, a property owner cannot 
defeat an action to take a parcel of his land under the 
power of eminent domain, simply by passively taking 
no action. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S. Ct. 
98, 103 (1954). 
 In addition, the Secretary points out that 
sanctions have historically been imposed for failure to 
timely file tax returns or truthfully report or pay 
taxes due, as well as failure to register for the 
selective service or report for military duty. The 
Commonwealth, however, counters that most of the 
examples presented are directly related to a specific 
constitutional provision – empowering Congress to 
assess taxes and to provide and maintain an Army 
and Navy, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, or requiring 
compensation for exercising the power of eminent 
domain. U.S. Const. amend. V. In the case of the 
landowner sanctioned for contamination of his 
property, liability largely stemmed from an active 
transaction of purchase. In contrast, no specifically 
articulated constitutional authority exists to mandate 
the purchase of health insurance. 
 
V. 
 Despite the laudable intentions of Congress in 
enacting a comprehensive and transformative health 
care regime, the legislative process must still operate 
within constitutional bounds. Salutatory goals and 
creative drafting have never been sufficient to offset 
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an absence of enumerated powers. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Morrison, “[e]ven [our] modern-era of 
precedents which have expanded congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power 
is subject to outer limits.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
608, 120 S. Ct. at 1748-49 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
556-57, 115 S. Ct. at 1628). Congressional findings, no 
matter how extensive, are insufficient to enlarge the 
Commerce Clause powers of Congress. Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 In Wickard and Gonzales, the Supreme Court 
staked out the outer boundaries of Commerce Clause 
power. In both cases, the activity under review was 
the product of a self-directed affirmative move to 
cultivate and consume wheat or marijuana. This 
self-initialed change of position voluntarily placed the 
subject within the stream of commerce. Absent that 
step, governmental regulation could have been 
avoided. 
 In Morrison and Lopez, however, the Supreme 
Court tightened the reins and insisted that the 
perimeters of legislation enacted under Commerce 
Clause powers square with the historically-accepted 
contours of Article I authority delineated by the 
Supreme Court in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971). Pertinent to the immediate 
case, the Court in Perez stated that Congress has the 
power to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. Id. at 150, 91 S. Ct. at 1359. In 
Perez, the Court upheld a federal prohibition on 
extortionate credit transactions, even though the 
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specific transaction in question had not occurred in 
interstate commerce. 
 The Court in Lopez and Morrison constrained the 
boundaries of Commerce Clause jurisdiction to 
activities truly economic in nature and that had a 
demonstrable effect on interstate commerce. In Lopez, 
the Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 
which made it a federal offense for any individual 
knowingly to possess a firearm in a school zone, 
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 
First, the Court held that the statute by its terms had 
nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic 
enterprise. Second, it concluded that the act could not 
be sustained “under our cases upholding regulations 
of activities that arise out of or are connected with 
a commercial transaction, which viewed in the 
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.” 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. 
 Later in Morrison, the Court concluded that 
the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with 
the authority to impose civil remedies under the 
Violence Against Women Act. Despite extensive 
factual findings regarding the serious impact that 
gender-motivated violence has on victims and their 
families, the Court concluded that it was insufficient 
by itself to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce 
Clause legislation. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 
S. Ct. at 1752. The Court in Morrison ultimately 
rejected the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on 
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that conduct’s aggregated effect on interstate 
commerce. Id. at 617, 120 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 In surveying the legal landscape, several 
operative elements are commonly encountered in 
Commerce Clause decisions. First, to survive a 
constitutional challenge the subject matter must be 
economic in nature and affect interstate commerce, 
and second, it must involve activity. Every application 
of Commerce Clause power found to be 
constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved 
some form of action, transaction, or deed placed in 
motion by an individual or legal entity. The 
constitutional viability of the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision in this case turns on whether 
or not a person’s decision to refuse to purchase 
health care insurance is such an activity. 
 In her argument, the Secretary urges an 
expansive interpretation of the concept of activity. 
She posits that every individual in the United States 
will require health care at some point in their 
lifetime, if not today, perhaps next week or even next 
year. Her theory further postulates that because near 
universal participation is critical to the underwriting 
process, the collective effect of refusal to purchase 
health insurance affects the national market. 
Therefore, she argues, requiring advance purchase of 
insurance based upon a future contingency is an 
activity that will inevitably affect interstate 
commerce. Of course, the same reasoning could apply 
to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions. 
This broad definition of the economic activity subject 
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to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation 
and is unsupported by Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. 
 The power of Congress to regulate a class of 
activities that in the aggregate has a substantial and 
direct effect on interstate commerce is well settled. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 S. Ct. at 2209. This 
even extends to noneconomic activity closely 
connected to the intended market. Hoffman v. Hunt, 
126 F.3d 575, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1997). But these 
regulatory powers are triggered by some type of 
self-initiated action. Neither the Supreme Court nor 
any federal circuit court of appeals has extended 
Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to 
involuntarily enter the stream of commerce by 
purchasing a commodity in the private market.7 In 
doing so, enactment of the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision exceeds the Commerce Clause 
powers vested in Congress under Article I. 
 Because an individual’s personal decision to 
purchase – or decline to purchase – health insurance 
from a private provider is beyond the historical reach 
of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause does not provide a safe sanctuary. This clause 
grants Congress broad authority to pass laws in 
furtherance of its constitutionally-enumerated 
powers. This authority may only be constitutionally 
 
 7 The collective effect of an aggregate of such inactivity still 
falls short of the constitutional mark. 
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deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of 
an enumerated power. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1956-57. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in 
McCulloch, it must be within “the letter and spirit of 
the constitution.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. The 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is neither 
within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the Necessary and Proper Clause may not 
be employed to implement this affirmative duty to 
engage in private commerce. 
 
VI. 
 On an alternative front, the Secretary contends 
that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is a 
valid exercise of Congress’s independent taxation 
power under the General Welfare Clause in Article 1.8 
Despite pre-enactment representations to the 
contrary by the Executive and Legislative branches, 
the Secretary now argues that the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision is, in essence, a “tax 
penalty.” The Secretary notes that the Provision is 
codified in the Internal Revenue Code and the 
penalty, if applicable, is reported and paid as a part 
of an individual’s annual tax return. 
 Because the Provision is purportedly a product of 
congressional power of taxation, judicial review is 
 
 8 “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the . . . general Welfare.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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generally narrow and limited. United States v. 
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84, 103 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 
(1983). Relying on United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 
446 (4th Cir. 1992), the Secretary asserts that the 
power of Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, and 
excises under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, requires only that it be a revenue 
raising measure and that the associated regulatory 
provisions bear a “reasonable relation” to the 
statute’s taxing power. Id. at 448; see also Sonzinsky 
v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513, 57 S. Ct. 554, 
555-56 (1937) (involving whether a levy on the sale of 
firearms described as a tax and passed by Congress’s 
taxing power was in fact a tax). According to the 
Secretary, the power of Congress to tax for the 
general welfare is checked only by the electorate. 
“Unless there are provisions, extraneous to any tax 
need, courts are without authority to limit the 
exercise of the taxing power.” United States v. 
Kahrigher, 345 U.S. 22, 31, 73 S. Ct. 510, 515 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds, Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968). 
 The Secretary also reiterates that Congress may 
use its power under the tax clause even for purposes 
that would exceed its power under other provisions of 
Article I. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 
71 S. Ct. 108, 110 (1950). As an example, the 
Secretary highlights the assessment of estate taxes. 
Congress has the authority to impose inheritance 
taxes but lacks power under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate the administration of estates. 
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 The Secretary takes issue with the 
Commonwealth’s contention that the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision is a penalty, rather 
than a tax, and that there is a legal distinction 
between the two. “In passing on the constitutionality 
of a tax law [the court is] ‘concerned only with its 
practical operation, not its definition or the precise 
form of descriptive words which may be applied to 
it.’ ” Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 
363, 61 S. Ct. 586, 588 (1941) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 Initially she points out that the Provision has all 
the historic attributes of a tax. First and foremost, 
the Provision generates revenue forecast to be 
approximately $4 billion annually to be paid into the 
general treasury. She argues that this falls squarely 
within the classic definition of a tax, namely, “a . . . 
burden, laid upon individuals or property for the 
purpose of supporting the Government.” United 
States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 
518 U.S. 213, 224, 116 S. Ct. 2016, 2113 (1996) 
(quoting New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492, 
27 S. Ct. 137, 140 (1906)).9 The income threshold for 
the penalty to apply under the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision is based on the statutory level 
requiring individuals to file income tax returns and is 
calculated by reference to the individual’s household 
 
 9 A penalty, on the other hand, imports the notion of a 
punishment for an unlawful act or omission. Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 224, 116 S. Ct. at 2113. 
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income for the given year. If the penalty applies, the 
taxpayer reports it on his return for that year. The 
penalty becomes an additional income tax liability. 26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(2). The Secretary therefore 
maintains that Congress treated the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision as an exercise of its 
taxing power in addition to its commerce power. 
 The Secretary also dismisses the 
Commonwealth’s contention that the Provision is a 
penalty as opposed to a tax. She concedes that the 
Provision has a regulatory purpose, but adds that 
“[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory” to the 
extent “it interposes an economic impediment to the 
activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.” 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513, 57 S. Ct. at 555. She also 
emphasizes that courts have abandoned the 
antiquated distinction between revenue raising taxes 
and regulatory penalties. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 
416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12, 94 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 (1974). 
Although Section 1501 variously employs the terms 
“tax” and “penalties,” “the labels used do not 
determine the extent of the taxing power.” Simmons 
v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 n.21 (4th Cir. 
1962). 
 Furthermore, despite the Commonwealth’s 
insistence to the contrary, the Secretary argues that 
courts have upheld the exercise of congressional 
taxing power even when its regulatory intent or 
purpose extends beyond its Commerce Clause 
authority. “From the beginning of our government 
the courts have sustained taxes although imposed 
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with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends 
which, considered apart, were beyond the 
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by 
legislation directly addressed to their 
accomplishment.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45, 71 S. Ct. 
at 110. The Commonwealth’s analysis is further 
flawed, in her view, because their foundational 
bedrock of supporting authority consists of long 
discarded criminal as opposed to regulatory cases. 
The Minimum Essential Coverage Provision does not 
impose a criminal punishment. 
 Therefore, the Secretary maintains that because 
the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision in fact 
generates revenue and its regulatory features are 
rationally related to the goal of requiring every 
individual to pay for the medical services they 
receive, which is within the ambit of Commerce 
Clause powers, the Provision must be upheld. 
 The Commonwealth urges the Court to reject the 
Secretary’s simplistic analysis that casts aside a 
wealth of historical tax clause jurisprudence. The 
Commonwealth does not dispute that the principles it 
relies upon as controlling have been rarely deployed 
in recent years, but the scope of congressional power 
under review is without modern counterpart. The 
Commonwealth also disagrees that the penalty 
provision in question meets the classic characteristics 
of a tax – or was intended by Congress to be a tax. 
The text of Section 1501 unequivocally states that it 
is a product of the Commerce Clause, not the General 
Welfare Clause. Moreover, any revenue generated is 
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merely incidental to a violation of a regulatory 
provision. 
 Irrespective of labels, the Commonwealth 
contends that the federal government is seeking to 
smuggle an unconstitutional exercise of the 
Commerce Clause past judicial review in the guise of 
a tax. In the Commonwealth’s view, this legislative 
tactic offends the letter and spirit of the Constitution. 
“[T]he law is that Congress can tax under its taxing 
power that which it can’t regulate, but it can’t 
regulate through taxation that which it cannot 
otherwise regulate.” (Tr. 81:18-21, July 1, 2010 (citing 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax 
Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 449, 450 (1922))); see 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68, 56 S. Ct. 312, 
320 (1936); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17, 45 
S. Ct. 446, 448-49 (1925). “[A] ‘purported tax’ that is 
actually a penalty to force compliance with a 
regulatory scheme must be tied to an enumerated 
power other than the taxing power.” (Pl.’s Reply Mem. 
11, ECF No. 117.) 
 The Attorney General of Virginia specifically 
asks the Court to closely examine the viability 
of the Secretary’s core premise that the terms 
“tax” and “penalty” are legally synonymous and 
interchangeable. The Commonwealth maintains that 
the mainstay of the Secretary’s taxation argument 
founders on the shoals of this faulty assumption. 
This notion of interchangeable is apparently derived 
from a footnote in Bob Jones University 
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It is true that the Court [in earlier cases] 
drew what it saw at the time as distinctions 
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes. 
But the Court has subsequently abandoned 
such distinctions. Even if such distinctions 
have merit, it would not assist petitioner [in 
this case], since its challenge is aimed at the 
imposition of federal income, FICA, and 
FUTA taxes which are clearly intended to 
raise revenue. 
Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 741 n.12, 94 S. Ct. at 
2048 n.12 (internal citations omitted).  
 The Secretary argues that this cursory footnote 
disarms the precedential impact of an entire body 
of constitutional law governing regulatory penalties. 
In the Commonwealth’s view, the Secretary has 
misconstrued the import and precedential effect of 
this footnote, which should be accorded no more 
dignity than dicta. To support this contention, the 
Commonwealth directs the Court’s attention to a 
contrary position articulated by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. La Franca. “The two words [tax 
versus penalty] are not interchangeable . . . and if an 
exaction [is] clearly a penalty it cannot be converted 
into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.” 
United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572, 51 
S. Ct. 278, 280 (1931); see also Reorganized CF&I 
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Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 224, 116 S. Ct. 
at 2112.10 
 The Attorney General of Virginia maintains that 
the distinction between a tax and a penalty may be 
subtle, but is nonetheless significant. He adds that 
the power of Congress to exact a penalty is more 
constrained than its taxing authority under the 
General Welfare Clause because it must be in aid of 
an enumerated power. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. 
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393, 60 S. Ct. 907, 912 
(1940); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61, 56 
S. Ct. 312, 317 (1936). 
 Despite the Secretary’s characterization of such 
cases as superannuated, the Commonwealth hastens 
to reply that they have never been overruled by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In fact, the Commonwealth 
points out that the holding in the Child Labor Tax 
Case was restated with approval by the Supreme 
Court in 1994 in Department of Revenue of Montana 
v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). 
“Yet we have also recognized that ‘there comes a time 
in the extension of the penalizing features of the 
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and 
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of 
regulation and punishment.’ ” Id. at 779, 114 S. Ct. at 
 
 10 In rejoinder, the Secretary notes that the term “penalty” 
defined and discussed in Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, 
Inc. referred to a payment as a penalty for an unlawful act, not a 
noncompliance sanction, as here. 
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1946 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38). 
The Commonwealth argues that this is such a case. 
 The Commonwealth also discounts the 
significance of Congress’s use of the term “tax” in the 
ACA and the placement of the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision in the Internal Revenue Code. 
“No inference, implication, or presumption of 
legislative construction shall be drawn or made by 
reason of the location or grouping of any particular 
section or provision of this title. . . .” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7806(b). 
 The Commonwealth emphasizes that the best 
evidence of congressional intent is the language 
chosen by that legislative body. In the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision (26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(b)(1)) Congress specifically denominated this 
payment for failure to comply with the mandate as a 
“penalty.” “Because the PPACA penalty is an exaction 
for an omission – one that if it operated perfectly 
would produce no revenue – it is a penalty as a 
matter of law. . . .” (Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. 
28, ECF No. 95.) 
 During oral argument on the Secretary’s Motion 
to Dismiss, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of 
the United States informed the Court that because 
the Provision in fact generated revenue, and its 
regulatory features were rationally related to the goal 
of requiring every individual to pay for the medical 
services they receive, “that’s the end of the ballgame.” 
(Tr. 44:11, July 1, 2010.) The Commonwealth 
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maintains that the question of whether a provision is 
a penalty or tax is a question of law for the Court to 
resolve, relying on Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of 
Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 224-26, 116 S. Ct. 2113-14 and 
La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572, 51 S. Ct. at 280. 
 Because the noncompliance penalty provision in 
Section 1501 lacks a bona fide intention to raise 
revenue for the general welfare, the Commonwealth 
argues that it does not meet the historical criteria 
for a tax. Furthermore, the resulting regulatory 
tax, untethered to an enumerated power, is an 
unconstitutional encroachment on the state’s power of 
regulation under the Tenth Amendment. See Butler, 
297 U.S. at 68, 56 S. Ct. at 320; Child Labor Tax 
Case, 259 U.S. at 37-38, 42 S. Ct. at 451. While the 
Provision may have the incidental effect of raising 
revenue, the Commonwealth maintains that its clear 
intended purpose is to exercise prohibited police 
power to compel individuals to enter into private 
commercial transactions. 
 
VII. 
 The Minimum Essential Coverage Provision 
reads in pertinent part: “[i]f a taxpayer who is an 
applicable individual . . . fails to meet the 
requirement of subsection (a) [mandatory insurance 
coverage] . . . there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer 
a penalty. . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). Although 
purportedly grounded in the General Welfare Clause, 
the notion that the generation of revenue was a 
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significant legislative objective is a transparent 
afterthought. The legislative purpose underlying this 
provision was purely regulation of what Congress 
misperceived to be economic activity. The only 
revenue generated under the Provision is incidental 
to a citizen’s failure to obey the law by requiring the 
minimum level of insurance coverage. The resulting 
revenue is “extraneous to any tax need.” See Kahriger, 
345 U.S. at 31, 73 S. Ct. at 515.11 The use of the term 
“tax” appears to be a tactic to achieve enlarged 
regulatory license. 
 Compelling evidence of the intent of Congress 
can be found in the Act itself. In the preface to 
Section 1501, Congress specifically recites the 
constitutional basis for its actions and includes 
requisite findings of fact. “The individual . . . 
[mandate] is commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce. . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 18091(a)(1). The Secretary is correct that 
“[i]t is beyond serious question that a tax does not 
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, 
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities 
taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue 
obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue 
purpose of the tax may be secondary.” Sanchez, 340 
 
 11 In Florida ex rel. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1137-38, 
Judge Vinson perceptively notes that the Provision fails to 
mention any revenue generating purposes, characteristic of most 
tax clause enactments. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995). 
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U.S. at 44, 71 S. Ct. at 110 (internal citations 
omitted). The sources cited by the Secretary to 
support this proposition, however, are readily 
distinguishable from the immediate case. Unlike the 
mandate at hand, in Sanchez and Sonzinsky, the 
enactment in question purported on its face to be an 
exercise of the taxing power. 
 In concluding that Congress did not intend to 
exercise its powers of taxation under the General 
Welfare Clause, this Court’s analysis begins with the 
unequivocal denials by the Executive and Legislative 
branches that the ACA was a tax. In drafting this 
provision, Congress specifically referred to the 
exaction as a penalty. “[T]here is hereby imposed on 
the taxpayer a penalty . . . ” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). 
Earlier versions of the bill in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate used the more 
politically toxic term “tax” when referring to the 
assessment for noncompliance with the insurance 
mandate. See America’s Affordable Health Choices 
Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (2009); Affordable 
Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. 
(2009); and America’s Healthy Future Act, S. 1796, 
111th Cong. (2009). Each of these earlier versions 
specifically employed the word “tax” as opposed to 
“penalty” as the sanction for noncompliance. 
 In the final version of the ACA enacted by the 
Senate on December 24, 2009, the term “penalty” was 
substituted for “tax” in Section 1501(b)(1). A logical 
inference can be drawn that the substitution of this 
critical language was a conscious and deliberate act 
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on the part of Congress. See Russello v. United States, 
464 U.S. 16, 23-24, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300-301 (1983); 
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc). This shift in terminology during 
the final hours preceding an extremely close floor 
vote undermines the contention that the terms 
“penalty” and “tax” are synonymous.12 
 It is also significant to note that unlike the 
term “penalty” used in Section 1501(b)(1), other 
sections of the ACA specifically employ the word 
“tax.” Section 9009 imposes a tax on the sale of any 
taxable medical device by the manufacturer, 
producer, or importer. Section 9001 imposes a tax on 
high-cost, employer-sponsored health care coverage. 
Section 9015 imposes a tax on certain high-income 
taxpayers. Finally, Section 10907 imposes a tax on 
any indoor tanning service. The legislature’s apparent 
careful choice of words supports the conclusion that 
the term “tax” was not used indiscriminately. As the 
Supreme Court observed in Duncan v. Walker, “it is 
well settled that ‘[w]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ 
533 U.S. 167, 173, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2001) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 
 12 The Secretary’s use of the newly-coined expression “tax 
penalty” adds little to the debate. 
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 This Court is also not persuaded that the 
placement of the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision in the Internal Revenue Code under 
“miscellaneous excise taxes” has the significance 
claimed by the Secretary. The Internal Revenue Code 
itself clearly states that such placement does not give 
rise to any inference or presumption that the exaction 
was intended to be a tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b). 
Given the anomalous nature of this Provision, it is 
equally plausible that Congress simply docked the 
Provision in a convenient harbor. 
 This Court is therefore unpersuaded that Section 
1501(b)(1) is a bona fide revenue raising measure 
enacted under the taxing power of Congress. As the 
Supreme Court pointed out in La Franca, “[t]he two 
words [tax vs. penalty] are not interchangeable . . . 
and if an exaction [is] clearly a penalty, it cannot be 
converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling 
it such.” La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572, 515 S. Ct. at 
280. The penalizing feature of this so-called tax has 
clearly “los[t] its character as such” and has become 
“a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation 
and punishment.” Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 799, 114 
S. Ct. at 1946 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 
at 28, 42 S. Ct. at 451). No plausible argument can be 
made that it has “the purpose of supporting the 
Government.” Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, 
Inc., 518 U.S. at 224, 116 S. Ct. at 2113 (quoting New 
Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492, 27 S. Ct. 137, 
140 (1906)). 
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 Having concluded that Section 1501(b)(1) is, in 
form and substance, a penalty as opposed to a tax,13 it 
must be linked to an enumerated power other than 
the General Welfare Clause. See Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal Co., 310 U.S. at 393, 60 S. Ct. at 912; Butler, 297 
U.S. at 61, 56 S. Ct. at 317; Child Labor Tax Case, 
259 U.S. at 38, 42 S. Ct. at 451. Notwithstanding 
criticism by the pen of some constitutional scholars, 
the constraining principles articulated in this line of 
cases, while perhaps dormant, remains viable and 
applicable to the immediate dispute. Although they 
have not been frequently employed in recent years, 
this absence appears to be more a product of the 
unprecedented nature of the legislation under review 
than an abandonment of established principles. 
 It is clear from the text of Section 1501 that the 
underlying regulatory scheme was conceived as an 
exercise of Commerce Clause powers. This is 
supported by specific factual findings purporting to 
demonstrate the effect of the health care scheme 
on interstate commerce. In order for the 
noncompliance penalty component to survive 
constitutional challenge, it must serve to effectuate 
a valid exercise of an enumerated power – here 
 
 13 If allowed to stand as a tax, the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision would be the only tax in U.S. history to be 
levied directly on individuals for their failure to affirmatively 
engage in activity mandated by the government not specifically 
delineated in the Constitution. 
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the Commerce Clause. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., 
310 U.S. at 393, 60 S. Ct. at 912. 
 Earlier in this opinion, the Court concluded that 
Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause, 
or associated Necessary and Proper Clause, to compel 
an individual to involuntarily engage in a private 
commercial transaction, as contemplated by the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision. The absence 
of a constitutionally viable exercise of this 
enumerated power is fatal to the accompanying 
sanction for noncompliance. The Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General of the United States intimated as 
much during oral argument on the Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss, “if it is unconstitutional, then the 
penalty would fail as well.” (Tr. 21:10-11, July 1, 
2010.) 
 A thorough survey of pertinent constitutional 
case law has yielded no reported decisions from any 
federal appellate courts extending the Commerce 
Clause or General Welfare Clause to encompass 
regulation of a person’s decision not to purchase a 
product, notwithstanding its effect on interstate 
commerce or role in a global regulatory scheme. The 
unchecked expansion of congressional power to the 
limits suggested by the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision would invite unbridled exercise of federal 
police powers. At its core, this dispute is not simply 
about regulating the business of insurance – or 
crafting a scheme of universal health insurance 
coverage – it’s about an individual’s right to choose 
to participate. 
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 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution confers 
upon Congress only discrete enumerated 
governmental powers. The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people. See U.S. Const. amend. 
X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919, 117 
S. Ct. 2365, 2376-77 (1997). 
 On careful review, this Court must conclude that 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act – specifically the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision – exceeds the constitutional 
boundaries of congressional power. 
 
VIII. 
 Having found a portion of the Act to be invalid, 
the Section 1501 requirement to maintain minimum 
essential health care coverage, the Court’s next 
task is to determine whether this Section is 
severable from the balance of the enactment. 
Predictably, the Secretary counsels severability, 
and the Commonwealth urges wholesale invalidation. 
The Commonwealth’s position flows in part from 
the Secretary’s frequent contention that Section 
1501 is the linchpin of the entire health care 
regimen underlying the ACA. However, the bill 
embraces far more than health care reform. It is 
laden with provisions and riders patently extraneous 
to health care – over 400 in all. 
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 The most recent guidance on the permissible 
scope of severance is found in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 
3138 (2010). “Generally speaking, when confronting a 
constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the 
solution to the problem, severing any ‘problematic 
portions while leaving the remainder intact.’ ” Id. at 
3161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967 
(2006)). Because “[t]he unconstitutionality of a part 
of an act does not necessarily defeat or affect the 
validity of its remaining provisions,” Champlin 
Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 
234, 52 S. Ct. 559, 565 (1932), “the ‘normal rule’ is 
‘that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the 
required course.’ ” Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 
3161 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 
U.S. 491, 504, 105 S. Ct. 2794, 2802 (1985)). 
 The teachings of Free Enterprise are a direct 
descendent of the rule restated in Alaska Airlines, 
Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). 
“The standard for determining the severability of 
an unconstitutional provision is well established: 
‘[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not 
have enacted those provisions which are within its 
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid 
part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative 
as a law.’ ” Id. at 684, 107 S. Ct. at 1480 (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108, 96 S. Ct. 612, 677 
(1976)). 
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 In applying this standard, the Court must also 
consider whether the balance of the statute will 
function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress in the wake of severance of the 
unconstitutional provision. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. 
at 685, 107 S. Ct. at 1480. Finally, in evaluating 
severability, the Court must determine whether in 
the absence of the severed unconstitutional provision, 
Congress would have enacted the statute. Id. at 685, 
107 S. Ct. at 1480. Given the vagaries of the 
legislative process, “this inquiry can sometimes be 
‘elusive.’ ”  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 
(quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932, 103 
S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (1983)). 
 The final element of the analysis is difficult to 
apply in this case given the haste with which the 
final version of the 2,700 page bill was rushed to the 
floor for a Christmas Eve vote. It would be virtually 
impossible within the present record to determine 
whether Congress would have passed this bill, 
encompassing a wide variety of topics related and 
unrelated to heath care, without Section 1501. Even 
then, the Court’s conclusions would be speculative at 
best. Moreover, without the benefit of extensive 
expert testimony and significant supplementation of 
the record, this Court cannot determine what, if any, 
portion of the bill would not be able to survive 
independently. 
 Therefore, this Court will hew closely to the 
time-honored rule to sever with circumspection, 
severing any “problematic portions while leaving the 
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remainder intact.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329, 126 S. Ct. 
at 967. Accordingly, the Court will sever only Section 
1501 and directly-dependent provisions which make 
specific reference to Section 1501.14 
 
IX. 
 The final issue for resolution is the 
Commonwealth’s request for injunctive relief 
enjoining implementation of Section 1501 – at least 
until a higher court acts. In reviewing this request, 
the Commonwealth urges this Court to employ the 
traditional requirements for injunctive relief 
articulated in Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 
130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010). This case, however, 
turns on atypical and uncharted applications of 
constitutional law interwoven with subtle political 
undercurrents. The outcome of this case has 
significant public policy implications. And the final 
word will undoubtedly reside with a higher court. 
 Aside from scant guiding precedent on the 
central issues, there are no compelling exigencies in 
this case. The key provisions of Section 1501 – the 
only aspect of the ACA squarely before this Court – do 
not take effect until 2013 at the earliest. Therefore, 
 
 14 A court’s ability to rewrite legislation is severely 
constrained and best left to the legislature. “[S]uch editorial 
freedom . . . belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary. 
Congress of course remains free to pursue any of these options 
[to amend legislation] going forward.” Free Enter. Fund, 130 
S. Ct. at 3162. 
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the likelihood of any irreparable harm pending 
certain appellate review is somewhat minimal. 
Although the timely implementation of Section 1501 
might require each side to take some initial 
preparatory steps in the ensuing months, none are 
irreversible. 
 Historically, federal district courts have been 
reluctant to invoke the extraordinary remedy of 
injunctive relief against federal officers where a 
declaratory judgment is adequate. “[W]e have long 
presumed that officials of the Executive Branch will 
adhere to the law as declared by the court. As a 
result, the declaratory judgment is the functional 
equivalent of an injunction.” Comm. on the Judiciary 
of the United States House of Representatives v. Miers, 
542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Smith 
v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Regan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The Commonwealth appears to 
concede that if the Secretary is duty-bound to honor 
this Court’s declaratory judgment, there is no need 
for injunctive relief. (Pl.’s Reply Mem. 19.) In this 
Court’s view, the award of declaratory judgment is 
sufficient to stay the hand of the Executive branch 
pending appellate review. 
 
X. 
 In the final analysis, the Court will grant 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and deny 
Defendant’s similar motion. The Court will sever 
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Section 1501 from the balance of the ACA and deny 
Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief. 
 An appropriate Order will accompany this 
Memorandum Opinion. 
 /s/ Henry Hudson
  Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge 
Date: Dec. 13, 2010  
Richmond, VA  
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Richmond Division 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA EX REL. 
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, 
II, in his official capacity as 
Attorney General of Virginia, 
  Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
in her official capacity, 
  Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action No. 
3:10CV188-HEH 
 
ORDER 
(Granting Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment) 
(Filed Dec. 13, 2010) 
 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Motions 
for Summary Judgment filed by both parties (Dk. 
Nos. 88, 90) on September 3, 2010, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons 
stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, 
Plaintiff ’s Motion is GRANTED as to its request for 
declaratory relief and DENIED as to its request for 
injunctive relief, and Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. 
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 The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order 
and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion to all 
counsel of record. 
 It is SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ Henry Hudson
  Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge 
Date: Dec. 13, 2010  
Richmond, VA  
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Richmond Division 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA EX REL. 
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, 
II, in his official capacity as 
Attorney General of Virginia, 
  Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
in her official capacity, 
  Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action No. 
3:10CV188-HEH 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
(Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss) 
(Filed Aug. 2, 2010) 
 This is a narrowly-tailored facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of Section 1501 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). This provision, in 
essence, requires individuals to either obtain a 
minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay  
a penalty for failing to do so. According to the 
Complaint, which seeks declaratory and injunctive 
relief, the enactment of Section 1501 not only exceeds 
the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause 
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and General Welfare Clause of the United States 
Constitution, but is also directly at tension with 
Virginia Code Section 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010), commonly 
referred to as the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act. 
 The case is presently before the Court on 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, filed pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). 
Both sides have filed extensive and thoroughly 
researched memoranda supporting their respective 
positions. The Court heard oral argument on July 
1, 2010. Although this case is laden with public 
policy implications and has a distinctive political 
undercurrent, at this stage the sole issues before the 
Court are subject matter jurisdiction and the legal 
sufficiency of the Complaint. 
 
I. 
 In the Complaint, the Commonwealth of Virginia 
(the “Commonwealth”) assails Section 1501 (or 
“Minimum Essential Coverage Provision”) on a 
number of fronts. First, the Commonwealth contends 
that requiring an otherwise unwilling individual to 
purchase a good or service from a private vendor is 
beyond the outer limits of the Commerce Clause. In 
the Commonwealth’s view, the failure – or refusal – of 
its citizens to elect to purchase health insurance is 
not “economic activity” and therefore not subject to 
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
Succinctly put, the Commonwealth defies the 
Secretary to point to any Commerce Clause 
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jurisprudence extending its tentacles to an 
individual’s decision not to engage in economic 
activity. Furthermore, they argue that since Section 
1501 exceeds this enumerated power, Congress 
cannot invoke either the Necessary and Proper 
Clause or its taxation powers to regulate such passive 
economic inactivity. 
 Alternatively, the Commonwealth maintains that 
Section 1501 is in direct conflict with the Virginia 
Health Care Freedom Act. The Commonwealth 
argues that the enactment of Section 1501 therefore 
encroaches on the sovereignty of the Commonwealth 
and offends the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
 The Defendant in this case is Kathleen Sebelius, 
in her official capacity as Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (the 
“Secretary”). The Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss, filed 
under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), has 
several distinct strands. The Secretary argues 
initially that the Attorney General of Virginia, in his 
official capacity, lacks standing to challenge Section 
1501, thereby depriving this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Because the mandatory insurance 
provision is not effective until 2014, the Secretary 
also maintains that the issues are not ripe for 
immediate resolution. 
 With respect to the merits, the Secretary 
contends that the Complaint lacks legal vitality and 
therefore fails to state a cause of action. She asserts 
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that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is 
amply supported by time-honored applications of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and associated 
regulatory authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. The theoretical foundation for the Secretary’s 
position is predicated on factual findings by Congress 
that Section 1501 is the central ingredient of a 
complex health care regulatory scheme. Its core 
underpinning is the notion that every individual will 
need medical services at some point. Everyone, 
voluntarily or otherwise, is therefore either a current 
or future participant in the health care market. 
 To underwrite this health care scheme and 
guarantee affordable coverage to every individual, the 
cost of providing these services must be defrayed from 
some source, particularly as to the individuals who 
are uninsured. To address the annual deficit caused 
by uncompensated medical services, which according 
to the Secretary is approximately $43 billion, 
Congress included the penalty provision in Section 
1501 to coax all individuals to purchase insurance. 
Because Section 1501, like the Act as a whole, 
regulates decisions about how to pay for services in 
the health care market and the insurance industry, 
the Secretary reasons that it necessarily affects 
interstate commerce. 
 Lastly, the Secretary contends that Section 1501 
is a valid exercise of Congress’s independent 
authority to use its taxing and spending power under 
the General Welfare Clause. Therefore, she argues 
that this action is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. 
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II. 
 Turning first to the standing issue, relying on 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 
(1923), the Secretary argues that the Attorney 
General’s prosecution of this case, on behalf of the 
citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, is barred 
by the long-standing doctrine of “parens patriae.” Id. 
at 485, 43 S. Ct. at 600. In Mellon, the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted that because citizens of an individual 
state are also citizens of the United States, “[i]t 
cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, 
may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens 
of the United States from the operation of the 
statutes thereof.” Id. The Court further stated in 
Mellon that “it is no part of [a State’s] duty or power 
to enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect of their 
relations with the federal government.” Id. at 485-86, 
43 S. Ct. at 600. Therefore, the Secretary contends 
that a state does not have standing as parens patriae 
to bring an action against the federal government. 
Id.; see Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16, 102 S. Ct. 3260, 
3270 (1982). 
 The Secretary further maintains that the 
congressional enactment at issue, Section 1501, 
imposes no obligation on the Commonwealth as a 
sovereign. The Secretary marginalizes the conflict 
between Section 1501 and the Virginia Health Care 
Freedom Act as a political policy dispute 
manufactured for the sole purpose of creating 
standing. The resulting abstract policy dispute causes 
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no imminent injury to the sovereign and is thus 
insufficient to support standing to challenge a federal 
enactment. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 484-85, 43 S. Ct. at 
600. 
 On the other hand, the Commonwealth views the 
task at hand differently. In prosecuting the immediate 
action, the Commonwealth, through its Attorney 
General, is not simply representing individual citizens, 
it is defending the constitutionality and enforceability 
of its duly enacted laws. The Commonwealth 
maintains that its standing to defend its legislative 
enactments is a fossilized principle uniformly 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, citing 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
“[T]he power to create and enforce a legal 
code, both civil and criminal” is one of the 
quintessential functions of a State. Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. 
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 102 S. Ct. 3260, 
3265-66, 73 L. Ed. 2d 995 (1982). Because 
the State alone is entitled to create a legal 
code, only the State has the kind of “direct 
stake” identified in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. [727,] 740, 92 S. Ct. [1361,] 1369 
[(1972)], in defending the standards 
embodied in that code. 
Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65, 106 S. Ct. at 1705. 
 The Commonwealth draws a clear distinction 
between this case and those relied upon by the 
Secretary. The Commonwealth argues that it is 
not prosecuting this case in a parens patriae, or 
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quasi-sovereign capacity. In the immediate case, the 
Commonwealth is exercising a core sovereign power 
because the effect of the federal enactment is to 
require Virginia to yield under the Supremacy 
Clause. Unlike Mellon, irrespective of its underlying 
legislative intent, the Virginia statute is directly in 
conflict with Section 1501 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act.1 
 A subsidiary element of the Secretary’s argument 
that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is the 
alleged absence of any imminent injury to sovereign 
interest. The Commonwealth counters that the 
conflict between federal and state law is “immediate 
and complete with respect to the legal principles at 
issue.” (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 4.) By way of 
 
  1 In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1011, et seq., in reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 
322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944). The Act expressly declared 
that the continued regulation and taxation of the business of 
insurance, and all who engage in it, should be subject to the 
laws of the several states unless Congress specifically states the 
contrary. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 292 (4th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. Lexis 12349 (Dec. 3, 2007); see 
also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430, 66 S. Ct. 
1142, 1155 (1946). The Secretary argues that the language of 
Section 1501 is sufficient to imply an intent on the part of 
Congress to in effect preempt any state regulation to the 
contrary. The Commonwealth appears to disagree. (Tr. 48-49, 
July 1, 2010.) The demarcation between state and federal 
responsibility in this area will require further development in 
future proceedings in order to adequately address the 
Commonwealth’s Tenth Amendment argument. 
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further elucidation, the Commonwealth contends that 
it has already begun taking steps to prepare for the 
implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. It asserts that “officials are 
presently having to deviate from their ordinary duties 
to begin the administrative response to the changes 
in federal law as they cascade through the Medicaid 
and insurance regulatory systems.” (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n 
Mot. Dismiss 4.) 
 The next facet of the Secretary’s challenge to the 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in this case 
invokes the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).2 
The Anti-Injunction Act provides, in pertinent part, 
that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be 
maintained in any court by any person, whether or 
not such person is the person against whom such tax 
was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). The Secretary 
argues that the restraining effect of this Act is broad 
enough to include payments which are labeled a 
 
  2 By implication, this argument would also include parallel 
provisions in the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 
“Though the Anti-Injunction Act concerns federal courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction and the tax-exclusion provision of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act concerns the issuance of a particular 
remedy, the two statutory texts are, in underlying intent and 
practical effect, coextensive.” In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 
F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996). “In light of the two provisions’ 
coextensive nature, a finding that one of the two statutes does 
not bar the debtors in the instant cases from seeking and 
obtaining free and clear orders will necessitate a finding that 
the other statute does not pose an obstacle either.” Id. at 584. 
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“penalty rather than a tax,” as the Secretary styles 
the assessment in this case for failure to purchase the 
requisite insurance coverage. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Dismiss 16.) Because the Secretary maintains that 
the immediate action constitutes an abatement of a 
tax liability or penalty, she claims the District Court 
lacks jurisdiction. The Secretary’s position is that the 
only appropriate relief vehicle for a citizen seeking to 
challenge the penalty provisions of Section 1501 
would be to pay the required penalty and sue for a 
refund. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 
736, 94 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1974). 
 The Commonwealth urges a more narrow 
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act. The 
Commonwealth contends that the word “person” used 
in the operative portion of the Anti-Injunction Act 
does not include a state. The U.S. Supreme Court, as 
well as the Fourth Circuit, has almost uniformly held 
that the word “person” appearing in a federal statute 
should not be interpreted as including a state. There 
is a “longstanding interpretive presumption that 
‘person’ does not include the sovereign.” Vt. Agency of 
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 780, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1866 (2000); see also Va. 
Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185, 
189 (4th Cir. 2005). “The presumption is, of course, 
not a hard and fast rule of exclusion, but it may be 
disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of 
statutory intent to the contrary.” Vt. Agency of 
Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 781, 120 S. Ct. at 1867 
(internal citations omitted). The Commonwealth 
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argues that the Secretary has failed to overcome the 
requisite presumption because she cannot point to any 
persuasive authority that the Anti-Injunction Act 
applies to states. Therefore, the Commonwealth 
argues that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to 
its prosecution of this case. 
 Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that 
the claims advanced in this case fall squarely within 
an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act recognized in 
South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 104 S. Ct. 
1107 (1984). In Regan, the Supreme Court observed 
that the Anti-Injunction Act was not intended to bar 
“actions brought by aggrieved parties for whom 
[Congress] has not provided an alternative remedy.” 
Id. at 378, 104 S. Ct. at 1114. Because the 
Commonwealth contends that only the sovereign has 
standing to seek judicial vindication of its own 
statutes, it claims the effect of the Anti-Injunction Act 
would be to deny the Commonwealth a remedy to 
address the effect of the federal enactment at issue. 
 Although the Commonwealth’s contention that 
the term “person” in the Anti-Injunction Act does not 
apply to states may be well-founded, this Court 
believes it is clear that the Regan exception applies in 
this case.3 As the Supreme Court held in Regan, the 
 
  3 This Court can also not ignore the fact that the 
Commonwealth’s Complaint does not challenge the penalty 
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
though the two undeniably act in tandem. Instead, the 
(Continued on following page) 
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Anti-Injunction Act “was intended to apply only when 
Congress has provided an alternative avenue for an 
aggrieved party to litigate its claims on its own 
behalf.” Id. at 381, 104 S. Ct. at 1115; see also In re 
Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d at 584. 
Additionally, the Regan Court emphasized that, “the 
indicia of congressional intent – the [Anti-Injunction] 
Act’s purposes and the circumstances of its enactment 
– demonstrate that Congress did not intend the Act to 
apply where an aggrieved party would be required to 
depend on the mere possibility of persuading a third 
party to assert his claims.” Regan, 465 U.S. at 381, 
104 S. Ct. at 1115. However, “[b]ecause of the strong 
policy animating the Anti-Injunction Act, and the 
sympathetic, almost unique, facts in Regan, courts have 
construed the Regan exception very narrowly. . . .” 
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401, 408 n.3 
(4th Cir. 2003). 
 Despite this narrow interpretation, this Court 
finds the justification for allowing an exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act in Regan applies with equal 
strength to the circumstances in this case. First, the 
Supreme Court found that “instances in which a third 
party may raise the constitutional rights of another 
are the exception rather than the rule.” Regan, 465 
U.S. at 380, 104 S. Ct. at 1115 (citing Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2874 (1976)). 
 
Complaint exclusively attacks the constitutionality of the 
mandate to purchase health care insurance. 
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Thus, in this case, without standing to defend the 
constitutionality of a state’s right to create and 
enforce its own legal code, an individual taxpayer 
would be unable to assert the constitutional rights of 
the Commonwealth. Second, “to make use of this 
remedy the State ‘must first be able to find [an 
individual] willing to subject himself to the rigors of 
litigation against the Service, and then must rely on 
[him] to present the relevant arguments on [its] 
behalf.’ ” Id. (citing Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 747 n.21, 
94 S. Ct. at 2051). Due to the magnitude, cost, and sui 
generis interest of Virginia in this case, even if 
standing was not an issue, it appears the 
Commonwealth would be hard-pressed to find a 
suitable party to argue the case on its behalf. 
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, “[b]ecause 
it is by no means certain that the State would be able 
to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims, reliance on 
the remedy suggested by the Secretary would create 
the risk that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely 
deprive the State of any opportunity to obtain review 
of its claims.” Id. at 380-81, 104 S. Ct. at 1115. 
Applying this logic to the Commonwealth, as a 
sovereign entity not required to purchase insurance 
under Section 1501, Virginia will never be assessed 
the fine imposed under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, and consequently, never afforded 
an opportunity to pay the penalty and request a 
refund. Therefore, this Court concludes that 
“[b]ecause Congress did not prescribe an alternative 
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remedy for the plaintiff in this case, the Act does not 
bar this suit.” Id. at 381, 104 S. Ct. at 1115-16. 
 Although this lawsuit has the collateral effect 
of protecting the individual interests of the citizens 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, its primary 
articulated objective is to defend the Virginia Health 
Care Freedom Act from the conflicting effect of an 
allegedly unconstitutional federal law. Despite its 
declaratory nature, it is a lawfully-enacted part of the 
laws of Virginia. The purported transparent 
legislative intent underlying its enactment is 
irrelevant. The mere existence of the lawfully-enacted 
statute is sufficient to trigger the duty of the Attorney 
General of Virginia to defend the law and the 
associated sovereign power to enact it.4 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court noted in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 
it is common ground that states have an interest as 
sovereigns in exercising “the power to create and 
enforce a legal code.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 
U.S. at 601, 102 S. Ct. at 3265. With few exceptions, 
courts have uniformly held that individuals do not 
have standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim. 
Kennedy v. Allera, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2780188, at 
*8 (4th Cir. July 15, 2010) (citing Brooklyn Legal 
 
  4 Federal courts have long recognized the duty of state 
Attorneys General to defend the laws of their states. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 5.1(a)(2) (requiring that any party challenging the 
constitutionality of a state statute serve notice on the state 
Attorney General). 
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Servs. Corp. B v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 
234-36 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 The power of the Attorney General to prosecute 
claims on behalf of the state he or she represents 
remains unsettled despite centuries of legal debate.5 
This is particularly true in cases involving suits 
against the federal government. See Alaska v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). Reviewing courts, in their standing analysis, 
have distinguished cases where the individual 
interests of citizens are purely at stake from those in 
which the interest of the state, as a separate body 
politic, is implicated. The former is distinguished 
by legal commentators from the latter as 
quasi-sovereignty as opposed to sovereignty. While 
standing jurisprudence in the area of quasi-sovereign 
or parens patriae standing defies simple formulation, 
courts have uniformly held that “where a harm is 
widely shared, a sovereign, suing in its individual 
interest, has standing to sue where that sovereign’s 
individual interests are harmed, wholly apart from 
the alleged general harm.” Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 476-77 
 
  5 Given the stake states have in protecting their sovereign 
interests, they are often accorded “special solicitude” in standing 
analysis. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520, 127 S. Ct. 
1438, 1455 (2007). 
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(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)).6 
 Closely analogous to the immediate case is 
Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236 
(10th Cir. 2008). There the State of Wyoming sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against a decision 
of the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives, which determined that 
a Wyoming statute purportedly establishing a 
procedure to expunge domestic violence misdemeanor 
convictions, in order to restore lost firearms rights, 
would not have the intended effect under federal law. 
As in the immediate case, the United States 
challenged the Article III standing of the State of 
Wyoming to seek judicial relief from the conflicting 
federal regulation. The Tenth Circuit held that 
Wyoming’s stake in the controversy was sufficiently 
adverse to warrant Article III standing. 
 Relying on the teachings of Alfred L. Snapp & 
Son, Inc., the Tenth Circuit observed that the states 
have a legally protected sovereign interest in “the 
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and 
entities within the relevant jurisdiction[, which] 
 
  6 Of course, Article III standing has other elements. A 
plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) an injury-in-fact that is both 
concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; 
(ii) an injury that is traceable to the conduct complained of; and 
(iii) an injury that is redressable by a decision of the court. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 
2130, 2136 (1992). 
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involves the power to create and enforce a legal code.” 
Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp 
& Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S. Ct. at 3265). 
“Federal regulatory action that preempts state 
law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy this 
prong. Accordingly, we conclude that Wyoming has 
sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact. . . .” Id. at 1242 
(internal citations omitted). 
 This Court finds the Tenth Circuit’s standing 
analysis in Wyoming to be sound and adopts its 
principled and logical reasoning in this case. The 
Commonwealth, through its Attorney General, 
satisfies Article III’s standing requirements under 
the facts of this case. 
 
III. 
 Resolution of the standing issue resolves only a 
single strand of the case or controversy requirements 
of Article III subject matter jurisdiction. The matter 
must also be ripe for adjudication. In other words, the 
claim must be sufficiently mature and issues 
sufficiently defined and concrete to create an actual 
justiciable controversy. See Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. 
Ins. Corps. (Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases), 
419 U.S. 102, 138-39, 95 S. Ct. 335, 356 (1974). 
“[R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing. . . .” 
Id. at 140, 95 S. Ct. at 357. It implicates 
both constitutional limitations and prudential 
consideration. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Inc., 509 
U.S. 43, 57 n.18, 1135 S. Ct. 2485, 2496 (1993). In 
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determining whether a claim is ripe for judicial 
review, courts evaluate “ ‘the fitness of the issues 
for judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship of withholding 
court consideration.’ ” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 
(2010) (quoting Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 538 U.S. 805, 808, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 2031 
(2003)). “The burden of proving ripeness falls on the 
party bringing suit.” Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 
319 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 This element of the Secretary’s argument is 
closely intertwined with her contention that Virginia 
has not demonstrated that it will suffer a hardship 
from the provision it challenges because the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision does not go 
into effect until 2014. This lack of immediate impact, 
in her view, renders the Commonwealth’s challenge 
premature. To support this contention, the Secretary 
relies principally on South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. 301, 86 S. Ct. 803 (1966). Katzenbach 
involved a suit to enjoin enforcement of certain 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
particularly those sections providing civil and 
criminal sanctions against interference with the 
exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. The 
Katzenbach Court found those sections of the statute 
imposing criminal penalties to be premature for 
constitutional review, but held that the regulatory 
portions were ripe for judicial consideration. 
 It is important to note that the Supreme Court 
has historically drawn a distinction between the 
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ripeness analysis employed for criminal statutes as 
opposed to other regulatory enactments. Reg’l Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 143 n.29, 95 
S. Ct. at 358. Unlike a regulatory statute, the 
decision to initiate criminal prosecutions resides 
within the discretion of prosecutors – and allows for 
citizens to voluntarily bring their conduct within the 
bounds of the law. Id. The Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision presently before the Court lacks 
criminal remedies. In fact, it specifically waives 
criminal prosecution or sanctions for failure to pay a 
penalty levied by the Act. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(A). 
Therefore, neither prosecutorial discretion nor self-
regulated citizen conduct considerations are present 
here. With certain delineated exceptions, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(a) mandates that a citizen purchase, or 
otherwise obtain insurance, or face a monetary 
assessment. The central issue in this case is the 
Commonwealth’s sovereign interest in upholding the 
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act. The issues 
presented are purely legal and further development of 
the factual record would not clarify the issues for 
judicial resolution. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. 
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3333 
(1985). 
 While the mandatory compliance provisions of 
the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision do not go 
into effect until 2014, that does not mean that its 
effects will not be felt by the Commonwealth in the 
near future. This provision will compel scores of 
people who are not currently enrolled to evaluate and 
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contract for insurance coverage. Individuals currently 
insured will be required to be sure that their present 
plans comply with this regulatory regimen. Insurance 
carriers will have to take steps in the near future to 
accommodate the influx of new enrollees to public 
and private insurance plans. Employers will need to 
determine if their current insurance satisfies the 
statutory requirements. 
 More importantly, the Commonwealth must 
revamp its health care program to ensure compliance 
with the enactment’s provisions, particularly with 
respect to Medicaid. This process will entail more 
than simple fine tuning. Unquestionably, this 
regulation radically changes the landscape of health 
insurance coverage in America. 
 The Supreme Court, and the preponderance 
of reviewing courts of appeals, have not been reticent 
to consider the constitutionality of legislative 
enactments prior to their date of effectiveness when 
the resulting alleged injury is impending and more 
than a “mere possibility.” See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925) (ruling a year prior 
to the challenged law’s date of effectiveness was 
permissible); see also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93, 108 S. Ct. 636, 642-43 
(1988) (upholding a pre-enforcement challenge to a 
state law on First Amendment grounds). Again, the 
alleged injury in this case is the collision between 
state and federal law. Neither the White House nor 
Congress has given any indication that the Minimum 
Essential Coverage Provision at issue will not be 
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enforced, and the Court sees no reason to assume 
otherwise. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. at 393, 
108 S. Ct. at 643. Nor do the facts before the Court 
here present a “hypothetical” case, United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S. Ct. 519, 523 (1960), 
or a “remote and abstract . . . inquiry.” Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 
222, 224, 74 S. Ct. 447, 448 (1954). 
 The issues in this case are fully framed, the 
underlying facts are well settled, and the case is 
accordingly ripe for review. The Commonwealth has 
therefore satisfied all requirements of Article III 
standing. 
IV. 
 Turning to the merits of the Complaint, it is 
important to keep in mind that the Court’s mission at 
this stage is narrow. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
challenge, a complaint need only state a legally viable 
cause of action. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; 
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding 
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of 
defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 
F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
828, 114 S. Ct. 93 (1993). In reviewing a 12(b)(6) 
motion, the complaint must be construed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, assuming its factual 
allegations to be true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984). 
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 This time-honored standard is a bit more difficult 
to apply in the context of this case. The congressional 
enactment under review – the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision – literally forges new ground and 
extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current 
high watermark. Counsel for both sides have 
thoroughly mined relevant case law and offered well 
reasoned analyses. The result, however, has been 
insightful and illuminating, but short of definitive. 
While this Court’s decision may set the initial judicial 
course of this case, it will certainly not be the final 
word. 
 The historically-accepted contours of Article I 
Commerce Clause power were restated by the 
Supreme Court in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146, 150, 91 S. Ct. 1357, 1359 (1971). First, Congress 
can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Id. 
Second, Congress has the authority to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
and persons or things in interstate commerce. Id. 
Third, Congress has the power to regulate activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. It 
appears from the argument and memoranda of 
counsel that only the third category is implicated in 
the case at hand. 
 In arguing that an individual’s decision not 
to purchase health insurance is in effect “economic 
activity,” the Secretary relies on an aggregation 
theory. In other words, the sum of individual 
decisions to participate or not in the health insurance 
market has a critical effect on interstate commerce. 
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The Secretary’s argument is drawn in large measure 
from the teachings of the Supreme Court in Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), wherein 
the Court noted: 
[O]ur case law firmly establishes Congress’ 
power to regulate purely local activities that 
are part of an economic “class of activities” 
that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. . . . When Congress decides that 
the “total incidence” of a practice poses a 
threat to a national market, it may regulate 
the entire class. . . . In this vein, we have 
reiterated that when “a general regulatory 
statute bears a substantial relation to 
commerce, the de minimis character of 
individual instances arising under that 
statute is of no consequence.” 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 17, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06 
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558, 
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995)). 
 In the Secretary’s view, without full market 
participation, the financial foundation supporting the 
health care system will fail, in effect causing the 
health care regime to “implode.” At oral argument, 
the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United 
States, on behalf of the Secretary, described the 
collective effect of the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision as the critical element of the national 
health care scheme, “[a]nd what the [congressional] 
testimony was, was if you do the preexisting 
condition exclusion and no differential health care 
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status, without a minimum coverage type provision, 
it will inexorably drive that market into extinction. 
And what somebody said more succinctly was, the 
market will implode.” (Tr. 33:7-13, July 1, 2010.) 
 To support this argument, the Secretary 
compared the market impact of the universal 
insurance requirement to regulation of wheat 
harvested for personal consumption or marijuana 
grown for personal use. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), acknowledged by most 
constitutional scholars as the most expansive 
application of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme 
Court upheld the power of Congress to regulate the 
personal cultivation and consumption of wheat on a 
private farm. The Court reasoned that the 
consumption of such non-commercially produced 
wheat reduced the amount of commercially produced 
wheat purchased and consumed nationally, thereby 
affecting interstate commerce. The Court concluded: 
[The fact that] appellee’s own contribution to 
the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself 
is not enough to remove him from the scope 
of federal regulation where, as here, his 
contribution, taken together with that of 
many others similarly situated, is far from 
trivial. . . . But if we assume that it is never 
marketed, it supplies a need of the man who 
grew it which would otherwise be reflected 
by purchases in the open market. 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28, 63 S. Ct. at 90-91. 
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 Similarly, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the aggregate effect of personal 
growth and consumption of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes, pursuant to California law, had a sufficient 
impact on interstate commerce to warrant regulation 
under the Commerce Clause. “Like the farmer in 
Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home 
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is 
an established, albeit illegal, interstate market. . . . 
Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding 
that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside 
federal control would similarly affect price and 
market conditions.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 18-19, 125 
S. Ct. at 2206-07. 
 In response, the Commonwealth highlights what 
it perceives to be the critical distinction between the 
line of cases relied upon by the Secretary and the 
Commerce Clause application presently before the 
Court. What the Supreme Court deemed to be 
“economic activity” in Wickard and Raich necessarily 
involved a voluntary decision to perform an act, such 
as growing wheat or cultivating marijuana. The 
Commonwealth argues that this critical element is 
absent in the regulatory mechanism established in 
the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision. This 
provision, the Commonwealth maintains, requires 
a person to perform an involuntary act and as a 
result, submit to Commerce Clause regulation. The 
Commonwealth continues that neither the U.S. 
Supreme Court nor any circuit court of appeals has 
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upheld the extension of Commerce Clause power to 
encompass economic inactivity. 
 Drawing on the logic articulated in United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 
and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 
S. Ct. 1740 (2000), which limited the boundaries of 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction to activities truly 
economic in nature and that actually affect interstate 
commerce, the Commonwealth contends that a 
decision not to purchase a product, such as health 
insurance, is not an economic activity. It is a virtual 
state of repose – or idleness – the converse of activity. 
At best, Section 1501 regulates future activity in 
anticipation of need. 
 In United States v. Morrison, the Court 
acknowledged that its “interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has 
developed. . . . [E]ven [our] modern-era precedents 
which have expanded congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject 
to outer limits.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-08, 120 
S. Ct. at 1748-49 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937)). The 
Court in Morrison also noted that “the existence of 
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to 
sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause 
legislation.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 
1752. Finally, in Morrison, the Court rejected “the 
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, 
violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
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conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 
Id. at 617, 120 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 The Commonwealth further maintains that the 
Secretary’s position finds no sustenance in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
This clause grants Congress broad authority to pass 
laws in furtherance of its constitutionally-enumerated 
powers. The Commonwealth draws the Court’s 
attention to several observations of the Supreme 
Court in the recent case of United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). The Court in Comstock began 
its analysis by quoting Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819): “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
 In commenting on Chief Justice Marshall’s 
remarks, the Court in Comstock noted that: 
[W]e have since made clear that, in 
determining whether the Necessary and 
Proper Clause grants Congress the 
legislative authority to enact a particular 
federal statute, we look to see whether 
the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of 
a constitutionally enumerated power. . . . 
[T]he relevant inquiry is simply whether the 
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means chosen are reasonably adapted to the 
attainment of a legitimate end under the 
commerce power or under other powers 
that the Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to implement. 
Id. at 1956-57 (internal citations omitted). 
 The Commonwealth maintains that even if a 
congressional enactment is noble and legitimate, the 
means adapted to enforce it under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause must be within the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution. In other words, it must have a firm 
constitutional foundation rooted in Article I. The 
goals of those portions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act directly pertinent to health care, 
i.e., universal health insurance coverage, no exclusion 
of persons with preexisting conditions, a requirement 
that all people receiving health care pay for such 
services in a timely fashion, etc., are laudable. The 
Commonwealth argues, however, that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause cannot be employed as a vehicle to 
enforce an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce 
Clause power, no matter how well intended. If a 
person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at 
a particular point in time does not constitute the type 
of economic activity subject to regulation under the 
Commerce Clause, then logically, an attempt to 
enforce such provision under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is equally offensive to the Constitution. 
 In rebuttal, the Secretary reiterates her position 
that a person cannot simply elect to avoid 
participation in the health care market. It is 
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inevitable, in her view, that every person – today or in 
the future – healthy or otherwise – will require 
medical care. The Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision simply provides a vehicle for prompt and 
dependable payment for such services if and when 
rendered. The Secretary also rejects the notion that 
the imposition of a monetary penalty for failing to 
perform a lawful act is alien to the spirit of the 
Constitution. The Secretary points out that sanctions 
have historically been imposed for failure to timely 
file tax returns or truthfully report or pay taxes due, 
as well as failure to register with the Selective 
Service or report for military duty. These examples, 
as the Commonwealth aptly notes, are directly 
tethered to a specific constitutional provision 
empowering Congress to assess taxes and provide 
and maintain an Army and Navy. U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8. No specifically articulated constitutional 
authority exists to mandate the purchase of health 
insurance or the assessment of a penalty for failing to 
do so. 
 As previously mentioned, the Commerce Clause 
aspect of this debate raises issues of national 
significance. The position of the parties are widely 
divergent and at times novel. The guiding precedent 
is informative, but inconclusive. Never before has the 
Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and 
Proper Clause been extended this far. At this 
juncture, the Court is not persuaded that the 
Secretary has demonstrated that the Complaint fails 
to state a cause of action with respect to the 
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Commerce Clause element. This portion of the 
Complaint advances a plausible claim with an 
arguable legal basis. 
 
V. 
 The final aspect of the Secretary’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
challenge raises an even closer and equally unsettled 
issue under congressional taxing powers. Contrary to 
pre-enactment representations by the Executive and 
Legislative branches, the Secretary now argues 
alternatively that the Minimum Essential Coverage 
Provision is a product of the government’s power to 
tax for the general welfare. (Tr. 19:16-17, July 1, 
2010.) This is of course supported by the placement of 
the penalty provisions within the Internal Revenue 
Code. Because the Secretary contends that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is an exercise 
of the less bridled power of Congress to tax, this 
element of the argument presents a much closer 
question than the preceding Commerce Clause 
debate. 
 The Secretary suggests that the constitutional 
analysis under the Tax Clause involves only two 
factors. Relying on United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 
446 (4th Cir. 1992), she asserts that the power of 
Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, and excises, 
under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 
requires only that it be a revenue-raising measure 
and that the associated regulatory provisions bear a 
reasonable relation to the statute’s taxing purpose. 
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Id. at 448; see also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 
U.S. 506, 513, 57 S. Ct. 554, 555-56 (1937); United 
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214 (1919). 
According to the Secretary, the power of Congress to 
tax for the general welfare is checked only by the 
electorate. “Unless there are provisions, extraneous to 
any tax need, courts are without authority to limit 
the exercise of the taxing power.” United States v. 
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31, 73 S. Ct. 510, 515 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds, Marchetti v. United Sales 
[sic], 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968). The Secretary 
points out that the power of Congress to use its 
taxing and spending power under the General 
Welfare Clause has long been recognized as 
extensive. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 
56-59, 24 S. Ct. 769, 776-78 (1904). Furthermore, the 
Secretary notes that Congress may use its power 
under the Tax Clause even for purposes that would 
exceed its powers under other provisions of Article I. 
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 71 S. Ct. 
108, 110 (1950). 
 Therefore, the Secretary argues that because the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision in fact 
generates revenue and its regulatory features are 
rationally related to the goal of requiring every 
individual to pay for the medical services they 
receive, “that’s the end of the ballgame.” (Tr. 44:11, 
July 1, 2010.) 
 Initially, in response, the Commonwealth 
contends that the noncompliance penalty provision in 
Section 1501 does not meet the historical criteria for 
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a tax.7 Aside from being referred to in Section 1501 
at Section 5000A(b)(1) as a “penalty,” the clear 
purpose of the assessment is to regulate conduct, not 
generate revenue for the government.8 In fact, the 
Commonwealth adds that if there is full compliance 
– if everyone purchases health insurance as required 
– this provision will generate no revenue. The 
Commonwealth’s doubt as to its purported purpose is 
heightened further by the prefatory language of 
Section 1501 which describes it as a derivative of the 
Commerce Clause. The Solicitor General of Virginia 
correctly noted during oral argument that the power 
of Congress to exact a penalty is more constrained 
than its taxing authority under the General Welfare 
Clause – it must be in aid of an enumerated power. 
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 
393, 60 S. Ct. 907, 912 (1940); United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. 1, 61, 56 S. Ct. 312, 317 (1936). 
 
  7 “[A] tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or 
property for the purpose of supporting the Government.” United 
States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 
213, 224, 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2112 (1996) (internal citations 
omitted). On the other hand, a penalty imports the notion of a 
punishment for an unlawful act or omission. Id. “The two words 
[tax vs. penalty] are not interchangeable . . . and if an exaction 
[is] clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the 
simple expedient of calling it such.” United States v. La Franca, 
282 U.S. 568, 572, 51 S. Ct. 278, 280 (1931). 
  8 In contrast, the Commonwealth points out that elsewhere 
in the Act, Congress specifically described levies as taxes, such 
as Sections 9001, 9004, 9015, and 9017. 
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 Although the Commonwealth concedes that the 
power of Congress to tax exceeds its ability to 
regulate under the Commerce Clause, it is not 
without limitation. “[T]he law is that Congress can 
tax under its taxing power that which it can’t 
regulate, but it can’t regulate through taxation that 
which it cannot otherwise regulate.” (Tr. 81:18-21, 
July 1, 2010 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. 
(Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 
449, 450 (1922).) To amplify its point, the 
Commonwealth focuses the Court’s attention on 
a series of cases in which the Supreme Court 
struck down certain “regulatory taxes” as an 
unconstitutional encroachment on the state’s power of 
regulation under the Tenth Amendment. See Butler, 
297 U.S. at 68, 56 S. Ct. at 320; Linder v. United 
States, 268 U.S. 5, 17-18, 45 S. Ct. 446, 449 (1925); 
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 35, 42 S. Ct. at 
451. In commenting on the limitations on the power 
of Congress to levy taxes to promote the general 
welfare, the Court in Butler noted that, “despite the 
breadth of the legislative discretion, our duty to hear 
and to render, judgment remains. If the statute 
plainly violates the stated principle of the 
Constitution, we must so declare.” Butler, 297 U.S. at 
67, 56 S. Ct. at 320; see also Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 29, 
73 S. Ct. at 513.9 
 
  9 Citing commentaries from a number of constitutional 
scholars, the Secretary maintains that this line of cases has 
fallen into desuetude. The Commonwealth counters that none of 
these cases have been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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 By analogy, the Commonwealth argues that the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision not only 
invokes rights reserved to the states, but also seeks to 
compel activity beyond the reach of Congress. As 
discussed above, the division of responsibility for 
regulating insurance between the Commonwealth 
and the federal government, to the extent relevant, is 
yet to be adequately staked out in this case. 
 The centerpiece of the Complaint at issue is its 
contention that Congress lacks the authority to 
regulate economic inactivity. Lacking such power to 
regulate a person’s decision not to participate in 
interstate commerce, logically, the Commonwealth 
argues, Congress would not have the power to tax or 
impose a penalty for such inactivity. This, of course, is 
the core issue in this case. 
 To bolster its position, the Commonwealth 
suggests that a careful survey of constitutional 
history yields no basis for such extension of Tax 
Clause powers. In its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss, the Commonwealth observes that 
“historically, direct taxes were taxes on persons or 
things, while duties, imposts, and excises have never 
meant a tax on a decision not to purchase or not to do 
something unrelated to a larger voluntary business or 
other undertaking.” (Pl. Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 
32.) 
 In her opposition, the Secretary rejoins that 
the Commonwealth misinterprets the limitations of 
Congress’s power under the Tax Clause. “[A] tax 
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statute [does not] necessarily fall because it touches 
on activities which Congress might not otherwise 
regulate.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44, 71 S. Ct. at 110. 
For example, the Secretary argues that Congress can 
tax inheritances even though the regulation of estates 
and inheritances is beyond Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 
59-60, 20 S. Ct. 747, 755 (1900). The Secretary 
stresses that “[i]t is beyond serious question that a 
tax does not cease to be valid merely because it 
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the 
activities taxed.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44, 71 S. Ct. at 
110. “[A] tax is not any the less a tax because it has a 
regulatory effect. . . .” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513, 57 
S. Ct. at 556 (internal citations omitted). 
 Casting aside many aspects of the 
Commonwealth’s argument, the Secretary contends 
that in the final analysis, the Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision falls within Congress’s extensive 
general welfare authority. She also underscores that 
decisions of how best to provide for the general 
welfare are for the representative branches, not for 
the courts. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 57 
S. Ct. 904, 908 (1937). “Inquiry into the hidden 
motives which may move Congress to exercise a 
power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the 
competency of courts.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14, 
57 S. Ct. at 556. 
 In enacting Section 1501 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Congress made 
extensive findings on the substantial effect of 
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decisions to purchase health insurance on the vast 
interstate health care market. These findings alone, 
in the Secretary’s view, provide more than adequate 
support for her contention that the penalty (or tax) at 
issue is rationally related to the objective of 
maintaining a financially viable health care market 
by requiring everyone to pay for the services they 
receive. She adds, through counsel, “[t]hat consuming 
health care services without paying for them is 
activity, plain and simple.” (Tr. 92:12-14, July 1, 
2010.) In this context, a consumer’s failure to act is a 
clear burden on interstate commerce. 
 The Secretary appeared to concede during oral 
argument, however, that if the ability to require the 
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is not within 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, than the 
penalty necessarily fails. As the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General of the United States appeared to 
note in his response to the Court, “if it is 
unconstitutional, then the penalty would fail as well.” 
(Tr. 21:10-11, July 1, 2010.) 
 
VI. 
 While this case raises a host of complex 
constitutional issues, all seem to distill to the single 
question of whether or not Congress has the power to 
regulate – and tax – a citizen’s decision not to 
participate in interstate commerce. Neither the U.S. 
Supreme Court nor any circuit court of appeals has 
squarely addressed this issue. No reported case from 
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any federal appellate court has extended the 
Commerce Clause or Tax Clause to include the 
regulation of a person’s decision not to purchase a 
product, notwithstanding its effect on interstate 
commerce. Given the presence of some authority 
arguably supporting the theory underlying each side’s 
position, this Court cannot conclude at this stage that 
the Complaint fails to state a cause of action.10 
 The Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss will therefore 
be denied. Resolution of the controlling issues in this 
case must await a hearing on the merits. 
 An appropriate Order will accompany this 
Memorandum Opinion. 
 /s/ Henry Hudson
  Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge 
Date: Aug. 2, 2010  
Richmond, VA  
 
 
  10 “It is well-established that defendants bear the burden of 
proving that plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law.” Bennett v. 
MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1091 (6th Cir. 2010). “Under Rule 
12(b)(6), the party moving for dismissal has the burden of 
proving that no claim has been stated.” James Wm. Moore, et 
al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34(1)(a) (3d ed. 2010). 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Richmond Division 
 
COMMONWEALTH 
OF VIRGINIA EX REL. 
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, 
in his official capacity as 
Attorney General of Virginia, 
        Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
in her official capacity, 
        Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action No. 
 3:10CV188-HEH
 
ORDER 
(Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss) 
(Filed Aug. 2, 2010) 
 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss (Dk. No. 21), filed on May 24, 
2010. For the reasons stated in the accompanying 
Memorandum Opinion, the Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss is DENIED. 
 The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order 
and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion to all 
counsel of record. 
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 It is SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ Henry Hudson
   Henry E. Hudson
  United States District Judge 
Date: Aug. 2, 2010   
Richmond, VA 
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P. BARR; EDWIN MEESE, III; RICHARD L. 
THORNBURGH; EVE ELLINGWOOD, a/k/a Cohen 
Sternlight, Judge, Retired; AMERICAN CIVIL 
RIGHTS UNION; AMERICANS FOR FREE CHOICE 
IN MEDICINE; MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL 
FOUNDATION; VIRGINIA ORGANIZING 
          Movants 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
No. 11-1058 
(3:10-cv-00188-HEH) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, EX REL. 
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, in his official 
capacity as Attorney General of Virginia 
          Plaintiff-Appellant 
v. 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, 
in her official capacity 
          Defendant-Appellee 
v. 
RAY ELBERT PARKER; AMERICAN CENTER FOR 
LAW & JUSTICE ET AL.; PHYSICIAN HOSPITALS 
OF AMERICA; SMALL BUSINESS MAJORITY 
FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED; CENTER FOR 
AMERICAN PROGRESS; FEDERAL RIGHTS 
PROJECT NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW 
CENTER; WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION; 
LIBERTY GROUP; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
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PROFESSORS; CATO INSTITUTE; LANDMARK 
LEGAL FOUNDATION; RANDY E. BARNETT, 
Professor; COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE; W. SPENCER CONNERAT, III; 
STEVEN J. WILLIS; PACIFIC LEGAL 
FOUNDATION; YOUNG INVINCIBLES; WILLIAM 
P. BARR; EDWIN MEESE, III; RICHARD L. 
THORNBURGH; EVE ELLINGWOOD, a/k/a Cohen 
Sternlight, Judge, Retired; AMERICAN CIVIL 
RIGHTS UNION; AMERICANS FOR FREE CHOICE 
IN MEDICINE; MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL 
FOUNDATION; VIRGINIA ORGANIZING 
          Movants 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ORDER 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 The Court consolidates Case No. 11-1057 and 
Case No. 11-1058. The appellant in Case No. 11-1057 
shall be considered the appellant for purposes of the 
consolidated appeals and shall proceed first at 
briefing and at oral argument. Entry of appearance 
forms and disclosure statements filed by counsel and 
parties to the lead case are deemed filed in the 
secondary case. 
 For the Court – By Direction
 /s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk 
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Filed: January 20, 2011 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
1100 East Main Street, Suite 501 
Richmond, Virginia 23219-3517 
www.ca4.uscourts.gov 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DOCKETING NOTICE – 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
No. 11-1057, Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
Kathleen Sebelius 
 3:10-cv-00188-HEH 
This case has been placed on the Court’s docket under 
the above-referenced number, which should be used 
on papers subsequently filed in this Court. 
Counsel are responsible for ensuring that documents 
are timely filed by actual receipt as required in 
the appropriate clerk’s office. Noncompliance with 
jurisdictional deadlines will prevent the Court from 
considering the case, and failure to meet other 
deadlines may result in dismissal for failure to 
prosecute or in imposition of sanctions. See Local 
Rules 45, 46(g). 
In cases in which more than one attorney represents 
a party, future notices will be sent only to attorneys 
who have entered an appearance as counsel of record; 
other attorneys will be removed from the case. 
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Counsel are responsible for ensuring that social 
security numbers, juvenile names, dates of birth, and 
financial account numbers are redacted from any 
documents filed with the Court and that any sealed 
materials are filed in accordance with the enclosed 
Memorandum on Sealed and Confidential 
Materials. Counsel must obtain an Appellate CM/ 
ECF Filer Account as outlined in the Notice 
Regarding Implementation of CM/ECF; electronic 
filing is mandatory for counsel in all Fourth Circuit 
cases effective June 1, 2008. 
Counsel must file the initial forms required upon 
docketing, as set forth in the following table of forms, 
in the clerk’s office within 14 days of the date of this 
notice. The forms can be completed and printed or 
saved in electronic form. 
Click on a link to display the required form; all forms 
are also available at www.ca4.uscourts.gov. 
Form: Required 
From: 
Required
Number: 
Appearance 
of Counsel 
Counsel of record for any 
party to the appeal (If not 
admitted to this Court, 
counsel must complete and 
submit an application for 
admission.) 
Original 
only 
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Disclosure 
Statement 
All parties to a civil or 
bankruptcy case and all 
corporate defendants in a 
criminal case (not required
from the United States, from
indigent parties, or from 
state or local governments
in pro se cases) 
Original 
only 
Docketing 
Statement 
Appellant’s counsel (not 
required after Rule 5 grant 
of permission to appeal) 
Original 
only 
Transcript 
Order 
Appellant, only if ordering 
transcript (not required 
from appellee) 
Attach to 
docketing 
statement 
CJA 24 Appellant, only if 
transcript is at court 
expense under Criminal 
Justice Act (not required 
from appellee) 
Attach to 
docketing 
statement 
I will be the case manager for this case. Please 
contact me at the number listed below if you have any 
questions regarding your case. 
RJ Warren 
Deputy Clerk 
804-916-2702 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, § 8, clauses 1 and 3 of the United States 
Constitution provides in relevant part: 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes . . . to pay the debts and provide for the . . . 
general welfare of the United States; but all duties 
imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States;  
*    *    * 
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes;  
*    *    * 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Excerpts from the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
Sec. 1501. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM 
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.  
(a) Findings. – Congress makes the following 
findings:  
(1) In general. – The individual responsibility 
requirement provided for in this section (in this 
subsection referred to as the “requirement”) is 
commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result 
of the effects described in paragraph (2).  
(2) Effects on the national economy and 
interstate commerce. – The effects described in this 
paragraph are the following: 
(A) The requirement regulates activity that 
is commercial and economic in nature: economic and 
financial decisions about how and when health care is 
paid for, and when health insurance is purchased. 
(B) Health insurance and health care 
services are a significant part of the national 
economy. National health spending is projected to 
increase from $ 2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of 
the economy, in 2009 to $ 4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. 
Private health insurance spending is projected to be  
$ 854,000,000,000 in 2009, and pays for medical 
supplies, drugs, and equipment that are shipped in 
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interstate commerce. Since most health insurance is 
sold by national or regional health insurance 
companies, health insurance is sold in interstate 
commerce and claims payments flow through 
interstate commerce. 
(C) The requirement, together with the 
other provisions of this Act, will add millions of new 
consumers to the health insurance market, increasing 
the supply of, and demand for, health care services. 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
requirement will increase the number and share of 
Americans who are insured. 
(D) The requirement achieves near-
universal coverage by building upon and 
strengthening the private employer-based health 
insurance system, which covers 176,000,000 Americans 
nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar requirement 
has strengthened private employer-based coverage: 
despite the economic downturn, the number of 
workers offered employer-based coverage has actually 
increased. 
(E) Half of all personal bankruptcies are 
caused in part by medical expenses. By significantly 
increasing health insurance coverage, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of 
this Act, will improve financial security for families. 
(F) Under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), 
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), 
and this Act, the Federal Government has a 
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significant role in regulating health insurance which 
is in interstate commerce. 
(G) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the 
Public Health Service Act (as added by section 1201 of 
this Act), if there were no requirement, many 
individuals would wait to purchase health insurance 
until they needed care. By significantly increasing 
health insurance coverage, the requirement, together 
with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize 
this adverse selection and broaden the health 
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, 
which will lower health insurance premiums. The 
requirement is essential to creating effective health 
insurance markets in which improved health 
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do 
not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be 
sold. 
(H) Administrative costs for private health 
insurance, which were $ 90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 
26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current 
individual and small group markets. By significantly 
increasing health insurance coverage and the size of 
purchasing pools, which will increase economies of 
scale, the requirement, together with the other 
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce 
administrative costs and lower health insurance 
premiums. The requirement is essential to creating 
effective health insurance markets that do not 
require underwriting and eliminate its associated 
administrative costs. 
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(3) Supreme Court ruling. – In United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 
533 (1944)), the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that insurance is interstate commerce subject to 
Federal regulation. (b) In General. – Subtitle D of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding 
at the end the following new chapter: 
 “CHAPTER 48 – MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM 
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE  
 “Sec. 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum 
essential coverage.  
“Sec. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN 
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.  
“(a) Requirement To Maintain Minimum Essential 
Coverage. – An applicable individual shall for each 
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the individual who 
is an applicable individual, is covered under 
minimum essential coverage for such month.  
“(b) Shared Responsibility Payment. –  
“(1) In general. – If an applicable individual 
fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or 
more months during any calendar year beginning 
after 2013, then, except as provided in subsection (d), 
there is hereby imposed a penalty with respect to the 
individual in the amount determined under 
subsection (c).  
App. 103 
“(2) Inclusion with return. – Any penalty 
imposed by this section with respect to any month 
shall be included with a taxpayer’s return under 
chapter 1 for the taxable year which includes such 
month.  
“(3) Payment of penalty. – If an individual with 
respect to whom a penalty is imposed by this section 
for any month –  
“(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 
152) of another taxpayer for the other taxpayer’s 
taxable year including such month, such other 
taxpayer shall be liable for such penalty, or 
“(B) files a joint return for the taxable year 
including such month, such individual and the spouse 
of such individual shall be jointly liable for such 
penalty.  
“(c) Amount of Penalty. –  
“(1) In general. – The penalty determined under 
this subsection for any month with respect to any 
individual is an amount equal to 1/12 of the 
applicable dollar amount for the calendar year. 
“(2) Dollar limitation. – The amount of the 
penalty imposed by this section on any taxpayer for 
any taxable year with respect to all individuals for 
whom the taxpayer is liable under subsection (b)(3) 
shall not exceed an amount equal to 300 percent the 
applicable dollar amount (determined without regard 
to paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar year with or 
within which the taxable year ends. 
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“(3) Applicable dollar amount. – For purposes of 
paragraph (1) –  
“(A) In general. – Except as provided in 
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar 
amount is $ 750. 
“(B) Phase in. – The applicable dollar 
amount is $ 95 for 2014 and $ 350 for 2015.  
“(C) Special rule for individuals under age 
18. – If an applicable individual has not attained the 
age of 18 as of the beginning of a month, the 
applicable dollar amount with respect to such 
individual for the month shall be equal to one-half of 
the applicable dollar amount for the calendar year in 
which the month occurs. 
“(D) Indexing of amount. – In the case of 
any calendar year beginning after 2016, the 
applicable dollar amount shall be equal to $ 750, 
increased by an amount equal to –  
“(i) $ 750, multiplied by 
“(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment 
determined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year, 
determined by substituting ‘calendar year 2015’ for 
‘calendar year 1992’ in subparagraph (B) thereof. 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a 
multiple of $ 50, such increase shall be rounded to the 
next lowest multiple of $ 50. 
“(4) Terms relating to income and families. – 
For purposes of this section –  
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“(A) Family size. – The family size involved 
with respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to the 
number of individuals for whom the taxpayer is 
allowed a deduction under section 151 (relating to 
allowance of deduction for personal exemptions) for 
the taxable year. 
“(B) Household income. – The term 
‘household income’ means, with respect to any 
taxpayer for any taxable year, an amount equal to the 
sum of –  
“(i) the modified gross income of the 
taxpayer, plus 
“(ii) the aggregate modified gross 
incomes of all other individuals who –  
“(I) were taken into account in 
determining the taxpayer’s family size under 
paragraph (1), and 
“(II) were required to file a return 
of tax imposed by section 1 for the taxable year. 
“(C) Modified gross income. – The term 
‘modified gross income’ means gross income –  
“(i) decreased by the amount of any 
deduction allowable under paragraph (1), (3), (4), or 
(10) of section 62(a), 
“(ii) increased by the amount of 
interest received or accrued during the taxable year 
which is exempt from tax imposed by this chapter, 
and  
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“(iii) determined without regard to 
sections 911, 931, and 933.  
“(D) Poverty line. –  
“(i) In general. – The term ‘poverty line’ 
has the meaning given that term in section 2110(c)(5) 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(5)).  
“(ii) Poverty line used. – In the case of 
any taxable year ending with or within a calendar 
year, the poverty line used shall be the most recently 
published poverty line as of the 1st day of such 
calendar year. 
“(d) Applicable Individual. – For purposes of this 
section –  
“(1) In general. – The term ‘applicable 
individual’ means, with respect to any month, an 
individual other than an individual described in 
paragraph (2), (3), or (4). 
“(2) Religious exemptions. –  
“(A) Religious conscience exemption. – Such 
term shall not include any individual for any month if 
such individual has in effect an exemption under 
section 1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act which certifies that such 
individual is a member of a recognized religious sect 
or division thereof described in section 1402(g)(1) and 
an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such 
sect or division as described in such section.  
“(B) Health care sharing ministry. –  
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“(i) In general. – Such term shall not 
include any individual for any month if such 
individual is a member of a health care sharing 
ministry for the month.  
“(ii) Health care sharing ministry. – 
The term ‘health care sharing ministry’ means an 
organization –  
“(I) which is described in section 
501(c)(3) and is exempt from taxation under section 
501(a), 
“(II) members of which share a 
common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share 
medical expenses among members in accordance with 
those beliefs and without regard to the State in which 
a member resides or is employed, 
“(III) members of which retain 
membership even after they develop a medical 
condition, 
“(IV) which (or a predecessor of 
which) has been in existence at all times since 
December 31, 1999, and medical expenses of its 
members have been shared continuously and without 
interruption since at least December 31, 1999, and 
“(V) which conducts an annual 
audit which is performed by an independent certified 
public accounting firm in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and which is made 
available to the public upon request. 
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“(3) Individuals not lawfully present. – Such 
term shall not include an individual for any month if 
for the month the individual is not a citizen or 
national of the United States or an alien lawfully 
present in the United States. 
“(4) Incarcerated individuals. – Such term shall 
not include an individual for any month if for the 
month the individual is incarcerated, other than 
incarceration pending the disposition of charges. 
“(e) Exemptions. – No penalty shall be imposed 
under subsection (a) with respect to –  
“(1) Individuals who cannot afford coverage. –  
“(A) In general. – Any applicable individual 
for any month if the applicable individual’s required 
contribution (determined on an annual basis) for 
coverage for the month exceeds 8 percent of such 
individual’s household income for the taxable year 
described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. For purposes of 
applying this subparagraph, the taxpayer’s household 
income shall be increased by any exclusion from gross 
income for any portion of the required contribution 
made through a salary reduction arrangement. 
“(B) Required contribution. – For purposes 
of this paragraph, the term ‘required contribution’ 
means –  
“(i) in the case of an individual eligible 
to purchase minimum essential coverage consisting of 
coverage through an eligible-employer-sponsored 
App. 109 
plan, the portion of the annual premium which 
would be paid by the individual (without regard to 
whether paid through salary reduction or otherwise) 
for self-only coverage, or 
“(ii) in the case of an individual eligible 
only to purchase minimum essential coverage 
described in subsection (f)(1)(C), the annual premium 
for the lowest cost bronze plan available in the 
individual market through the Exchange in the State 
in the rating area in which the individual resides 
(without regard to whether the individual purchased 
a qualified health plan through the Exchange), 
reduced by the amount of the credit allowable under 
section 36B for the taxable year (determined as if the 
individual was covered by a qualified health plan 
offered through the Exchange for the entire taxable 
year). 
“(C) Special rules for individuals related to 
employees. – For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if 
an applicable individual is eligible for minimum 
essential coverage through an employer by reason of 
a relationship to an employee, the determination 
shall be made by reference to the affordability of the 
coverage to the employee. 
“(D) Indexing. – In the case of plan years 
beginning in any calendar year after 2014, 
subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting for 
‘8 percent’ the percentage the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services determines reflects the excess of the 
rate of premium growth between the preceding 
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calendar year and 2013 over the rate of income 
growth for such period.   
“(2) Taxpayers with income under 100 percent 
of poverty line. – Any applicable individual for any 
month during a calendar year if the individual’s 
household income for the taxable year described in 
section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is less than 100 percent of the 
poverty line for the size of the family involved 
(determined in the same manner as under subsection 
(b)(4)). 
“(3) Members of Indian tribes. – Any applicable 
individual for any month during which the individual 
is a member of an Indian tribe (as defined in section 
45A(c)(6)). 
“(4) Months during short coverage gaps. –  
“(A) In general. – Any month the last day of 
which occurred during a period in which the 
applicable individual was not covered by minimum 
essential coverage for a continuous period of less than 
3 months.  
“(B) Special rules. – For purposes of 
applying this paragraph –  
“(i) the length of a continuous period 
shall be determined without regard to the calendar 
years in which months in such period occur, 
“(ii) if a continuous period is greater 
than the period allowed under subparagraph (A), no 
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exception shall be provided under this paragraph for 
any month in the period, and 
“(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous 
period described in subparagraph (A) covering 
months in a calendar year, the exception provided by 
this paragraph shall only apply to months in the first 
of such periods. The Secretary shall prescribe rules 
for the collection of the penalty imposed by this 
section in cases where continuous periods include 
months in more than 1 taxable year. 
“(5) Hardships. – Any applicable individual 
who for any month is determined by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services under section 
1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship with 
respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a 
qualified health plan. 
“(f) Minimum Essential Coverage. – For purposes of 
this section –  
“(1) In general. – The term ‘minimum essential 
coverage’ means any of the following:  
“(A) Government sponsored programs. – 
Coverage under –  
“(i) the Medicare program under part A 
of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 
“(ii) the Medicaid program under title 
XIX of the Social Security Act, 
“(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI 
of the Social Security Act, 
App. 112 
“(iv) the TRICARE for Life program, 
“(v) the veteran’s health care program 
under chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, or 
“(vi) a health plan under section 
2504(e) of title 22, United States Code (relating to 
Peace Corps volunteers). 
“(B) Employer-sponsored plan. – Coverage 
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan. 
“(C) Plans in the individual market. – 
Coverage under a health plan offered in the 
individual market within a State. 
“(D) Grandfathered health plan. – Coverage 
under a grandfathered health plan.  
“(E) Other coverage. – Such other health 
benefits coverage, such as a State health benefits risk 
pool, as the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
in coordination with the Secretary, recognizes for 
purposes of this subsection.  
“(2) Eligible employer-sponsored plan. – The 
term ‘eligible employer-sponsored plan’ means, with 
respect to any employee, a group health plan or group 
health insurance coverage offered by an employer to 
the employee which is –  
“(A) a governmental plan (within the 
meaning of section 2791(d)(8) of the Public Health 
Service Act), or 
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“(B) any other plan or coverage offered in 
the small or large group market within a State. 
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan 
described in paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group 
market. 
“(3) Excepted benefits not treated as minimum 
essential coverage. – The term ‘minimum essential 
coverage’ shall not include health insurance coverage 
which consists of coverage of excepted benefits –  
“(A) described in paragraph (1) of 
subsection (c) of section 2791 of the Public Health 
Service Act; or 
“(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of 
such subsection if the benefits are provided under a 
separate policy, certificate, or contract of insurance.  
“(4) Individuals residing outside United States 
or residents of territories. – any applicable individual 
shall be treated as having minimum essential 
coverage for any month –  
“(A) if such month occurs during any period 
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 
911(d)(1) which is applicable to the individual, or  
“(B) if such individual is a bona fide 
resident of any possession of the United States (as 
determined under section 937(a)) for such month.  
“(5) Insurance-related terms. – Any term used 
in this section which is also used in title I of the 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act shall have 
the same meaning as when used in such title. 
“(g) Administration and Procedure. –  
“(1) In general. – The penalty provided by this 
section shall be paid upon notice and demand by the 
Secretary, and except as provided in paragraph (2), 
shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as 
an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter 
68. 
“(2) Special rules. – Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law –  
“(A) Waiver of criminal penalties. – In the 
case of any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay any 
penalty imposed by this section, such taxpayer shall 
not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty 
with respect to such failure.  
“(B) Limitations on liens and levies. – The 
Secretary shall not –  
“(i) file notice of lien with respect to any 
property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay 
the penalty imposed by this section, or  
“(ii) levy on any such property with respect 
to such failure.” 
“(c) Clerical Amendment. – The table of chapters for 
subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to 
chapter 47 the following new item: 
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 “CHAPTER 48 – Maintenance of Minimum 
Essential Coverage.” 
“(d) Effective Date. – The amendments made by this 
section shall apply to taxable years ending after 
December 31, 2013. 
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STATE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Virginia Code § 38.2-3430.1:1, provides that:  
No resident of this Commonwealth, 
regardless of whether he has or is eligible for 
health insurance coverage under any policy 
or program provided by or through his 
employer, or a plan sponsored by the 
Commonwealth or the federal government, 
shall be required to obtain or maintain a 
policy of individual insurance coverage 
except as required by a court or the 
Department of Social Services where an 
individual is named a party in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding. No provision of 
this title shall render a resident of this 
Commonwealth liable for any penalty, 
assessment, fee, or fine as a result of his 
failure to procure or obtain health insurance 
coverage. This section shall not apply to 
individuals voluntarily applying for coverage 
under a state-administered program 
pursuant to Title XIX or Title XXI of the 
Social Security Act. This section shall not 
apply to students being required by an 
institution of higher education to obtain and 
maintain health insurance as a condition of 
enrollment. Nothing herein shall impair the 
rights of persons to privately contract for 
health insurance for family members or 
former family members.  
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PUBLIC LAW 111-148 [H.R. 3590] 
MAR. 23, 2010 
PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
111 P.L. 148; 124 Stat. 119; 
2010 Enacted H.R. 3590; 111 Enacted H.R. 3590 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) Short Title. – This Act may be cited as the 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”. 
(b) Table of Contents. – The table of contents of this 
Act is as follows: 
 Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
TITLE I – QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH 
CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS 
Subtitle A – Immediate Improvements in Health Care 
Coverage for All Americans 
 Sec. 1001. Amendments to the Public Health 
Service Act. 
“Part A – Individual and Group Market Reforms 
“Subpart II – Improving Coverage 
“Sec. 2711. No lifetime or annual limits. 
“Sec. 2712. Prohibition on rescissions. 
“Sec. 2713. Coverage of preventive health services. 
“Sec. 2714. Extension of dependent coverage. 
“Sec. 2715. Development and utilization of uniform 
explanation of coverage documents and standardized 
definitions. 
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“Sec. 2716. Prohibition of discrimination based on 
salary. 
“Sec. 2717. Ensuring the quality of care. 
“Sec. 2718. Bringing down the cost of health care 
coverage. 
“Sec. 2719. Appeals process. 
 Sec. 1002. Health insurance consumer 
information. 
 Sec. 1003. Ensuring that consumers get value 
for their dollars. 
 Sec. 1004. Effective dates. 
Subtitle B – Immediate Actions to Preserve and 
Expand Coverage 
 Sec. 1101. Immediate access to insurance for 
uninsured individuals with a preexisting condition. 
 Sec. 1102. Reinsurance for early retirees. 
 Sec. 1103. Immediate information that allows 
consumers to identify affordable coverage options. 
 Sec. 1104. Administrative simplification. 
 Sec. 1105. Effective date. 
Subtitle C – Quality Health Insurance Coverage for 
All Americans 
Part I – Health Insurance Market Reforms 
 Sec. 1201. Amendment to the Public Health 
Service Act. 
“Subpart I – General Reform 
“Sec. 2704. Prohibition of preexisting condition 
exclusions or other discrimination based on health 
status. 
“Sec. 2701. Fair health insurance premiums. 
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“Sec. 2702. Guaranteed availability of coverage. 
“Sec. 2703. Guaranteed renewability of coverage. 
“Sec. 2705. Prohibiting discrimination against 
individual participants and beneficiaries based on 
health status. 
“Sec. 2706. Non-discrimination in health care. 
“Sec. 2707. Comprehensive health insurance coverage. 
“Sec. 2708. Prohibition on excessive waiting periods. 
Part II – Other Provisions 
 Sec. 1251. Preservation of right to maintain 
existing coverage. 
 Sec. 1252. Rating reforms must apply uniformly 
to all health insurance issuers and group health 
plans. 
 Sec. 1253. Effective dates. 
Subtitle D – Available Coverage Choices for All 
Americans 
Part I – Establishment of Qualified Health Plans 
 Sec. 1301. Qualified health plan defined. 
 Sec. 1302. Essential health benefits requirements. 
 Sec. 1303. Special rules. 
 Sec. 1304. Related definitions. 
Part II – Consumer Choices and Insurance 
Competition Through Health Benefit Exchanges 
 Sec. 1311. Affordable choices of health benefit 
plans. 
 Sec. 1312. Consumer choice. 
 Sec. 1313. Financial integrity. 
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Part III – State Flexibility Relating to Exchanges 
 Sec. 1321. State flexibility in operation and 
enforcement of Exchanges and related requirements. 
 Sec. 1322. Federal program to assist establishment 
and operation of nonprofit, member-run health 
insurance issuers. 
 Sec. 1323. Community health insurance option. 
 Sec. 1324. Level playing field. 
Part IV – State Flexibility to Establish Alternative 
Programs 
 Sec. 1331. State flexibility to establish basic health 
programs for low-income individuals not eligible for 
Medicaid. 
 Sec. 1332. Waiver for State innovation. 
 Sec. 1333. Provisions relating to offering of plans 
in more than one State. 
Part V – Reinsurance and Risk Adjustment 
 Sec. 1341. Transitional reinsurance program for 
individual and small group markets in each State. 
 Sec. 1342. Establishment of risk corridors for 
plans in individual and small group markets. 
 Sec. 1343. Risk adjustment. 
Subtitle E – Affordable Coverage Choices for All 
Americans 
Part I – Premium Tax Credits and Cost-sharing 
Reductions 
Subpart A – Premium Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing 
Reductions 
 Sec. 1401. Refundable tax credit providing 
premium assistance for coverage under a qualified 
health plan. 
 Sec. 1402. Reduced cost-sharing for individuals 
enrolling in qualified health plans. 
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Subpart B – Eligibility Determinations 
 Sec. 1411. Procedures for determining eligibility 
for Exchange participation, premium tax credits and 
reduced cost-sharing, and individual responsibility 
exemptions. 
 Sec. 1412. Advance determination and payment 
of premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions. 
 Sec. 1413. Streamlining of procedures for 
enrollment through an exchange and State Medicaid, 
CHIP, and health subsidy programs. 
 Sec. 1414. Disclosures to carry out eligibility 
requirements for certain programs. 
 Sec. 1415. Premium tax credit and cost-sharing 
reduction payments disregarded for Federal and 
Federally-assisted programs. 
Part II – Small Business Tax Credit 
 Sec. 1421. Credit for employee health insurance 
expenses of small businesses. 
Subtitle F – Shared Responsibility for Health Care 
Part I – Individual Responsibility 
 Sec. 1501. Requirement to maintain minimum 
essential coverage. 
 Sec. 1502. Reporting of health insurance coverage. 
Part II – Employer Responsibilities 
 Sec. 1511. Automatic enrollment for employees 
of large employers. 
 Sec. 1512. Employer requirement to inform 
employees of coverage options. 
 Sec. 1513. Shared responsibility for employers. 
 Sec. 1514. Reporting of employer health insurance 
coverage. 
 Sec. 1515. Offering of Exchange-participating 
qualified health plans through cafeteria plans. 
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Subtitle G – Miscellaneous Provisions 
 Sec. 1551. Definitions. 
 Sec. 1552. Transparency in government. 
 Sec. 1553. Prohibition against discrimination on 
assisted suicide. 
 Sec. 1554. Access to therapies. 
 Sec. 1555. Freedom not to participate in Federal 
health insurance programs. 
 Sec. 1556. Equity for certain eligible survivors. 
 Sec. 1557. Nondiscrimination. 
 Sec. 1558. Protections for employees. 
 Sec. 1559. Oversight. 
 Sec. 1560. Rules of construction. 
 Sec. 1561. Health information technology 
enrollment standards and protocols. 
 Sec. 1562. Conforming amendments. 
 Sec. 1563. Sense of the Senate promoting fiscal 
responsibility. 
TITLE II – ROLE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS 
Subtitle A – Improved Access to Medicaid 
 Sec. 2001. Medicaid coverage for the lowest 
income populations. 
 Sec. 2002. Income eligibility for nonelderly 
determined using modified gross income. 
 Sec. 2003. Requirement to offer premium 
assistance for employer-sponsored insurance. 
 Sec. 2004. Medicaid coverage for former foster 
care children. 
 Sec. 2005. Payments to territories. 
 Sec. 2006. Special adjustment to FMAP 
determination for certain States recovering from a 
major disaster. 
 Sec. 2007. Medicaid Improvement Fund rescission. 
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Subtitle B – Enhanced Support for the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program 
 Sec. 2101. Additional federal financial participation 
for CHIP. 
 Sec. 2102. Technical corrections. 
Subtitle C – Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment 
Simplification 
 Sec. 2201. Enrollment Simplification and 
coordination with State Health Insurance Exchanges. 
 Sec. 2202. Permitting hospitals to make 
presumptive eligibility determinations for all Medicaid 
eligible populations. 
Subtitle D – Improvements to Medicaid Services 
 Sec. 2301. Coverage for freestanding birth center 
services. 
 Sec. 2302. Concurrent care for children. 
 Sec. 2303. State eligibility option for family 
planning services. 
 Sec. 2304. Clarification of definition of medical 
assistance. 
Subtitle E – New Options for States to Provide 
Long-Term Services and Supports 
 Sec. 2401. Community First Choice Option. 
 Sec. 2402. Removal of barriers to providing 
home and community-based services. 
 Sec. 2403. Money Follows the Person Rebalancing 
Demonstration. 
 Sec. 2404. Protection for recipients of home 
and community-based services against spousal 
impoverishment.   
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 Sec. 2405. Funding to expand State Aging and 
Disability Resource Centers. 
 Sec. 2406. Sense of the Senate regarding 
long-term care. 
Subtitle F – Medicaid Prescription Drug Coverage 
 Sec. 2501. Prescription drug rebates. 
 Sec. 2502. Elimination of exclusion of coverage 
of certain drugs. 
 Sec. 2503. Providing adequate pharmacy 
reimbursement. 
Subtitle G – Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
Hospital (DSH) Payments 
 Sec. 2551. Disproportionate share hospital 
payments. 
Subtitle H – Improved Coordination for Dual Eligible 
Beneficiaries 
 Sec. 2601. 5-year period for demonstration 
projects. 
 Sec. 2602. Providing Federal coverage and 
payment coordination for dual eligible beneficiaries. 
Subtitle I – Improving the Quality of Medicaid for 
Patients and Providers 
 Sec. 2701. Adult health quality measures. 
 Sec. 2702. Payment Adjustment for Health 
Care-Acquired Conditions. 
 Sec. 2703. State option to provide health homes 
for enrollees with chronic conditions. 
 Sec. 2704. Demonstration project to evaluate 
integrated care around a hospitalization. 
 Sec. 2705. Medicaid Global Payment System 
Demonstration Project. 
 Sec. 2706. Pediatric Accountable Care Organization 
Demonstration Project. 
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 Sec. 2707. Medicaid emergency psychiatric 
demonstration project. 
Subtitle J – Improvements to the Medicaid and CHIP 
Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC) 
 Sec. 2801. MACPAC assessment of policies 
affecting all Medicaid beneficiaries. 
Subtitle K – Protections for American Indians and 
Alaska Natives 
 Sec. 2901. Special rules relating to Indians. 
 Sec. 2902. Elimination of sunset for reimbursement 
for all Medicare part B services furnished by certain 
Indian hospitals and clinics. 
Subtitle L – Maternal and Child Health Services 
 Sec. 2951. Maternal, infant, and early childhood 
home visiting programs. 
 Sec. 2952. Support, education, and research for 
postpartum depression. 
 Sec. 2953. Personal responsibility education. 
 Sec. 2954. Restoration of funding for abstinence 
education. 
 Sec. 2955. Inclusion of information about the 
importance of having a health care power of attorney 
in transition planning for children aging out of foster 
care and independent living programs. 
TITLE III – IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND 
EFFICIENCY OF HEALTH CARE 
Subtitle A – Transforming the Health Care Delivery 
System 
Part I – Linking Payment to Quality Outcomes Under 
the Medicare Program 
 Sec. 3001. Hospital Value-Based purchasing 
program. 
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 Sec. 3002. Improvements to the physician 
quality reporting system. 
 Sec. 3003. Improvements to the physician 
feedback program. 
 Sec. 3004. Quality reporting for long-term care 
hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation hospitals, and 
hospice programs. 
 Sec. 3005. Quality reporting for PPS-exempt 
cancer hospitals. 
 Sec. 3006. Plans for a Value-Based purchasing 
program for skilled nursing facilities and home 
health agencies. 
 Sec. 3007. Value-based payment modifier under 
the physician fee schedule. 
 Sec. 3008. Payment adjustment for conditions 
acquired in hospitals. 
Part II – National Strategy to Improve Health Care 
Quality 
 Sec. 3011. National strategy. 
 Sec. 3012. Interagency Working Group on 
Health Care Quality. 
 Sec. 3013. Quality measure development. 
 Sec. 3014. Quality measurement. 
 Sec. 3015. Data collection; public reporting. 
Part III – Encouraging Development of New Patient 
Care Models 
 Sec. 3021. Establishment of Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation within CMS. 
 Sec. 3022. Medicare shared savings program. 
 Sec. 3023. National pilot program on payment 
bundling. 
 Sec. 3024. Independence at home demonstration 
program. 
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 Sec. 3025. Hospital readmissions reduction 
program. 
 Sec. 3026. Community-Based Care Transitions 
Program. 
 Sec. 3027. Extension of gainsharing demonstration. 
Subtitle B – Improving Medicare for Patients and 
Providers 
Part I – Ensuring Beneficiary Access to Physician 
Care and Other Services 
 Sec. 3101. Increase in the physician payment 
update. 
 Sec. 3102. Extension of the work geographic 
index floor and revisions to the practice expense 
geographic adjustment under the Medicare physician 
fee schedule. 
 Sec. 3103. Extension of exceptions process for 
Medicare therapy caps. 
 Sec. 3104. Extension of payment for technical 
component of certain physician pathology services. 
 Sec. 3105. Extension of ambulance add-ons. 
 Sec. 3106. Extension of certain payment rules 
for long-term care hospital services and of moratorium 
on the establishment of certain hospitals and 
facilities. 
 Sec. 3107. Extension of physician fee schedule 
mental health add-on. 
 Sec. 3108. Permitting physician assistants to 
order post-Hospital extended care services. 
 Sec. 3109. Exemption of certain pharmacies 
from accreditation requirements. 
 Sec. 3110. Part B special enrollment period for 
disabled TRICARE beneficiaries. 
 Sec. 3111. Payment for bone density tests. 
 Sec. 3112. Revision to the Medicare Improvement 
Fund. 
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 Sec. 3113. Treatment of certain complex diagnostic 
laboratory tests. 
 Sec. 3114. Improved access for certified nurse-
midwife services. 
Part II – Rural Protections 
 Sec. 3121. Extension of outpatient hold harmless 
provision. 
 Sec. 3122. Extension of Medicare reasonable costs 
payments for certain clinical diagnostic laboratory 
tests furnished to hospital patients in certain rural 
areas. 
 Sec. 3123. Extension of the Rural Community 
Hospital Demonstration Program. 
 Sec. 3124. Extension of the Medicare-dependent 
hospital (MDH) program. 
 Sec. 3125. Temporary improvements to the 
Medicare inpatient hospital payment adjustment for 
low-volume hospitals. 
 Sec. 3126. Improvements to the demonstration 
project on community health integration models in 
certain rural counties. 
 Sec. 3127. MedPAC study on adequacy of 
Medicare payments for health care providers serving 
in rural areas. 
 Sec. 3128. Technical correction related to 
critical access hospital services. 
 Sec. 3129. Extension of and revisions to 
Medicare rural hospital flexibility program. 
Part III – Improving Payment Accuracy 
 Sec. 3131. Payment adjustments for home 
health care. 
 Sec. 3132. Hospice reform. 
 Sec. 3133. Improvement to Medicare 
disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments. 
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 Sec. 3134. Misvalued codes under the physician 
fee schedule. 
 Sec. 3135. Modification of equipment utilization 
factor for advanced imaging services. 
 Sec. 3136. Revision of payment for power-driven 
wheelchairs. 
 Sec. 3137. Hospital wage index improvement. 
 Sec. 3138. Treatment of certain cancer hospitals. 
 Sec. 3139. Payment for biosimilar biological 
products. 
 Sec. 3140. Medicare hospice concurrent care 
demonstration program. 
 Sec. 3141. Application of budget neutrality on 
a national basis in the calculation of the Medicare 
hospital wage index floor. 
 Sec. 3142. HHS study on urban Medicare-dependent 
hospitals. 
 Sec. 3143. Protecting home health benefits. 
Subtitle C – Provisions Relating to Part C 
 Sec. 3201. Medicare Advantage payment. 
 Sec. 3202. Benefit protection and simplification. 
 Sec. 3203. Application of coding intensity 
adjustment during MA payment transition. 
 Sec. 3204. Simplification of annual beneficiary 
election periods. 
 Sec. 3205. Extension for specialized MA plans 
for special needs individuals. 
 Sec. 3206. Extension of reasonable cost contracts. 
 Sec. 3207. Technical correction to MA private 
fee-for-service plans. 
 Sec. 3208. Making senior housing facility 
demonstration permanent. 
 Sec. 3209. Authority to deny plan bids. 
 Sec. 3210. Development of new standards for 
certain Medigap plans. 
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Subtitle D – Medicare Part D Improvements for 
Prescription Drug Plans and MA-PD Plans 
 Sec. 3301. Medicare coverage gap discount 
program. 
 Sec. 3302. Improvement in determination of 
Medicare part D low-income benchmark premium. 
 Sec. 3303. Voluntary de minimis policy for subsidy 
eligible individuals under prescription drug plans and 
MA-PD plans. 
 Sec. 3304. Special rule for widows and widowers 
regarding eligibility for low-income assistance. 
 Sec. 3305. Improved information for subsidy 
eligible individuals reassigned to prescription drug 
plans and MA-PD plans. 
 Sec. 3306. Funding outreach and assistance for 
low-income programs. 
 Sec. 3307. Improving formulary requirements 
for prescription drug plans and MA-PD plans with 
respect to certain categories or classes of drugs. 
 Sec. 3308. Reducing part D premium subsidy 
for high-income beneficiaries. 
 Sec. 3309. Elimination of cost sharing for certain 
dual eligible individuals. 
 Sec. 3310. Reducing wasteful dispensing of 
outpatient prescription drugs in long-term care 
facilities under prescription drug plans and MA-PD 
plans. 
 Sec. 3311. Improved Medicare prescription drug 
plan and MA-PD plan complaint system. 
 Sec. 3312. Uniform exceptions and appeals process 
for prescription drug plans and MA-PD plans. 
 Sec. 3313. Office of the Inspector General studies 
and reports. 
 Sec. 3314. Including costs incurred by AIDS 
drug assistance programs and Indian Health Service 
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in providing prescription drugs toward the annual 
out-of-pocket threshold under part D. 
 Sec. 3315. Immediate reduction in coverage gap 
in 2010. 
Subtitle E – Ensuring Medicare Sustainability 
 Sec. 3401. Revision of certain market basket 
updates and incorporation of productivity improvements 
into market basket updates that do not already 
incorporate such improvements. 
 Sec. 3402. Temporary adjustment to the 
calculation of part B premiums. 
 Sec. 3403. Independent Medicare Advisory Board. 
Subtitle F – Health Care Quality Improvements 
 Sec. 3501. Health care delivery system research; 
Quality improvement technical assistance. 
 Sec. 3502. Establishing community health teams 
to support the patient-centered medical home. 
 Sec. 3503. Medication management services in 
treatment of chronic disease. 
 Sec. 3504. Design and implementation of 
regionalized systems for emergency care. 
 Sec. 3505. Trauma care centers and service 
availability. 
 Sec. 3506. Program to facilitate shared 
decisionmaking. 
 Sec. 3507. Presentation of prescription drug 
benefit and risk information. 
 Sec. 3508. Demonstration program to integrate 
quality improvement and patient safety training into 
clinical education of health professionals. 
 Sec. 3509. Improving women’s health. 
 Sec. 3510. Patient navigator program. 
 Sec. 3511. Authorization of appropriations. 
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Subtitle G – Protecting and Improving Guaranteed 
Medicare Benefits 
 Sec. 3601. Protecting and improving guaranteed 
Medicare benefits. 
 Sec. 3602. No cuts in guaranteed benefits. 
TITLE IV – PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASE 
AND IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH 
Subtitle A – Modernizing Disease Prevention and 
Public Health Systems 
 Sec. 4001. National Prevention, Health Promotion 
and Public Health Council. 
 Sec. 4002. Prevention and Public Health Fund. 
 Sec. 4003. Clinical and community preventive 
services. 
 Sec. 4004. Education and outreach campaign 
regarding preventive benefits. 
Subtitle B – Increasing Access to Clinical Preventive 
Services 
 Sec. 4101. School-based health centers. 
 Sec. 4102. Oral healthcare prevention activities. 
 Sec. 4103. Medicare coverage of annual wellness 
visit providing a personalized prevention plan. 
 Sec. 4104. Removal of barriers to preventive 
services in Medicare. 
 Sec. 4105. Evidence-based coverage of preventive 
services in Medicare. 
 Sec. 4106. Improving access to preventive 
services for eligible adults in Medicaid. 
 Sec. 4107. Coverage of comprehensive tobacco 
cessation services for pregnant women in Medicaid. 
 Sec. 4108. Incentives for prevention of chronic 
diseases in Medicaid. 
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Subtitle C – Creating Healthier Communities 
 Sec. 4201. Community transformation grants. 
 Sec. 4202. Healthy aging, living well; evaluation 
of community-based prevention and wellness programs 
for Medicare beneficiaries. 
 Sec. 4203. Removing barriers and improving 
access to wellness for individuals with disabilities. 
 Sec. 4204. Immunizations. 
 Sec. 4205. Nutrition labeling of standard menu 
items at chain restaurants. 
 Sec. 4206. Demonstration project concerning 
individualized wellness plan. 
 Sec. 4207. Reasonable break time for nursing 
mothers. 
Subtitle D – Support for Prevention and Public 
Health Innovation 
 Sec. 4301. Research on optimizing the delivery 
of public health services. 
 Sec. 4302. Understanding health disparities: 
data collection and analysis. 
 Sec. 4303. CDC and employer-based wellness 
programs. 
 Sec. 4304. Epidemiology-Laboratory Capacity 
Grants. 
 Sec. 4305. Advancing research and treatment for 
pain care management. 
 Sec. 4306. Funding for Childhood Obesity 
Demonstration Project. 
Subtitle E – Miscellaneous Provisions 
 Sec. 4401. Sense of the Senate concerning CBO 
scoring. 
 Sec. 4402. Effectiveness of Federal health and 
wellness initiatives. 
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TITLE V – HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 
Subtitle A – Purpose and Definitions 
 Sec. 5001. Purpose. 
 Sec. 5002. Definitions. 
Subtitle B – Innovations in the Health Care Workforce 
 Sec. 5101. National health care workforce 
commission. 
 Sec. 5102. State health care workforce development 
grants. 
 Sec. 5103. Health care workforce assessment. 
Subtitle C – Increasing the Supply of the Health Care 
Workforce 
 Sec. 5201. Federally supported student loan funds. 
 Sec. 5202. Nursing student loan program. 
 Sec. 5203. Health care workforce loan repayment 
programs. 
 Sec. 5204. Public health workforce recruitment 
and retention programs. 
 Sec. 5205. Allied health workforce recruitment 
and retention programs. 
 Sec. 5206. Grants for State and local programs. 
 Sec. 5207. Funding for National Health Service 
Corps. 
 Sec. 5208. Nurse-managed health clinics. 
 Sec. 5209. Elimination of cap on commissioned 
corps. 
 Sec. 5210. Establishing a Ready Reserve Corps. 
Subtitle D – Enhancing Health Care Workforce 
Education and Training 
 Sec. 5301. Training in family medicine, general 
internal medicine, general pediatrics, and physician 
assistantship. 
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 Sec. 5302. Training opportunities for direct care 
workers. 
 Sec. 5303. Training in general, pediatric, and 
public health dentistry. 
 Sec. 5304. Alternative dental health care providers 
demonstration project. 
 Sec. 5305. Geriatric education and training; 
career awards; comprehensive geriatric education. 
 Sec. 5306. Mental and behavioral health education 
and training grants. 
 Sec. 5307. Cultural competency, prevention, and 
public health and individuals with disabilities training. 
 Sec. 5308. Advanced nursing education grants. 
 Sec. 5309. Nurse education, practice, and retention 
grants. 
 Sec. 5310. Loan repayment and scholarship 
program. 
 Sec. 5311. Nurse faculty loan program. 
 Sec. 5312. Authorization of appropriations for 
parts B through D of title VIII. 
 Sec. 5313. Grants to promote the community 
health workforce. 
 Sec. 5314. Fellowship training in public health. 
 Sec. 5315. United States Public Health Sciences 
Track. 
Subtitle E – Supporting the Existing Health Care 
Workforce 
 Sec. 5401. Centers of excellence. 
 Sec. 5402. Health care professionals training for 
diversity. 
 Sec. 5403. Interdisciplinary, community-based 
linkages. 
 Sec. 5404. Workforce diversity grants. 
 Sec. 5405. Primary care extension program. 
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Subtitle F – Strengthening Primary Care and Other 
Workforce Improvements 
 Sec. 5501. Expanding access to primary care 
services and general surgery services. 
 Sec. 5502. Medicare Federally qualified health 
center improvements. 
 Sec. 5503. Distribution of additional residency 
positions. 
 Sec. 5504. Counting resident time in nonprovider 
settings. 
 Sec. 5505. Rules for counting resident time for 
didactic and scholarly activities and other activities. 
 Sec. 5506. Preservation of resident cap positions 
from closed hospitals. 
 Sec. 5507. Demonstration projects To address 
health professions workforce needs; extension of 
family-to-family health information centers. 
 Sec. 5508. Increasing teaching capacity. 
 Sec. 5509. Graduate nurse education 
demonstration. 
Subtitle G – Improving Access to Health Care 
Services 
 Sec. 5601. Spending for Federally Qualified 
Health Centers (FQHCs). 
 Sec. 5602. Negotiated rulemaking for development 
of methodology and criteria for designating medically 
underserved populations and health professions 
shortage areas. 
 Sec. 5603. Reauthorization of the Wakefield 
Emergency Medical Services for Children Program. 
 Sec. 5604. Co-locating primary and specialty 
care in community-based mental health settings. 
 Sec. 5605. Key National indicators. 
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Subtitle H – General Provisions 
 Sec. 5701. Reports. 
TITLE VI – TRANSPARENCY AND PROGRAM 
INTEGRITY 
Subtitle A – Physician Ownership and Other 
Transparency 
 Sec. 6001. Limitation on Medicare exception to 
the prohibition on certain physician referrals for 
hospitals. 
 Sec. 6002. Transparency reports and reporting 
of physician ownership or investment interests. 
 Sec. 6003. Disclosure requirements for in-office 
ancillary services exception to the prohibition on 
physician self-referral for certain imaging services. 
 Sec. 6004. Prescription drug sample transparency. 
 Sec. 6005. Pharmacy benefit managers 
transparency requirements. 
Subtitle B – Nursing Home Transparency and 
Improvement 
Part I – Improving Transparency of Information 
 Sec. 6101. Required disclosure of ownership and 
additional disclosable parties information. 
 Sec. 6102. Accountability requirements for skilled 
nursing facilities and nursing facilities. 
 Sec. 6103. Nursing home compare Medicare 
website. 
 Sec. 6104. Reporting of expenditures. 
 Sec. 6105. Standardized complaint form. 
 Sec. 6106. Ensuring staffing accountability. 
 Sec. 6107. GAO study and report on Five-Star 
Quality Rating System. 
Part II – Targeting Enforcement 
 Sec. 6111. Civil money penalties. 
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 Sec. 6112. National independent monitor 
demonstration project. 
 Sec. 6113. Notification of facility closure. 
 Sec. 6114. National demonstration projects on 
culture change and use of information technology in 
nursing homes. 
Part III – Improving Staff Training 
 Sec. 6121. Dementia and abuse prevention 
training. 
Subtitle C – Nationwide Program for National and 
State Background Checks on Direct Patient Access 
Employees of Long-term Care Facilities and 
Providers 
 Sec. 6201. Nationwide program for National 
and State background checks on direct patient access 
employees of long-term care facilities and providers. 
Subtitle D – Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
 Sec. 6301. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research. 
 Sec. 6302. Federal coordinating council for 
comparative effectiveness research. 
Subtitle E – Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP Program 
Integrity Provisions 
 Sec. 6401. Provider screening and other 
enrollment requirements under Medicare, Medicaid, 
and CHIP. 
 Sec. 6402. Enhanced Medicare and Medicaid 
program integrity provisions. 
 Sec. 6403. Elimination of duplication between 
the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank 
and the National Practitioner Data Bank. 
 Sec. 6404. Maximum period for submission of 
Medicare claims reduced to not more than 12 months. 
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 Sec. 6405. Physicians who order items or services 
required to be Medicare enrolled physicians or eligible 
professionals. 
 Sec. 6406. Requirement for physicians to provide 
documentation on referrals to programs at high risk 
of waste and abuse. 
 Sec. 6407. Face to face encounter with patient 
required before physicians may certify eligibility for 
home health services or durable medical equipment 
under Medicare. 
 Sec. 6408. Enhanced penalties. 
 Sec. 6409. Medicare self-referral disclosure 
protocol. 
 Sec. 6410. Adjustments to the Medicare durable 
medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies 
competitive acquisition program. 
 Sec. 6411. Expansion of the Recovery Audit 
Contractor (RAC) program. 
Subtitle F – Additional Medicaid Program Integrity 
Provisions 
 Sec. 6501. Termination of provider participation 
under Medicaid if terminated under Medicare or 
other State plan. 
 Sec. 6502. Medicaid exclusion from participation 
relating to certain ownership, control, and management 
affiliations. 
 Sec. 6503. Billing agents, clearinghouses, or 
other alternate payees required to register under 
Medicaid. 
 Sec. 6504. Requirement to report expanded set 
of data elements under MMIS to detect fraud and 
abuse. 
 Sec. 6505. Prohibition on payments to institutions 
or entities located outside of the United States. 
 Sec. 6506. Overpayments. 
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 Sec. 6507. Mandatory State use of national 
correct coding initiative. 
 Sec. 6508. General effective date. 
Subtitle G – Additional Program Integrity Provisions 
 Sec. 6601. Prohibition on false statements and 
representations. 
 Sec. 6602. Clarifying definition. 
 Sec. 6603. Development of model uniform report 
form. 
 Sec. 6604. Applicability of State law to combat 
fraud and abuse. 
 Sec. 6605. Enabling the Department of Labor to 
issue administrative summary cease and desist 
orders and summary seizures orders against plans 
that are in financially hazardous condition. 
 Sec. 6606. MEWA plan registration with 
Department of Labor. 
 Sec. 6607. Permitting evidentiary privilege and 
confidential communications. 
Subtitle H – Elder Justice Act 
 Sec. 6701. Short title of subtitle. 
 Sec. 6702. Definitions. 
 Sec. 6703. Elder Justice. 
Subtitle I – Sense of the Senate Regarding Medical 
Malpractice 
 Sec. 6801. Sense of the Senate regarding medical 
malpractice. 
TITLE VII – IMPROVING ACCESS TO INNOVATIVE 
MEDICAL THERAPIES 
Subtitle A – Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation 
 Sec. 7001. Short title. 
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 Sec. 7002. Approval pathway for biosimilar 
biological products. 
 Sec. 7003. Savings. 
Subtitle B – More Affordable Medicines for Children 
and Underserved Communities 
 Sec. 7101. Expanded participation in 340B 
program. 
 Sec. 7102. Improvements to 340B program 
integrity. 
 Sec. 7103. GAO study to make recommendations 
on improving the 340B program. 
TITLE VIII – CLASS ACT 
 Sec. 8001. Short title of title. 
 Sec. 8002. Establishment of national voluntary 
insurance program for purchasing community living 
assistance services and support. 
TITLE IX – REVENUE PROVISIONS 
Subtitle A – Revenue Offset Provisions 
 Sec. 9001. Excise tax on high cost 
employer-sponsored health coverage. 
 Sec. 9002. Inclusion of cost of employer-sponsored 
health coverage on W-2. 
 Sec. 9003. Distributions for medicine qualified 
only if for prescribed drug or insulin. 
 Sec. 9004. Increase in additional tax on 
distributions from HSAs and Archer MSAs not used 
for qualified medical expenses. 
 Sec. 9005. Limitation on health flexible spending 
arrangements under cafeteria plans. 
 Sec. 9006. Expansion of information reporting 
requirements. 
 Sec. 9007. Additional requirements for charitable 
hospitals. 
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 Sec. 9008. Imposition of annual fee on branded 
prescription pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
importers. 
 Sec. 9009. Imposition of annual fee on medical 
device manufacturers and importers. 
 Sec. 9010.  Imposition of annual fee on health 
insurance providers. 
 Sec. 9011. Study and report of effect on 
veterans health care. 
 Sec. 9012. Elimination of deduction for expenses 
allocable to Medicare Part D subsidy. 
 Sec. 9013. Modification of itemized deduction 
for medical expenses. 
 Sec. 9014. Limitation on excessive remuneration 
paid by certain health insurance providers. 
 Sec. 9015. Additional hospital insurance tax on 
high-income taxpayers. 
 Sec. 9016. Modification of section 833 treatment 
of certain health organizations. 
 Sec. 9017. Excise tax on elective cosmetic 
medical procedures. 
Subtitle B – Other Provisions 
 Sec. 9021. Exclusion of health benefits provided 
by Indian tribal governments. 
 Sec. 9022. Establishment of simple cafeteria 
plans for small businesses. 
 Sec. 9023. Qualifying therapeutic discovery project 
credit. 
TITLE X – STRENGTHENING QUALITY, 
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL 
AMERICANS 
Subtitle A – Provisions Relating to Title I 
 Sec. 10101. Amendments to subtitle A. 
 Sec. 10102. Amendments to subtitle B. 
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 Sec. 10103. Amendments to subtitle C. 
 Sec. 10104. Amendments to subtitle D. 
 Sec. 10105. Amendments to subtitle E. 
 Sec. 10106. Amendments to subtitle F. 
 Sec. 10107. Amendments to subtitle G. 
 Sec. 10108. Free choice vouchers. 
 Sec. 10109. Development of standards for financial 
and administrative transactions. 
Subtitle B – Provisions Relating to Title II 
Part I – Medicaid and CHIP 
 Sec. 10201. Amendments to the Social Security 
Act and title II of this Act. 
 Sec. 10202. Incentives for States to offer home 
and community-based services as a long-term care 
alternative to nursing homes. 
 Sec. 10203. Extension of funding for CHIP 
through fiscal year 2015 and other CHIP-related 
provisions. 
Part II – Support for Pregnant and Parenting Teens 
and Women 
 Sec. 10211. Definitions. 
 Sec. 10212. Establishment of pregnancy assistance 
fund. 
 Sec. 10213. Permissible uses of Fund. 
 Sec. 10214. Appropriations. 
Part III – Indian Health Care Improvement 
 Sec. 10221. Indian health care improvement. 
Subtitle C – Provisions Relating to Title III 
 Sec. 10301. Plans for a Value-Based purchasing 
program for ambulatory surgical centers. 
 Sec. 10302. Revision to national strategy for 
quality improvement in health care. 
 Sec. 10303. Development of outcome measures. 
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 Sec. 10304. Selection of efficiency measures. 
 Sec. 10305. Data collection; public reporting. 
 Sec. 10306. Improvements under the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. 
 Sec. 10307. Improvements to the Medicare shared 
savings program. 
 Sec. 10308. Revisions to national pilot program 
on payment bundling. 
 Sec. 10309. Revisions to hospital readmissions 
reduction program. 
 Sec. 10310. Repeal of physician payment update. 
 Sec. 10311. Revisions to extension of ambulance 
add-ons. 
 Sec. 10312. Certain payment rules for long-term 
care hospital services and moratorium on the 
establishment of certain hospitals and facilities. 
 Sec. 10313. Revisions to the extension for the 
rural community hospital demonstration program. 
 Sec. 10314. Adjustment to low-volume hospital 
provision. 
 Sec. 10315. Revisions to home health care 
provisions. 
 Sec. 10316. Medicare DSH. 
 Sec. 10317. Revisions to extension of section 
508 hospital provisions. 
 Sec. 10318. Revisions to transitional extra benefits 
under Medicare Advantage. 
 Sec. 10319. Revisions to market basket 
adjustments. 
 Sec. 10320. Expansion of the scope of, and 
additional improvements to, the Independent Medicare 
Advisory Board. 
 Sec. 10321. Revision to community health teams. 
 Sec. 10322. Quality reporting for psychiatric 
hospitals. 
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 Sec. 10323. Medicare coverage for individuals 
exposed to environmental health hazards. 
 Sec. 10324. Protections for frontier States. 
 Sec. 10325. Revision to skilled nursing facility 
prospective payment system. 
 Sec. 10326. Pilot testing pay-for-performance 
programs for certain Medicare providers. 
 Sec. 10327. Improvements to the physician quality 
reporting system. 
 Sec. 10328. Improvement in part D medication 
therapy management (MTM) programs. 
 Sec. 10329. Developing methodology to assess 
health plan value. 
 Sec. 10330. Modernizing computer and data 
systems of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
services to support improvements in care delivery. 
 Sec. 10331. Public reporting of performance 
information. 
 Sec. 10332. Availability of Medicare data for 
performance measurement. 
 Sec. 10333. Community-based collaborative care 
networks. 
 Sec. 10334. Minority health. 
 Sec. 10335. Technical correction to the hospital 
value-based purchasing program. 
 Sec. 10336. GAO study and report on Medicare 
beneficiary access to high-quality dialysis services. 
Subtitle D – Provisions Relating to Title IV 
 Sec. 10401. Amendments to subtitle A. 
 Sec. 10402. Amendments to subtitle B. 
 Sec. 10403. Amendments to subtitle C. 
 Sec. 10404. Amendments to subtitle D. 
 Sec. 10405. Amendments to subtitle E. 
 Sec. 10406. Amendment relating to waiving 
coinsurance for preventive services. 
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 Sec. 10407. Better diabetes care. 
 Sec. 10408. Grants for small businesses to 
provide comprehensive workplace wellness programs. 
 Sec. 10409. Cures Acceleration Network. 
 Sec. 10410. Centers of Excellence for Depression. 
 Sec. 10411. Programs relating to congenital heart 
disease. 
 Sec. 10412. Automated Defibrillation in Adam’s 
Memory Act. 
 Sec. 10413. Young women’s breast health 
awareness and support of young women diagnosed 
with breast cancer. 
Subtitle E – Provisions Relating to Title V 
 Sec. 10501. Amendments to the Public Health 
Service Act, the Social Security Act, and title V of this 
Act. 
 Sec. 10502. Infrastructure to Expand Access to 
Care. 
 Sec. 10503. Community Health Centers and the 
National Health Service Corps Fund. 
 Sec. 10504. Demonstration project to provide 
access to affordable care. 
Subtitle F – Provisions Relating to Title VI 
 Sec. 10601. Revisions to limitation on Medicare 
exception to the prohibition on certain physician 
referrals for hospitals. 
 Sec. 10602. Clarifications to patient-centered 
outcomes research. 
 Sec. 10603. Striking provisions relating to 
individual provider application fees. 
 Sec. 10604. Technical correction to section 6405. 
 Sec. 10605. Certain other providers permitted 
to conduct face to face encounter for home health 
services. 
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 Sec. 10606. Health care fraud enforcement. 
 Sec. 10607. State demonstration programs to 
evaluate alternatives to current medical tort litigation. 
 Sec. 10608. Extension of medical malpractice 
coverage to free clinics. 
 Sec. 10609. Labeling changes. 
Subtitle G – Provisions Relating to Title VIII 
 Sec. 10801. Provisions relating to title VIII. 
Subtitle H – Provisions Relating to Title IX 
 Sec. 10901. Modifications to excise tax on high 
cost employer-sponsored health coverage. 
 Sec. 10902. Inflation adjustment of limitation on 
health flexible spending arrangements under cafeteria 
plans. 
 Sec. 10903. Modification of limitation on charges 
by charitable hospitals. 
 Sec. 10904. Modification of annual fee on medical 
device manufacturers and importers. 
 Sec. 10905. Modification of annual fee on health 
insurance providers. 
 Sec. 10906. Modifications to additional hospital 
insurance tax on high-income taxpayers. 
 Sec. 10907. Excise tax on indoor tanning services 
in lieu of elective cosmetic medical procedures. 
 Sec. 10908. Exclusion for assistance provided to 
participants in State student loan repayment programs 
for certain health professionals. 
 Sec. 10909. Expansion of adoption credit and 
adoption assistance programs. 
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Civil Action No. 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Filed Sep. 23, 2010) 
*    *    * 
[Following a discussion of remedies and severability, 
and noting the following if the court “were to rule in 
Virginia’s favor at the merits stage”:] 
 Under these principles, some provisions of the 
Act plainly cannot survive. As defendants repeatedly 
have made clear – in passages that Virginia inflates 
beyond their obvious meaning – insurance industry 
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reforms in Section 1201 such as guaranteed-issue 
and community-rating will stand or fall with the 
minimum coverage provision. As noted, these reforms 
within Section 1201 protect the 57 million Americans 
with pre-existing medical conditions by requiring 
insurers to issue policies to those persons at non-
discriminatory rates. As Virginia correctly recognizes 
(Pl.’s Mem. 26-27), these regulations of the interstate 
insurance market must be coupled with the minimum 
coverage provision in order to be effective. Absent a 
minimum coverage provision, the guaranteed-issue 
and community-rating reforms in Section 1201 would 
cause many to drop coverage, leading to a spiral of 
increased premiums and a shrinking risk pool – the 
insurance market will “implode.” Because Congress 
would not have intended this result, these reforms 
cannot be severed from the minimum coverage 
provision.14 
*    *    * 
  
 
 14 This link establishes that the minimum coverage 
provision is constitutional, however, as Congress has the power 
to enact measures to ensure the vitality of its broader 
regulations of interstate commerce. See Dean, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 
460. 
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*    *    * 
 [88] So what the government has quote, unquote, 
conceded, is that there are a number of specific 
provisions that the – particularly 2701, 2702, 2704, 
which are the guaranteed issues, they are the parts of 
the Bill that really impose the most core commerce – 
reforms on insurance companies; the preexisting 
conditions, lifetime caps, and things of that nature. 
But those are the provisions really for the reasons 
that we’ve said the two are necessary, those really 
couldn’t stand. That they would create exactly the 
kind of market implosion that we talked about, and 
we’re consistent about that. 
*    *    * 
  [89] MR. GERSHENGORN: Your Honor, 
the only ones that we think necessarily fall are those 
– the three that I mentioned. The others, there are – 
it’s clear that the Medicaid one doesn’t fall. I think 
that the others would require a further analysis that 
I don’t think, quite frankly, either side has done in 
the briefing before this Court. 
*    *    * 
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II. COMMONWEALTH’S STATEMENT OF 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
 Pursuant to Local Rule 56(b), the Commonwealth 
submits the following statement of facts believed to 
be undisputed. 
1. At the 2010 Regular Session of the Virginia 
General Assembly, Virginia Code § 38.2-3430.1:1, 
the Health Care Freedom Act, was enacted 
with the assent of the Governor. (Doc. 1 at 1 
¶ 1; Doc. 87 at 1 ¶ 2).  
2. That statute provides:  
No resident of this Commonwealth, 
regardless of whether he has or is 
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eligible for health insurance 
coverage under any policy or 
program provided by or through his 
employer, or a plan sponsored by 
the Commonwealth or the federal 
government, shall be required to 
obtain or maintain a policy of 
individual insurance coverage 
except as required by a court or the 
Department of Social Services 
where an individual is named a 
party in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. No provision of this title 
shall render a resident of this 
Commonwealth liable for any 
penalty, assessment, fee, or fine as a 
result of his failure to procure or 
obtain health insurance coverage. 
This section shall not apply to 
individuals voluntarily applying for 
coverage under a state-administered 
program pursuant to Title XIX or 
Title XXI of the Social Security Act. 
This section shall not apply to 
students being required by an 
institution of higher education to 
obtain and maintain health 
insurance as a condition of 
enrollment. Nothing herein shall 
impair the rights of persons to 
privately contract for health 
insurance for family members or 
former family members.  
 (Doc. 1 ¶ 3; Doc. 87 at 1 ¶ 3). 
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3. Subsequently, PPACA was enacted into law. 
124 Stat. 119, 1029 (2010).  
4. Congress expressly stated that the mandate 
and penalty were essential elements of the 
act without which the statutory scheme 
cannot function. (PPACA § 1501; § 10106).  
5. The Federal act contains no severability 
clause. (PPACA passim).  
6. Kathleen Sebelius in her official capacity is 
presently responsible for administering 
PPACA. (PPACA passim; Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 8; Doc. 
87 at 2 ¶ 8).  
7. Before the act was passed, the Senate 
Finance Committee asked the Congressional 
Research Service to opine on the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate. 
The Service replied: “Whether such a 
requirement would be constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most 
challenging question posed by such a 
proposal, as it is a novel issue whether 
Congress may use this Clause to require an 
individual to purchase a good or a service.” 
Cong. Research Serv. Requiring Individuals 
to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional 
Analysis 3 (2009). Similar advice was given 
by the Congressional Budget Office in 
connection with the Clinton administration 
health care initiative. See The Budgetary 
Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy 
Health Insurance, CBO Memorandum, at 1 
(August 1994), available at http://www. 
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (“A 
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mandate requiring all individuals to 
purchase health insurance would be an 
unprecedented form of federal action. The 
government has never required people to buy 
any good or service as a condition of lawful 
residence in the United States. An individual 
mandate would have two features that, in 
combination, would make it unique. First, it 
would impose a duty on individuals as 
members of society. Second, it would require 
people to purchase a specific service that 
would be heavily regulated by the federal 
government.”).  
8. PPACA passed the Senate on a party line 
vote with considerable minority protest. See, 
e.g., Cong. Rec. Nov. 2, 2009 S10965 (no bill); 
id., S10973 (bill being drafted behind closed 
doors); id., Nov. 17, 2009 S11397 (“The 
majority leader has had in his office a secret 
bill that he is working on that we have not 
seen yet.”); id., S11401 (No Child Left Behind 
got 7 weeks on the floor – “We don’t even 
have a bill yet”); id., Nov. 19, 2009 S11819 
(bill is a shell, not the real one); id., Nov. 30, 
2009 S11982 (Official debate begins); id., 
Dec. 3, 2009 S12263 (bill has been on floor 
for 3 days and never has been in committee); 
id., Dec. 5, 2009 S12487 (majority will not 
slow down); id., Dec. 11, 2009 S12981  
(“We are going to have three Democratic 
amendments and one Republican 
amendment voted on, and the Democrats 
wrote the bill”); id., S12977 (votes on 
amendments blocked; “In the meantime, this 
backroom deal that is being cut, which we 
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haven’t seen – supposedly it has been sent to 
the CBO to see what it would cost”); id., Dec. 
14, 2009 S13144 (“There is somewhere in 
this building a hidden bill, known as the 
manager’s amendment, which is being 
drafted by one or two or three people . . . ”); 
id., Dec. 17, 2009 S13344 (bill is not being 
given the legislative time it deserves because 
the polls show a majority of Americans are 
against it and thus it has become a political 
nightmare for the majority who now simply 
want to ram it through before Christmas 
even though “no one outside the majority 
leader’s conference room has seen it yet”); 
id., Dec. 22, 2009 S13756 (Nebraska deal); 
Id., Mar. 10, 2010 H1307 (reconciliation 
being used because bill could not re-pass the 
Senate).  
9. In contrast, the General Assembly of Virginia 
passed several identical versions of the 
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (“HCFA”) 
on a bi-partisan basis, with margins as high 
as 90 to 3 in the House of Delegates and 25 
to 15 in the Senate. See SB 417 Individual 
health insurance coverage; resident of State 
shall not be required to obtain a policy, 
available at http://leg.state.va.us/cgi-bin/ 
legp504.exe?101+sum+SB417. At the time of 
passage of the HCFA, the Virginia House of 
Delegates contained 59 Republicans, 39 
Democrats and 2 Independents, while the 
Virginia Senate contained 22 Democrats and 
18 Republicans. See attached Declarations of 
Bruce Jamerson and Susan Schaar.  
  
App. 158 
10. Although the mandate does not take effect 
for several years, PPACA imposes immediate 
and continuing burdens on Virginia. (Aff. 
Sec’y Hazel) (Doc. 28).  
*    *    * 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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*    *    * 
Response to Plaintiff ’s  
Statement of Material Facts 
 1. The Secretary does not dispute that the 
Virginia legislature has enacted Virginia Code § 38.2-
3430.1:1, but disputes that the statute is more than 
declaratory. In any event, the statute is not material. 
State law cannot revoke powers granted by the 
Constitution to Congress. Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 (“Just 
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as state acquiescence to federal regulation cannot 
expand the bounds of the Commerce Clause, so too 
state action cannot circumscribe Congress’ plenary 
commerce power.”) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (“no 
form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the 
regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to 
Congress”). 
 2. The Secretary does not dispute that Virginia 
has accurately quoted the text of Virginia Code 
§ 38.2-3430.1:1. For the reasons stated in paragraph 
1 above, this fact is not material. 
 3. The Secretary does not dispute that Congress 
has enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 4. The Secretary disputes this statement, as it 
mischaracterizes the cited material. The Secretary 
does not dispute the findings that Congress actually 
made. Congress found that, without a minimum 
coverage provision, the insurance market reforms in 
the Act, such as the ban on denying coverage to 
persons because of pre-existing conditions or charging 
more on the basis of those conditions, would amplify 
existing incentives for individuals to “wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care,” 
thereby shifting greater costs onto third parties. ACA, 
§§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a). Congress accordingly found 
that the minimum coverage provision “is an essential 
part of [the Act’s] larger regulation of economic activity,” 
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and that its absence “would undercut Federal 
regulation of the health insurance market.” Id. 
§§ 1501(a)(2)(H), 10106(a). Congress did not find that 
the minimum coverage provision was essential to 
every element of the ACA. 
 5. The Secretary does not dispute that no single 
provision of the ACA explicitly addresses severability. 
This statement is not material, however, for the 
reasons discussed below at pages 29-33. 
 6. The Secretary disputes this statement. She is 
responsible for the administration of a number of the 
provisions of the ACA. However, the Secretary of  
the Treasury administers the minimum coverage 
provision at issue in this suit. ACA, § 1501(b) (adding 
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)); see 26 U.S.C. § 7801(a). The 
Secretary of the Treasury is not a party in this suit. 
 7. The Secretary disputes this statement. The 
Senate Finance Committee asked the Congressional 
Research Service (“CRS”) to prepare a report 
addressing the constitutionality of the minimum 
coverage provision, and CRS concluded in its report 
that Congress could use its power under the General 
Welfare Clause to enact the minimum coverage 
provision. The Secretary disputes that the minimum 
coverage provision is “unprecedented.” This statement, 
in any event, is not material. 
 8. The Secretary does not dispute that the 
Senate adopted the ACA by a vote of 60-39, and  
the House of Representatives adopted it by a vote of 
219-212. This fact, however, is not material. The 
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constitutionality of a statute adopted by a majority 
vote of both Houses of Congress and signed by the 
President does not turn on the partisan affiliations of 
the proponents or the opponents of the statute. 
 9. The Secretary does not dispute that the 
Virginia legislature has enacted Virginia Code 
§ 38.2-3430.1:1. This fact is not material, however, 
nor are the party affiliations of the Virginia 
legislators who voted for and against this legislative 
statement of position, for the reasons set forth in 
paragraphs 1 and 8 above. 
 10. The Secretary disputes this statement. The 
minimum coverage provision does not impose any 
burdens or obligations on Virginia as a state. Any 
actions that Virginia may undertake as a state 
pursuant to other provisions of the ACA are 
irrelevant to its standing to challenge the minimum 
coverage provision. “[A] plaintiff must establish that 
he has standing to challenge each provision of [a 
statute] by showing that he was injured by 
application of those provisions.” Covenant Media of 
S.C. v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 430 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
*    *    * 
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*    *    * 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
 1. Congress gave detailed consideration to the 
structure of the reforms of the interstate health 
insurance market that it enacted in the ACA, as 
shown by the more than fifty hearings that it held on 
the subject in the 110th and 111th Congresses alone. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, at 954-68 (2010) 
(Ex. 1). The following facts well exceed a rational 
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basis for Congress to conclude that it had authority 
under Article I of the Constitution to enact the ACA, 
and in particular, the minimum coverage provision:1  
 
I. The Widespread Lack of Insurance Coverage 
in the Interstate Market 
 2. In 2009, the United States spent more than 
17 percent of its gross domestic product on health 
care. Pub. L. No. 111-148 (“ACA”), §§ 1501(a)(2)(B), 
10106(a).2 
 3. Notwithstanding these expenditures, 45 
million people – an estimated 15% of the population – 
went without health insurance for some portion of 
2009. Absent the new statute, that number would 
have climbed to 54 million by 2019. CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE (“CBO”), KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS 11 (Dec. 2008) 
 
 1 This is Court does not independently review the facts 
underlying Congress’s conclusion that it had the Article I 
authority to enact a statute. The Court’s task instead is to 
determine “whether a ‘rational basis’ exists” for Congress to so 
conclude. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (quoting 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)). The 
“legislative facts” underlying the conclusion are accordingly not 
subject to courtroom proof. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory 
committee’s note; see also Maersk Line Ltd. v. Care, 271 F. Supp. 
2d 818, 821 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2003).  
 2 Although Congress is not required to set forth 
particularized findings of an activity’s effect on interstate 
commerce, when, as here, it does so, courts “will consider 
congressional findings in [their] analysis.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 21. 
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[hereinafter KEY ISSUES] (Ex. 2); see also CBO, THE 
LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 21-22 (June 2009) (Ex. 
3). 
 4. The pervasive lack of insurance has occured 
[sic] because “[t]he market for health insurance . . . is 
not a well-functioning market.” COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
ADVISERS (“CEA”), THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR HEALTH 
CARE REFORM 16 (June 2009) (submitted into the 
record for The Economic Case for Health Reform: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 111th 
Cong. 5 (2009)) [hereinafter THE ECONOMIC CASE] (Ex. 
4). There are several features that are unique to the 
national health insurance market that have caused 
that market to fail, and that have prevented many 
from obtaining needed insurance. 
 5. Health insurance is a unique market. With 
rare exceptions, individuals cannot make a personal 
choice to eliminate the current or potential future 
consumption of health care services. Nor can 
individuals reliably predict whether they or their 
families will need health care. They may go without 
health care for many years, then unexpectedly suffer 
a debilitating injury or disease and suddenly incur 
high or even catastrophic health care costs. See J.P. 
Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 
100 Q.J. MED. 53, 54-55 (2007) (Ex. 5). This 
combination of universal need and unavoidable 
uncertainty gave rise to the private health insurance 
industry, as well as federal programs such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, and federal regulation under 
statutes such as ERISA, COBRA, EMTALA, and 
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HIPAA. In this market, everyone is a participant 
because everyone, in one way or another, is faced with 
managing the financial risks associated with 
unpredictable future health care costs. Katherine 
Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Myths and 
Misconceptions About U.S. Health Insurance, 27 
HEALTH AFFAIRS w533, w534 (2008) (Ex. 6); Jonathan 
Gruber, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 442-28 
(3d ed. 2009) (Ex. 7). 
 6. When a person does fall ill, he is effectively 
assured of at least a basic level of care, without 
regard to his insured status. Under the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd, for example, hospitals that participate in 
Medicare and offer emergency services are required 
to stabilize any patient who arrives, regardless of 
whether he has insurance or otherwise can pay for 
that care. CBO, KEY ISSUES, at 13. In addition, most 
hospitals are nonprofit organizations that “have some 
obligation to provide care for free or for a minimal 
charge to members of their community who could not 
afford it otherwise.” Id. For-profit hospitals “also 
provide such charity or reduced-price care.” Id.  
 7. Because of the availability of this backstop of 
free care, many persons have an incentive not to 
obtain insurance, knowing that they will not bear the 
full cost of their decision to attempt to pay for their 
health care needs out-of-pocket. THE ECONOMIC CASE, 
at 17. See also Bradley Herring, The Effect of the 
Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the 
App. 167 
Demand for Private Health Insurance, 24 J. OF 
HEALTH ECON. 225, 226 (2005) (Ex. 8). 
 8. Most individuals make economic decisions 
whether to attempt to pay for their anticipated health 
care needs through insurance, or to attempt (often 
unsuccessfully) to pay out-of-pocket. In making these 
decisions, individuals weigh the cost of insurance 
against the cost of their potential out-of-pocket 
expenses. See Mark V. Pauly, Risks and Benefits in 
Health Care: The View from Economics, 26 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 653, 657-58 (2007) (Ex. 9). 
 9. Individuals regularly revisit these economic 
decisions whether to purchase insurance or attempt 
to finance their health care needs through another 
manner. Movement in and out of insured status is 
“very fluid.” Of those who are uninsured at some 
point in a given year, about 63% have coverage at 
some other point during the same year. CBO, HOW 
MANY PEOPLE LACK HEALTH INSURANCE AND FOR HOW 
LONG?, 4, 9 (May 2003) (Ex. 10); see also KEY ISSUES, 
at 11. 
 10. Empirical studies document the universal 
need for, and use of, health care services. Far from 
being inactive bystanders, the vast majority of the 
population – even of the uninsured population – has 
participated in the health care market by receiving 
medical services. See June E. O’Neill & Dave  
M. O’Neill, Who Are the Uninsured?: An Analysis  
of America’s Uninsured Population, Their 
Characteristics, and Their Health, 20-22 (2009) (Ex. 
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11) (94% of even long-term uninsured have received 
some level of medical care); see also National Center 
for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2009 at 
318 (2010) (for 2007, 62.6% of uninsured at a given 
point in time had at least one visit to a doctor or 
emergency room within the year) (Ex. 12). 
 11. The health insurance market is also unique 
due to the extreme distribution of risk within the 
market. The large majority of medical expenditures 
are incurred by a small percentage of the population. 
“About 20 percent of the population accounts for 
80 percent of health spending,” with “the sickest 
one-percent accounting for nearly one-quarter of 
health expenditures.” H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, at 
990 (internal quotation omitted). 
 
II. Insurance Industry Incentives to Deny 
Coverage Under Prior Law 
 12. Because of the extremely uneven 
distribution of risk, insurers seek to exclude those 
they deem most likely to incur expenses. 47 Million 
and Counting: Why the Health Care Marketplace Is 
Broken: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
110th Cong. 51-52 (2008) (statement of Mark Hall, 
Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest 
Univ.) (Ex. 13). That is, they adopt practices designed 
– albeit imperfectly – to “cherry-pick healthy people 
and to weed out those who are not as healthy.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, at 990 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
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 13. These practices include medical underwriting, 
or the individualized review of an insurance 
applicant’s health status. This practice is costly, 
resulting in administrative fees that are responsible 
for 26 to 30 percent of the cost of premiums in  
the individual and small group markets. ACA, 
§§ 1501(a)(2)(J), 10106(a). Medical underwriting 
yields substantially higher risk-adjusted premiums or 
outright denial of insurance coverage for an 
estimated one-fifth of applicants, a portion of the 
population that is most in need of coverage. CBO, KEY 
ISSUES, at 81.  
 14. These practices also include: denial of 
coverage for those with pre-existing conditions, even 
minor ones; exclusion of pre-existing conditions from 
coverage; higher, and often unaffordable, premiums 
based on the insured’s medical history; and rescission 
of policies after claims are made. Id. These practices 
are often harsh and unfair for consumers, in that 
“many who need coverage cannot obtain it, and many 
more who have some type of insurance may not have 
adequate coverage to meet their health care needs.” 
Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market 
Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 111th Cong. 53 (2009) (Linda Blumberg, 
Senior Fellow, Urban Inst.) (Ex. 14). Insurers often 
revoke coverage even for relatively minor pre-existing 
conditions. Consumer Choices and Transparency in 
the Health Insurance Industry: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 111th Cong. 
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29-30 (2009) (Karen Pollitz, Research Professor, 
Georgetown Univ. Health Policy Inst.) (Ex. 15). 
 15. More than 57 million Americans have some 
pre-existing medical condition, and thus, absent 
reform, risk denial or rescission of insurance 
coverage. Families USA Foundation, Health Reform: 
Help for Americans with Pre-Existing Conditions,  
at 2 (2010) (Ex. 16). Given that insurers operate  
in interstate commerce and can gauge their 
participation in state markets based on the nature of 
regulation there, see Sara Rosenbaum, Can States 
Pick Up the Health Reform Torch?, 362 NEW ENGL. J. 
MED. e29, at 3 (2010) (Ex. 17), Congress concluded 
that there was a need for regulatory protection at a 
national level. 
 
III. The Substantial Economic Effects of the 
Lack of Insurance Coverage 
 16. Aside from these issues of cost and consumer 
protection, Congress found that the widespread 
inability of Americans to obtain affordable coverage, 
or to obtain coverage at all, also has significant 
additional economic effects. For example, 62 percent 
of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by 
medical expenses. ACA, §§ 1501(a)(2)(G), 10106(a).  
 17. Moreover, the uncertainty that many 
Americans experience as to whether they can obtain 
coverage also constrains the labor market. The 
phenomenon of “job lock,” in which employees avoid 
changing employment because they fear losing 
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coverage, is widespread. Employees are 25% less 
likely to change jobs if they are at risk of losing 
health insurance coverage in doing so. THE ECONOMIC 
CASE at 36-37; see also Gruber, PUBLIC FINANCE AND 
PUBLIC POLICY at 431. 
 18. Insurance industry reform to guarantee 
coverage would alleviate “job lock” and increase 
wages, in the aggregate, by more than $10 billion 
annually, or 0.2% of the gross domestic product. THE 
ECONOMIC CASE at 36-37. 
 19. One result of industry practices that deny, 
impede, or raise the cost of insurance coverage is that 
many millions of people are uninsured. In the 
aggregate, the uninsured shift much of the cost of 
their care onto other persons. The uninsured continue 
to receive health care services, but empirical evidence 
shows they pay only a small portion of the cost. For 
example, one estimate found that hospitals collect 
from uninsured patients on average only 10% of the 
cost of their care. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, 
Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the 
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 665 
n.121 (2008) (Ex. 18). 
 20. This phenomenon is not limited to the 
uninsured with the lowest incomes. On average, 
uninsured persons with incomes of more than 300% 
of the federal poverty level pay for less than one half 
of the cost of the medical care that they receive. 
Herring, 24 J. OF HEALTH ECON. at 229-30. 
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 21. The costs of “uncompensated care” for the 
uninsured fall on other participants in the health 
care market. In the aggregate, that cost shifting 
amounted to $43 billion in 2008, about 5 percent of 
overall hospital revenues. CBO, KEY ISSUES, at 114. 
Indeed, this figure may underestimate the cost 
shifting. One study estimated that the uninsured in 
2008 collectively received $86 billion in care during 
the time they lacked coverage, including $56 billion in 
services for which they did not pay, either in the form 
of bad debts or in the form of reduced-cost or free 
charitable care. Jack Hadley et al., Covering the 
Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of 
Payment, and Incremental Costs 2008, 27 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS w399, w401 (2008) (Ex. 19); CBO, KEY 
ISSUES, at 114; see also CBO, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS 
AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS 1-2 (2006) 
(Ex. 20).  
 22. Public funds subsidize these costs. For 
example, through Disproportionate Share Hospital 
payments, the federal government paid for tens of 
billions of dollars in uncompensated care for the 
uninsured in 2008 alone. Congress determined that 
preventing or reducing cost-shifting would lower 
these public subsidies. H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, 
at 983; see also THE ECONOMIC CASE, at 8. 
 23. The remaining costs in the first instance fall 
on health care providers, which in turn “pass on the 
cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to 
families.” ACA, § 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a). This cost-
shifting effectively creates a “hidden tax” reflected in 
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fees charged by health care providers and premiums 
charged by insurers. CEA, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT 187 (Feb. 2010) (Ex. 21); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-443, pt. II, at 985 (2010); S. REP. NO.111-89, 
at 2 (2009) (Ex. 22). 
 24. When premiums increase as a result of cost-
shifting by the uninsured, more people who see 
themselves as healthy make the economic calculation 
not to buy, or to drop, coverage. For many, this 
economic calculation leads them to wait to obtain 
coverage until they grow older, when they anticipate 
greater health care needs. See CBO, KEY ISSUES at 12 
(percentage of uninsured older adults in 2007 was 
roughly half the percentage of uninsured younger 
adults). See also M.E. Martinez & R.A. Cohen, Health 
Insurance Coverage: Early Release of Estimates From 
the National Health Interview Survey, January-June 
2009, National Center for Health Statistics, at 2 (Dec. 
2009) (Ex. 23); U.S. Census Bureau, Census 
Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (2009) (Table H101, data on coverage 
status by age) (available at www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/cpstables/032009/health/h01_001.htm) (Ex. 24). 
 25. This self-selection further narrows the 
risk pool, which, in turn, further increases the 
price of coverage for the insured. The result is a 
self-reinforcing “premium spiral.” Health Reform in 
the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms at 118-19 
(2009) (American Academy of Actuaries); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, at 985. 
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 26. This premium spiral particularly hurts 
small employers, due to their relative lack of 
bargaining power. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, 
at 986-88; THE ECONOMIC CASE at 37-38; see also 47 
Million and Counting at 36 (Raymond Arth, Nat’l 
Small Business Ass’n) (noting need for insurance 
reform and minimum coverage provision to stem rise 
of small business premiums). 
 
IV. The Reforms of the Affordable Care Act 
 27. To address the economic effects of these 
market failures, as well as to protect consumers,  
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care  
Act comprehensively “regulates activity that is 
commercial and economic in nature: economic and 
financial decisions about how and when health care is 
paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.” 
ACA, §§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 10106(a). The comprehensive 
reform has five main components. 
 28. First, to address inflated premiums in the 
individual and small-business insurance market, 
Congress established health insurance Exchanges “as 
an organized and transparent marketplace for the 
purchase of health insurance where individuals and 
employees (phased-in over time) can shop and 
compare health insurance options.” H.R. REP. NO. 
111-443, pt. II, at 976 (internal quotation omitted). 
Exchanges review premiums, coordinate participation 
and enrollment in health plans, implement 
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procedures to certify qualified health plans, and 
educate consumers. ACA, § 1311. 
 29. Second, the Act builds on the existing 
system of employer-based health insurance, in which 
most individuals receive coverage as part of employee 
compensation. See KEY ISSUES, at 4-5. It creates tax 
incentives for small businesses to purchase health 
insurance for employees, and imposes penalties on 
certain large businesses that do not provide 
employees adequate coverage. ACA, §§ 1421, 1513. 
 30. Third, the Act provides financial assistance 
to support the purchase of coverage for a large 
portion of the uninsured population. As Congress 
understood, nearly two-thirds of the uninsured are in 
families with income less than 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level, H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, pt. II, at 
978; see also KEY ISSUES, at 27, while 4 percent of 
those with income greater than 400 percent of the 
poverty level are uninsured. KEY ISSUES, at 11. The 
Act reduces this gap by providing premium tax 
credits for individuals and families with income 
between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty 
line, ACA, §§ 1401-02, and expands eligibility for 
Medicaid to individuals with income below 133 
percent of the federal poverty level beginning in 2014. 
Id. § 2001. 
 31. Fourth, the Act removes barriers to insurance 
coverage. As noted above, a variety of insurance 
industry practices have increased premiums for or 
denied coverage to those with the greatest health care 
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needs. Most significantly, the Act bars insurers from 
refusing to cover individuals with pre-existing 
medical conditions. ACA, § 1201. The Act also 
prevents insurers from rescinding coverage for  
any reason other than fraud or intentional 
misrepresentation, or declining to renew coverage 
based on health status. Id. §§ 1001, 1201. Further, 
with limited exceptions, the Act prohibits insurers 
from charging higher premiums on the basis of the 
insured’s prior medical history. Id. § 1201. And it 
prohibits caps on the coverage available to a 
policyholder in a given year or over a lifetime. Id. 
§§ 1001, 10101(a). 
 32. Finally, the Act requires that all Americans, 
with specified exceptions, maintain a minimum level 
of health insurance coverage, or pay a penalty. ACA, 
§§ 1501, 10106 (as amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032). 
 
V. The Minimum Coverage Provision as an 
Essential Part of the Act’s Insurance 
Industry Reforms 
 33. Congress found that this minimum coverage 
provision “is an essential part of this larger 
regulation of economic activity,” and that its absence 
“would undercut Federal regulation of the health 
insurance market.” Id. §§1501(a)(2)(H), 10106(a). 
That judgment rested on a number of Congressional 
findings. Congress found that, by “significantly 
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reducing the number of the uninsured, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of 
this Act, will lower health insurance premiums.”  
Id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a). Conversely, and 
importantly, Congress also found that, without the 
minimum coverage provision, the reforms in the Act, 
such as the ban on denying coverage or charging 
more based on pre-existing conditions, would amplify 
existing incentives for individuals to “wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care,” 
thereby further shifting costs onto third parties. Id. 
§§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a). Congress thus determined 
that the minimum coverage provision “is essential to 
creating effective health insurance markets in which 
improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of 
pre-existing conditions can be sold.” Id. 
 34. These Congressional findings are amply 
supported. The new “guaranteed issue” and 
“community rating” requirements under Section 1201 
of the Act ensure that all Americans can obtain 
coverage subject to no coverage limits and despite the 
pre-existing conditions they may have at that time. 
ACA, § 1201. Because these new insurance 
regulations would allow individuals to “wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care,” 
id., §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a), they would increase the 
incentives for individuals to “make an economic and 
financial decision to forego health insurance 
coverage” until their health care needs become 
substantial, id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 10106(a). 
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 35. Individuals who would make that decision 
would take advantage of the ACA’s reforms by joining 
a coverage pool maintained in the interim through 
premiums paid by other market participants. Without 
a minimum coverage provision, this market timing 
would increase the costs of uncompensated care and 
the premiums for the insured pool, creating pressures 
that would “inexorably drive [the health insurance] 
market into extinction.” Health Reform in the 21st 
Century: Insurance Market Reforms, at 13 (Uwe 
Reinhardt, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, 
Economics, and Public Affairs, Princeton University); 
see also William H. Frist, An Individual Mandate for 
Health Insurance Would Benefit All, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Sept. 28, 2009) (politics.usnews.com/ 
opinion/articles/2009/09/28/frist-an-individual-mandate- 
for-health-insurance-would-benefit-all.html) (Ex. 25). 
 36. This danger is not merely theoretical, but 
instead is borne out in the experience of states that 
have attempted “guaranteed issue” and “community 
rating” reforms without an accompanying minimum 
coverage provision. After New Jersey enacted a 
similar reform, its individual health insurance 
market experienced higher premiums and decreased 
coverage. See Alan C. Monheit, et al., Community 
Rating and Sustainable Individual Health Insurance 
Markets in New Jersey, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 167, 168 
(2004) (Ex. 26) (describing potential for “adverse 
selection death spiral” in a market with guaranteed 
issue); see also Health Reform in the 21st Century: 
Insurance Market Reforms at 101-02 (Dr. Reinhardt). 
App. 179 
 37. Likewise, after New York enacted a similar 
reform, “the market for individual health insurance 
in New York has nearly disappeared.” Stephen T. 
Parente & Tarren Bragdon, Healthier Choice: An 
Examination of Market-Based Reforms for New York’s 
Uninsured, MEDICAL PROGRESS REPORT NO. 10 at i 
(Manhattan Institute, Sept. 2009) (Ex. 27). 
 38. In contrast, Massachusetts enacted 
“guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms, 
coupled with a minimum coverage provision. Its 
reforms have succeeded. Since 2006, the average 
individual premium in Massachusetts has decreased 
by 40%, compared to a 14% increase in the national 
average. Jonathan Gruber, Mass. Inst. of Tech., The 
Senate Bill Lowers Non-Group Premiums: Updated 
for New CBO Estimates, at 1 (Nov. 27, 2009) 
(available at www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ 
Gruber_Report_4.pdf) (Ex. 28). See also Letter from 
Mitt H. Romney, Governor of Massachusetts, to 
State Legislature at 1-2 (Apr. 12, 2006) (Ex. 29) 
(signing statement for Massachusetts bill, noting 
need for insurance coverage requirement to prevent 
cost-shifting by the uninsured). 
 39. In short, “fundamental insurance-market 
reform is impossible” if the guaranteed issue and 
community-rating reforms are not coupled with a 
minimum coverage provision. Jonathan Gruber, 
Getting the Facts Straight on Health Care Reform, 
316 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2497, 2498 (2009) (Ex. 30). 
This is because “[a] health insurance market could 
never survive or even form if people could buy their 
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insurance on the way to the hospital.” 47 Million and 
Counting, at 52 (Prof. Hall). Accordingly, Congress 
found that the minimum coverage provision is 
“essential” to its broader effort to regulate health 
insurance industry underwriting practices that have 
prevented many from obtaining health insurance, 
ACA, §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), (J), 10106(a). 
 40. The minimum coverage provision also 
addresses the unnecessary costs created by the 
insurance industry’s practice of medical underwriting. 
“By significantly increasing health insurance 
coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will 
increase economies of scale, the requirement, 
together with the other provisions of this Act, will 
significantly reduce administrative costs and lower 
health insurance premiums,” and is therefore 
“essential to creating effective health insurance 
markets that do not require underwriting and 
eliminate its associated administrative costs.” ACA, 
§§ 1501(a)(2)(J), 10106(a). 
 
VI. The Revenue-Raising Effect of the 
Minimum Coverage Provision 
 41. The CBO projects that the reforms in the 
Act will reduce the number of uninsured Americans 
by approximately 32 million by 2019. Letter from 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to the Hon. 
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 
9 (Mar. 20, 2010) (Ex. 31) [hereinafter CBO Letter to 
Rep. Pelosi]. 
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 42. It further projects that the Act’s 
combination of reforms and tax credits will reduce the 
average premium paid by individuals and families in 
the individual and small-group markets. Id. at 15; 
CBO, AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT 23-25 (Nov. 30, 2009) (Ex. 32). 
 43. CBO estimates that the interrelated 
revenue and spending provisions in the Act – 
specifically taking into account revenue from the 
minimum coverage provision – will yield net savings 
to the federal government of more than $100 billion 
over the next decade. CBO Letter to Rep. Pelosi at 2. 
 44. In particular, the CBO estimates that the 
minimum coverage provision would produce about $4 
billion in annual revenue once it is fully in effect. 
CBO Letter to Rep. Pelosi at tbl. 4 at 2. 
*    *    * 
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II. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
33-11. Commonwealth agrees that the alleged 
facts upon which the Secretary relies are 
not adjudicative facts. (Doc. 91 at 16 n.1.). 
As a consequence, disagreements concerning 
her alleged legislative facts are no bar to 
summary judgment. The Commonwealth 
denies that any hearings were held or any 
reports issued with respect to the Senate 
bill that passed on Christmas Eve 2009.  
33-12. Commonwealth agrees that reviewing 
courts “ ‘will consider legislative findings.’ ” 
(Doc. 91 at 16 n.1.). However, the secrecy, 
haste and parliamentary brutality 
associated with the passage of PPACA 
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(Doc. 89 at 12-13 ¶ 8) should lead this 
Court to reject the premise that Congress 
took a hard look at the basis for its claimed 
power. The Congressional Research 
Service had warned that the mandate was 
unprecedented (Doc. 89 at 12 ¶ 7), and it is 
doubtful that a majority of those voting for 
it on a party line division had read the 
mammoth bill that emerged for their 
abbreviated consideration.  
33-12. Commonwealth denies that sources 
extraneous to § 1501 of PPACA are 
“ ‘legislative facts’ ” in the sense that they 
compose any part of the legislative history 
of PPACA. Nor can it be shown that they 
were before or in the mind of the 
majorities that passed PPACA. They are 
also not entitled to deference as 
information that Congress might have 
believed to be true under a rational basis 
test. (Doc. 91 at 16 n.1.) The Commerce 
Clause rational basis test recognized in 
Raich and Lopez should not be confused 
with the deferential due process rational 
basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
See United States v. Comstock, 176 
L. Ed. 2d 878, 900-01 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Rather, the Commerce Clause 
rational basis test as it relates to the scope 
of the Commerce Clause asks whether 
Congress has a rational basis for believing 
that “respondents’ activities, taken in the 
aggregate, substantially affect interstate 
commerce.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. Because 
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there are no activities at issue here, the 
test is not satisfied and the sources 
extraneous to PPACA cited in support of 
the Secretary’s argument are legally 
irrelevant.  
33-13. See responses 2 and 3-12.  
14-15. See response to 3-12. 
33-16. See response to 2.  
17-22. See response to 3-12.  
33-23. See responses 2 and 3-12.  
24-26. See response to 3-12.  
27-34. See responses 2 and 3-12. The 
Commonwealth of Virginia further responds 
that PPACA speaks for itself with respect 
to its operative provisions.  
35-38. See response to 3-12.  
39-40. See response to 27-34.  
33-41. See response to 3-12.  
*    *    * 
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 Defendant 
 
Date Filed  # Docket Text 
03/23/2010 161 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
against Kathleen Sebelius; filing 
fee paid $ 350, receipt number 
34683007662; filed by Commonwealth 
of Virginia, Ex Rel. Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli, II. (Attachments: # 1 Civil 
Cover Sheet, # 2 Receipt)(cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 03/23/2010) 
03/23/2010 162 Summons Issued as to Kathleen 
Sebelius, U.S. Attorney and U.S. 
App. 187 
Attorney General. Delivered to 
counsel. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 03/23/2010) 
03/23/2010 163 ORDER that the undersigned 
recuses himself from presiding over 
this action. It is hereby ORDERED 
that the Clerk reassign this action 
to another judge in accord with the 
standard assignment system. 
Signed by District Judge Robert E. 
Payne on 3/23/2010. Copies to 
counsel.(cmcc, ) (Entered: 03/23/2010) 
03/23/2010  Case reassigned by standard 
assignment system to District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson. District Judge 
Robert E. Payne no longer assigned 
to the case. (Reassigned pursuant 
to Order entered 3/23/2010.) 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 03/23/2010) 
03/25/2010 164 Certificate of Reporting Service 
by Kathleen Sebelius. Kathleen 
Sebelius served on 3/23/2010, 
answer due 5/24/2010. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 03/26/2010) 
04/30/2010 165 ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE – Initial Pretrial 
Conference set for 6/3/2010 at 9:15 
AM before District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson (rpiz) (Entered: 04/30/2010)  
04/30/2010 166 SCHEDULING ORDER with 
Attachment # 1 Pretrial Schedule A 
(signed by District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson on 4/30/2010) (rpiz) 
(Entered: 04/30/2010) 
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05/05/2010 117 MOTION re 6 Scheduling Order 
and Brief in Support Thereof by 
Kathleen Sebelius. (Attachments: # 1 
Proposed Order)(Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 05/05/2010)  
05/05/2010 168 RESPONSE to Motion re 7 
MOTION re 6 Scheduling Order 
and Brief in Support Thereof 
filed by Commonwealth of Virginia, 
Ex Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. 
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed 
Order)(McCullough, Stephen) 
(Entered: 05/05/2010) 
05/05/2010 169 MOTION for Erika Myers to appear 
Pro hac vice; filing fee waived; by 
Kathleen Sebelius. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/06/2010) 
05/05/2010 110 MOTION for Joel McElvain to 
appear Pro hac vice; filing fee 
waived; by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 05/06/2010)  
05/05/2010 111 MOTION for Sheila Lieber to 
appear Pro hac vice; filing fee 
waived; by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 05/06/2010) 
05/05/2010 112 MOTION for Ian Gershengorn to 
appear Pro hac vice; filing fee 
waived; by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 05/06/2010) 
05/05/2010  Notice of Correction: Plaintiff 
counsel has been advised to 
include the complete signature 
block on the certificate of service 
App. 189 
on future documents. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/06/2010) 
05/06/2010 113 ORDER granting 7 Defendant’s 
Motion to Modify the Scheduling 
Order, which the Court will construe 
as a Motion to Extend Time; the 
Defendant shall file her Answer or 
otherwise respond to the Complaint 
on or before May 24, 2010; if the 
Defendant files a motion to dismiss 
the Complaint, the time for filing 
an Answer shall be deferred until 
fourteen days after a ruling on 
that motion to dismiss. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
5/6/2010. Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/06/2010) 
05/07/2010 114 ORDER granting 9 Motion for Pro 
hac vice. Appointed Erika Myers for 
Kathleen Sebelius. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
5/6/2010. Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/07/2010) 
05/07/2010 115 ORDER granting 10 Motion for Pro 
hac vice. Appointed Joel McElvain 
for Kathleen Sebelius. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
5/6/2010. Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/07/2010) 
05/07/2010 116 ORDER granting 11 Motion for Pro 
hac vice. Appointed Sheila M. Lieber 
for Kathleen Sebelius. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
App. 190 
5/6/2010. Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/07/2010) 
05/07/2010 117 ORDER granting 12 Motion for Pro 
hac vice. Appointed Ian Gershengorn 
for Kathleen Sebelius. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
5/6/2010. Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 05/07/2010) 
05/19/2010 118 MOTION for Leave to File Excess 
Pages and Brief in Support Thereof 
by Kathleen Sebelius. (Attachments: 
# 1 Proposed Order)(Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 05/19/2010) 
05/19/2010 119 MOTION to Establish Briefing 
Schedule by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(Hambrick, Jonathan) (Entered: 
05/19/2010) 
05/19/2010 120 ORDER re: 18 Motion for Leave to 
Exceed the Page Limitations 
imposed by Local Civil Rule 7(F); 
that Defendant is GRANTED leave 
to file a memorandum in support of 
her motion to dismiss not to exceed 
45 pages; it is FURTHER ORDERED 
that Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to 
file a memorandum in opposition to 
defendant’s motion to dismiss not to 
exceed 45 pages; and it is FURTHER 
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file 
its opposition to Defendant’s motion 
to dismiss on or before 06/07/2010, 
and defendant shall file her reply 
brief in support of her motion to 
App. 191 
dismiss on or before 06/22/2010. 
Signed by District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson on 05/19/2010. (walk, ) 
(Entered: 05/19/2010) 
05/24/2010 121 MOTION to Dismiss by Kathleen 
Sebelius. (Hambrick, Jonathan) 
(Entered: 05/24/2010)  
05/24/2010 122 Memorandum in Support re 21 
MOTION to Dismiss filed by 
Kathleen Sebelius. (Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 05/24/2010)  
06/03/2010 123 ORDER regarding hearing dates 
for oral argument: 1) Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss – July 1, 2010 at 
10:00 a.m.; 2) Motions for Summary 
Judgment – October 18, 2010 at 
9:00 a.m.; parties to set briefing 
schedule for Motions for Summary 
Judgment, with briefs due fourteen 
days before the October 18, 2010 
hearing date; all amicus filings are 
due fourteen days before the hearing 
date which the specific brief 
addresses. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 6/3/2010. 
Copies to counsel.(cmcc, ) (Entered: 
06/03/2010) 
06/03/2010 124 Minute Entry for proceedings held 
before District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson (Court Reporter Liscio, 
OCR): Initial Pretrial Conference 
held on 6/3/2010. Hearing on deft’s 
Motion to Dismiss scheduled for 
App. 192 
7/1/2010 at 10:00 a.m. Hearing on 
Motions for Summary Judgment 
scheduled for 10/18/2010 at 9:00 
a.m.; all briefs due 14 days prior 
to hearing date. (rpiz) (Entered: 
06/03/2010) 
06/04/2010 125 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held 
on 6/3/2010, before Judge Henry E. 
Hudson. Court Reporter/Transcriber 
Krista Liscio, Telephone number 
804 916-2296. Transcript may be 
viewed at the court public terminal 
or purchased through the Court 
Reporter/Transcriber before the 
deadline for Release of Transcript 
Restriction. After that date it may 
be obtained through PACER. 
Redaction Request due 7/6/2010. 
Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 
8/4/2010. Release of Transcript 
Restriction set for 9/2/2010.(liscio, 
krista) (Entered: 06/04/2010) 
06/04/2010 126 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief by Ray Elbert Parker. 
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amicus 
Brief – Received, # 2 Cover 
Letter)(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/04/2010) 
06/07/2010 127 Notice of Filing of Official Transcript 
re: 25 Transcript. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 
06/07/2010) 06/07/2010 28 RESPONSE 
in Opposition re 21 MOTION to 
Dismiss filed by Commonwealth 
of Virginia, Ex Rel. Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli, II. (Attachments: # 1 
App. 193 
Affidavit Exhibit A)(Getchell, 
Earle) (Entered: 06/07/2010) 
06/07/2010 129 NOTICE of Appearance by Colby M. 
May on behalf of American Center 
for Law & Justice et al. (May, Colby) 
(Entered: 06/07/2010) 
06/07/2010 130 Financial Interest Disclosure Statement 
(Local Rule 7.1) by American Center 
for Law & Justice et al.. (May, Colby) 
(Entered: 06/07/2010) 
06/07/2010 131 MOTION for Leave to File Amici 
Brief by American Center for Law 
& Justice et al.. (Attachments: # 1 
Proposed Amici Brief, # 2 Proposed 
Order)(May, Colby) (Entered: 
06/07/2010)  
06/08/2010 132 CERTIFICATE of Service re 29 
Notice of Appearance by Colby M. 
May on behalf of American Center 
for Law & Justice et al. (May, Colby) 
(Entered: 06/08/2010) 
06/08/2010 133 CERTIFICATE of Service re 30 
Financial Disclosure Statement by 
Colby M. May on behalf of American 
Center for Law & Justice et al. 
(May, Colby) (Entered: 06/08/2010) 
06/09/2010 134 NOTICE of Attorney Withdrawal 
of Appearance re: Erika L. Myers 
by Kathleen Sebelius (Hambrick, 
Jonathan) Modified on 6/9/2010 to 
edit.(cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/09/2010)  
App. 194 
06/10/2010 135 ORDER granting 26 Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief 
submitted by Ray Elbert Parker; 
this Motion is GRANTED and the 
Clerk is directed to file the pro se 
movant’s Friend of the Court 
Amicus Curiae Brief. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
6/10/2010. Copies to counsel and 
movant, Ray Elbert Parker. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/10/2010) 
06/10/2010 136 Amicus Curiae Brief (“Friend of the 
Court Amicus Curiae Brief ”) 
entered by Ray Elbert Parker (filed 
pursuant to Order entered 6/10/2010). 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/10/2010) 
06/10/2010 137 ORDER granting 31 Motion for Leave 
to File a Brief as Amici Curiae 
supporting Plaintiff ’s opposition to 
the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, 
by amici American Center for Law 
and Justice, United States 
Representatives Paul Broun, Todd 
Akin, Rob Bishop, John Boehner, 
Michael Burgess, Dan Burton, Eric 
Cantor, Mike Conaway, Mary Fallin, 
John Fleming, Virginia Foxx, Trent 
Franks, Scott Garrett, Louie Gohmert, 
Bob Goodlatte, Jeb Hensarling, Walter 
Jones, Steve King, Doug Lamborn, 
Robert Latta, Michael McCaul, Cathy 
McMorris Rodgers, Jerry Moran, 
Mike Pence, Jean Schmidt, Lamar 
Smith, Todd Tiahrt, and Zach Wamp, 
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and the Constitutional Committee 
to Challenge the President and 
Congress on Health Care; IT IS 
ORDERED that the motion for 
leave to file a brief as amici curiae is 
granted and FURTHER ORDERED 
that the Clerk shall cause the Proposed 
Brief to be filed and entered on the 
docket of the above-captioned 
matter. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 6/10/2010. 
Copies to counsel and pro se amicus. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/10/2010) 
06/10/2010 138 Response Amici Brief filed by Todd 
Akin, American Center for Law and 
Justice, Rob Bishop, John Boehner, 
Paul Broun, Michael Burgess, Dan 
Burton, Eric Cantor, Mike Conaway, 
Constitutional Committee to Challenge 
the President and Congress on Health 
Care, Mary Fallin, John Fleming, 
Virginia Foxx, Trent Franks, Scott 
Garrett, Louie Gohmert, Bob 
Goodlatte, Jeb Hensarling, Walter 
Jones, Steve King, Doug Lamborn, 
Robert Latta, Michael McCaul, Jerry 
Moran, Mike Pence, Cathy McMorris 
Rodgers, Jean Schmidt, Lamar 
Smith, Todd Tiahrt, Zach Wamp. 
(May, Colby) (Entered: 06/10/2010) 
06/15/2010 139 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief by Physician Hospitals 
of America. (Attachments: # 1 
Memorandum of Law in Support, 
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# 2 Proposed Brief )(Fender, 
Matthew) (Entered: 06/15/2010)  
06/16/2010  Notice of Correction: Movant counsel 
will refile document 39 with the 
signature on the document 
matching the filing user’s login 
(required by CM/ECF Policies and 
Procedures); the memorandum in 
support will be filed as a separate 
document. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 
06/16/2010) 
06/16/2010 140 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief (refiled) by Physician 
Hospitals of America. (Attachments: 
# 1 Proposed Amicus Brief)(Oostdyk, 
Scott) (Entered: 06/16/2010) 
06/16/2010 141 Memorandum in Support re 40 
MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief (refiled) filed by 
Physician Hospitals of America. 
(Oostdyk, Scott) (Entered: 06/16/2010) 
06/16/2010 142 ORDER granting a Motion for Leave 
to Participate as Amicus Curiae (Dk. 
No. 39) in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss; this Motion is 
GRANTED and Movant is directed 
to file its Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Physician Hospitals of America in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 6/16/2010. 
Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/16/2010) 
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06/16/2010 143 Memorandum Amicus Curiae Brief 
filed by Physician Hospitals of America. 
(Oostdyk, Scott) (Entered: 06/16/2010) 
06/17/2010 144 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief by Small Business 
Majority Foundation, Inc.. 
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amicus 
Brief, # 2 Memorandum of Law in 
Support, # 3 Financial Disclosure, 
# 4 Proposed Order, # 5 Certificate 
of Service)(Young, John) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 145 MOTION and Memorandum in 
Support for Leave to File Brief Amici 
Curiae by Center for American 
Progress, Federal Rights Project 
National Senior Citizens Law 
Center. (Attachments: # 1 Brief 
Amici Curiae, # 2 Proposed 
Order)(France, Angela) Modified 
on 6/17/2010 to edit event (cmcc, ). 
(Entered: 06/17/2010)  
06/17/2010  Notice of Correction: Movant counsel 
will refile certain attachments to 
document 44 as separate documents 
as required by CM/ECF Policies 
and Procedures. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010)  
06/17/2010 146 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief by Washington Legal 
Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 
Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief, 
App. 198 
# 2 Proposed Order)(Samp, Richard) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 147 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard 
Abbott Samp on behalf of Washington 
Legal Foundation (Samp, Richard) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 148 Memorandum in Support re 44 
MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief filed by Small Business 
Majority Foundation, Inc.. (Young, 
John) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 149 Financial Interest Disclosure 
Statement (Local Rule 7.1) by Small 
Business Majority Foundation, Inc.. 
(Young, John) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 150 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by 
Small Business Majority Foundation, 
Inc. re 44 MOTION for Leave to 
File Amicus Curiae Brief. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 151 ORDER granting a Motion for Leave 
to File Brief Amici Curiae (Dk. No. 
44) in Support of Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss; the Motion is GRANTED 
and Movants are directed to file the 
Brief Amici Curiae of Small Business 
Majority Foundation, Inc. and The 
Main Street Alliance in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Signed by District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson on 6/17/2010. Copies to 
counsel. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
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06/17/2010 652 MOTION for Leave to Appear Amicus 
Curiae by Liberty Group. (Attachments: 
# 1 Proposed Brief, # 2 
Proposed Order)(Forest, John) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 653 NOTICE of Appearance by 
Andrew Abbott Nicely on behalf of 
Constitutional Law Professors (Nicely, 
Andrew) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 654 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief In Support of the 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss by 
Constitutional Law Professors. 
(Attachments: # 1 Amicus Brief of 
Constitutional Law Professors, # 2 
Proposed Order)(Nicely, Andrew) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 655 Response Brief Amici Curiae filed 
by Main Street Alliance, Small 
Business Majority Foundation, Inc.. 
(Young, John) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 656 NOTICE of Appearance by George 
William Norris, Jr on behalf of 
Cato Institute (Norris, George) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 657 Financial Interest Disclosure 
Statement (Local Rule 7.1) by 
Cato Institute. (Norris, George) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 658 MOTION for Leave to File Amici 
Memorandum by Cato Institute, 
Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
and Prof. Randy E. Barnett. (Norris, 
App. 200 
George) Modified to edit parties 
(cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 659 Memorandum of Amici Cato Institute, 
Competitive Enterprise Institute and 
Prof. Randy E. Barnett Supporting 
Plaintiff ’s Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss to 28 Response in 
Opposition to Motion filed by Cato 
Institute. (Norris, George) 
(DOCUMENT RECEIVED, NOT 
FILED, PENDING LEAVE OF 
COURT) Modified on 6/17/2010 
(cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 660 ORDER granting a Motion for Leave 
to File Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss (Dk. No. 46), submitted by 
the Washington Legal Foundation; 
the Motion is GRANTED and Movant 
is DIRECTED to file its Brief of 
Washington Legal Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Signed by District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson on 6/17/2010. Copies to counsel. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 661 ORDER granting Motion for Leave 
to File Brief of Amici Curiae by the 
March of Dimes Foundation, et al., 
in Support of Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss (Dk. No. 45); the Motion 
is GRANTED and Movants are 
DIRECTED to file their Brief of Amici 
Curiae in Support of Defendant’s 
App. 201 
Motion to Dismiss. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson 
on 6/17/2010. Copies to counsel. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 662 ORDER granting Motion for Leave 
to Participate as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff ’s Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dk. 
No. 52), submitted by Liberty Guard; 
this Motion is GRANTED and Movant 
is DIRECTED to file its Amicus 
Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff ’s 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 6/17/2010. 
Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 663 ORDER granting Motion for Leave 
to File Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss (Dk. No. 54), submitted by 
constitutional law professors Jack 
M. Balkin, Gillian E. Metzger, and 
Trevor W. Morrison; the Motion is 
GRANTED and Movants are 
DIRECTED to file their Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Constitutional Law 
Professors in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
6/17/2010. Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 664 MOTION for Leave to File Supplement 
for Amicus Curiae Party by Ray Elbert 
App. 202 
Parker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed 
Memorandum by Amicus Curiae 
Party)(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/17/2010) 
06/17/2010 665 MOTION for Leave to File Brief 
Amicus Curiae by Landmark Legal 
Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 
Exhibit Brief Amicus Curiae, # 2 
Proposed Order)(St. George, 
Timothy) (Entered: 06/17/2010)  
06/18/2010 666 ORDER GRANTING 58 Motion by 
Movants Cato Institute, et al. for 
Leave to Participate as Amici Curiae 
and Movants are DIRECTED to file 
their Memorandum as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff ’s Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. It is 
so ORDERED. Signed by District 
Judge Henry E. Hudson on 06/18/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 667 ORDER GRANTING 64 Motion for 
Leave to File Supplement Motion for 
Amicus Curiae Party, submitted by 
Ray Elbert Parker, Pro Se. The Clerk 
is DIRECTED to file Petitioner’s 
Brief. It is so ORDERED. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
06/18/2010. Copy mailed to Mr. Parker. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 668 Brief Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff ’s Opposition re: 21 
MOTION to Dismiss filed by Liberty 
Guard. (Forest, John) Modified to 
edit (cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
App. 203 
06/18/2010 669 Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff’s Opposition to 21 Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss by Cato Institute, 
Competitive Enterprise Institute 
and Prof. Randy E. Barnett. (Norris, 
George) Modified to edit (cmcc, ). 
(Entered: 06/18/2010)  
06/18/2010 670 Brief Amicus Curiae in Support to 
21 MOTION to Dismiss filed by 
Constitutional Law Professors Jack 
M. Balkin, Gillian E. Metzger, and 
Trevor W. Morrison. (Nicely, 
Andrew) Modified on 6/22/2010 to 
edit (cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 671 ORDER GRANTING 65 Motion by 
Movant Landmark Legal Foundation 
for Leave to Participate as Amicus 
Curiae and Movant is DIRECTED 
to file its Brief Amicus Curiae in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss. It is so ORDERED. 
Signed by District Judge Henry 
E. Hudson on 06/18/2010. (walk, ) 
(Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 672 Brief Amicus Curiae in Opposition 
re 21 MOTION to Dismiss filed by 
Washington Legal Foundation. 
(Samp, Richard) Modified to 
edit(cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010  Notice of Correction re: Document 
47; the filing user has been requested 
to file a separate Certificate of Service 
App. 204 
and to link the filing to Document 
47. (walk, ) (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 673 CERTIFICATE of Service re 47 
Notice of Appearance by Richard 
Abbott Samp on behalf of 
Washington Legal Foundation (Samp, 
Richard) (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 674 Brief Amicus Curiae in Opposition 
to Motion to Dismiss filed by 
Landmark Legal Foundation. 
(St. George, Timothy) Modified 
on 6/22/2010 to edit (cmcc, ). 
(Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010 675 Brief Amici Curiae of The March of 
Dimes Foundation, The American 
Association of People with Disabilities, 
The ARC of the United States, 
Breast Cancer Action, Families USA, 
the Family Violence Prevention Fund, 
Friends of Cancer Research, Mental 
Health America, National Breast 
Cancer Coalition, The National 
Organization for Rare Disorders, 
The National Partnership for Women 
& Families, National Patient 
Advocate Foundation, The National 
Senior Citizens Law Center, The 
National Women’s Law Center, The 
Ovarian Cancer National Alliance, 
Raising Women’s Voices for the 
Health Care We Need, and United 
Cerebral Palsy, in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss filed by Center for 
American Progress, Federal Rights 
App. 205 
Project National Senior Citizens 
Law Center. (France, Angela) 
Modified on 6/22/2010 to edit 
(cmcc, ). (Entered: 06/18/2010) 
06/18/2010  Notice of Correction: Amici counsel 
was contacted re: document 59, 
Amici Brief, regarding CM/ECF 
Policies and Procedures for 
documents needing leave of court. 
No action is necessary at this time. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/22/2010)  
06/21/2010 676 Supplemental Brief by Amicus 
Curiae Petitioner filed by Ray 
Elbert Parker (filed pursuant to 
Order entered 6/18/2010). (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 06/21/2010)  
06/22/2010 677 Reply to 21 MOTION to Dismiss 
filed by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(Attachments: # 1 Appendix of 
Statutory Materials)(Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 06/22/2010) 
06/23/2010 678 RESPONSE to Motion re 64 
MOTION for Leave to File filed by 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Ex Rel. 
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. (Getchell, 
Earle) (Entered: 06/23/2010) 
06/24/2010  Set Deadlines/Hearings as to 21 
Motion to Dismiss: Motion Hearing 
set for 7/1/2010 at 10:00 AM before 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson 
(rpiz) (Entered: 06/24/2010) 
06/30/2010 679 Amicus Curiae “Reply to Plaintiff ’s 
Memorandum of June 23, 2010 in 
App. 206 
Opposition to Dismiss Without 
Prejudice or Alternatively, for a 
Change of Venue” filed by Ray Elbert 
Parker. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 06/30/2010) 
07/01/2010 680 Minute Entry for proceedings held 
before District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson (Court Reporter Liscio, 
OCR): Motion Hearing held on 
7/1/2010 re 21 Motion to Dismiss 
filed by Kathleen Sebelius. 
Argument heard. Motion taken 
under advisement by Court; 
Memorandum Opinion to enter. 
(rpiz) (Entered: 07/02/2010)  
07/08/2010 681 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held 
on July 1, 2010, before Judge Henry 
E. Hudson. Court Reporter/Transcriber 
Krista Liscio, Telephone number 
804 916-2296. Transcript may be 
viewed at the court public terminal 
or purchased through the Court 
Reporter/Transcriber. Redaction 
Request due 8/9/2010. Redacted 
Transcript Deadline set for 9/7/2010. 
(liscio, krista) (Entered: 07/08/2010) 
07/08/2010 682 Notice of Filing of Official 
Transcript re 81 Transcript. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 07/08/2010) 
07/09/2010 683 Amicus Curiae Post Trial 
Memorandum in Support of 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss filed by Ray Elbert Parker. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 07/12/2010) 
App. 207 
08/02/2010 684 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed 
by District Judge Henry E. Hudson 
on 8/2/2010. Copies to counsel of 
record.(cmcc, ) (Entered: 08/02/2010) 
08/02/2010 685 ORDER regarding Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss (Dk. No. 21), filed 
May 24, 2010; for reasons stated in 
the accompanying Memorandum 
Opinion, the Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss is DENIED. Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
8/2/2010. Copies to counsel of record. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 08/02/2010) 
08/10/2010 686 CONSENT ORDER on the briefing 
schedule for the Motions for Summary 
Judgment to be filed by the parties; 
consistent with the Court’s June 3, 
2010 Order, the parties have conferred 
and agreed on such a schedule 
and accordingly it is ORDERED, 
AJUDGED and DECREED by the 
Court (see Order for details). Signed 
by District Judge Henry E. Hudson 
on 8/10/2010. Copies to counsel.(cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 08/10/2010) 
08/16/2010 687 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by 
Kathleen Sebelius.(Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 08/16/2010) 
09/03/2010 688 MOTION for Summary Judgment 
by Commonwealth of Virginia, Ex 
Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. 
(Getchell, Earle) (Entered: 09/03/2010) 
App. 208 
09/03/2010 689 Memorandum in Support re 88 
MOTION for Summary Judgment 
filed by Commonwealth of Virginia, 
Ex Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. 
(Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 
Affidavit)(Getchell, Earle) 
(Entered: 09/03/2010) 
09/03/2010 690 MOTION for Summary Judgment 
by Kathleen Sebelius. (Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 09/03/2010) 
09/03/2010 91 Memorandum in 
Support re 90 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment filed by 
Kathleen Sebelius. (Attachments: 
# 1 Appendix of Exhibits)(Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 09/03/2010) 
Jonathan) (Entered: 09/03/2010) 
09/03/2010 691 Memorandum in Support re 90 
MOTION for Summary Judgment 
filed by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(Attachments: # 1 Appendix of 
Exhibits)(Hambrick, Jonathan) 
(Entered: 09/03/2010) 
09/07/2010  Set Deadlines/Hearings as to 88 
Motion for Summary Judgment by 
Commonwealth of Virginia and 90 
Motion for Summary Judgment by 
Kathleen Sebelius: Motions Hearing 
set for 10/18/2010 at 9:00 AM before 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson 
(rpiz) (Entered: 09/07/2010) 
09/17/2010 692 MOTION (“Optional”) for Leave to 
File Amicus Brief by W. Spencer 
App. 209 
Connerat, III. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 
09/17/2010) 
09/21/2010 693 ORDER granting 92 Optional Motion 
for Leave to File Amicus Brief by W. 
Spencer Connerat, III; the Clerk is 
directed to file Movant’s Optional 
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief 
as Movant’s Brief as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff. Signed by District 
Judge Henry E. Hudson on 9/21/2010. 
Copies to counsel and Connerat. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 09/21/2010) 
09/21/2010 694 Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiff 
filed by W. Spencer Connerat, III 
(filed pursuant to Order entered 
9/21/2010). (cmcc, ) (Entered: 
09/21/2010) 
09/23/2010 695 Memorandum in Opposition re 90 
MOTION for Summary Judgment 
filed by Commonwealth of Virginia, 
Ex Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. 
(Getchell, Earle) (Entered: 09/23/2010) 
09/23/2010 696 Opposition to 88 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment filed by 
Kathleen Sebelius. (Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 09/23/2010) 
09/30/2010 697 NOTICE of Appearance by 
Patrick Michael McSweeney on 
behalf of Randy E. Barnett, Cato 
Institute, Competitive Enterprise 
Institute (McSweeney, Patrick) 
(Entered: 09/30/2010) 
App. 210 
09/30/2010 698 NOTICE of Appearance by Patrick 
Michael McSweeney on behalf of 
Steven J. Willis (McSweeney, 
Patrick) (Entered: 09/30/2010) 
09/30/2010  Notice of Correction: Local counsel 
for Pacific Legal Foundation has been 
advised to file notice of appearance. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
09/30/2010 699 MOTION for Timothy Sandefur to 
appear Pro hac vice by Pacific Legal 
Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 
Receipt)(cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
09/30/2010 100 MOTION for Luke Anthony Wake to 
appear Pro hac vice by Pacific Legal 
Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 
Receipt)(cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/01/2010 101 MOTION for Leave to File BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by Young Invincibles. 
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed 
Order Proposed Order, # 2 
Exhibit Amicus Brief) (Walter, 
Brett) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/01/2010 102 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Opposing 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment by Randy E. Barnett, 
Cato Institute, Competitive 
Enterprise Institute. (Attachments: 
# 1 Proposed Memorandum 
App. 211 
Supporting Plaintiff ’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Opposing 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, # 2 Proposed 
Order)(McSweeney, Patrick) 
(Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/01/2010 103 ORDER granting a Motion for Leave 
to File Brief of Amicus Curiae Young 
Invincibles, supporting Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dk. 
No. 101) ; ORDERED that the motion 
for leave to file a brief as amicus 
curiae is granted and FURTHER 
ORDERED that the Clerk shall cause 
the Proposed Brief to be filed and 
entered. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/1/2010. Copies 
to counsel. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/01/2010 104 Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Young Invincibles. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/01/2010 105 ORDER granting Motion for Leave 
to File Amicus Curiae Memorandum 
supporting Plaintiff ’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and opposing 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment by Randy E. Barnett, 
Cato Institute, Competitive 
Enterprise Institute (Dk. No. 102); 
it is ORDERED that the motion for 
leave to file a brief as amici curiae is 
granted. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/1/2010. 
App. 212 
Copies to counsel. (cmcc, ) 
(Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/01/2010 106 Memorandum as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff ’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Opposing 
Defendant’s Motion for summary 
Judgment filed by Randy E. Barnett, 
Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise 
Institute. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/01/2010) 
10/04/2010 107 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert 
Luther, III on behalf of Americans 
for Free Choice in Medicine and 
Pacific Legal Foundation (Luther, 
Robert) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 108 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Brief in Support of Plaintiff ’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
by Washington Legal Foundation. 
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order 
Granting Motion for Leave, # 2 
Exhibit Proposed Amicus 
Brief )(Samp, Richard) (Entered: 
10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 109 NOTICE of Appearance by Tara 
Lynn Renee Zurawski on behalf of 
William P. Barr, Edwin Meese, III, 
Richard L. Thornburgh (Zurawski, 
Tara) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 110 NOTICE of Appearance by Edwin 
Louis Fountain on behalf of William 
P. Barr, Edwin Meese, III, Richard 
L. Thornburgh (Fountain, Edwin) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
App. 213 
10/04/2010 111 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief by Physician Hospitals 
of America. (Attachments: # 1 
Memorandum Of Law in Support, 
# 2 Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief ) 
(Oostdyk, Scott) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 112 MOTION for Extension of Time to 
File a Motion for Leave to Participate 
as Amici Curiae by William P. Barr, 
Edwin Meese, III, Richard L. 
Thornburgh. (Fountain, Edwin) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 113 Memorandum in Support re 112 
MOTION for Extension of Time to 
File a Motion for Leave to Participate 
as Amici Curiae filed by William P. 
Barr, Edwin Meese, III, Richard L. 
Thornburgh. (Attachments: # 1 
Proposed Order)(Fountain, Edwin) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 114 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff ’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment by American 
Civil Rights Union. (Attachments: 
# 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 
Proposed amicus brief )(Gray, 
Daniel) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 115 Financial Interest Disclosure 
Statement (Local Rule 7.1) by 
American Civil Rights Union. 
(Gray, Daniel) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
App. 214 
10/04/2010 116 NOTICE of Appearance by Richard 
B. Rogers on behalf of American 
Civil Rights Union (Rogers, 
Richard) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 117 REPLY to Response to Motion re 88 
MOTION for Summary Judgment 
filed by Commonwealth of Virginia, 
Ex Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. 
(Getchell, Earle) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 118 Brief in Support Amicus Curiae Brief 
of Constitutional Law Professors 
In Support of the Secretary’s Motion 
For Summary Judgment filed by 
Jack M. Balkin, Gillian E. Metzger, 
Trevor W. Morrison. (Nicely, 
Andrew) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 119 ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff ’s 111 
Motion for Leave to Participate as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff ’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Movant Physician Hospitals of 
America is directed to file its Brief 
of Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/1/2010. 
(lhin, ) (cmcc, ). (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 120 ORDER GRANTING the American 
Civil Rights Union’s 114 Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief; 
upon receipt of this Order, counsel 
for the American Civil Rights Union 
shall electronically file the brief 
App. 215 
Signed by District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson on 10/4/2010. (lhin, ) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 121 ORDER GRANTING 112 Motion by 
the Former U.S. Attorneys General 
William Barr, Edwin Meese, III and 
Dick Thornburg [sic] for an Extension 
of Time to Seek Leave to File a Brief 
as amici curiae. It is FURTHER 
ORDERED that Movants shall file 
their motion seeking leave to 
participate as amici curiae by 
10/08/2010. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/04/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 122 Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff ’s 88 Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to 
Defendant’s 90 Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Physician Hospitals 
of America. (Oostdyk, Scott). Modified 
docket entry on 10/05/2010. 
(walk, ). (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 123 ORDER GRANTING 108 Motion 
by amici curiae Washington Legal 
Foundation and several constitutional 
law scholars for Leave to File an amici 
curiae Brief in support of Plaintiff ’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Clerk shall cause the proposed brief 
to be filed and entered on the docket. 
Signed by District Judge Henry 
E. Hudson on 10/04/2010. (walk, ) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
App. 216 
10/04/2010 124 NOTICE of Appearance by William 
Perry Pendley on behalf of Mountain 
States Legal Foundation (Pendley, 
William) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 125 Brief by Washington Legal Foundation 
and Constitutional Law Scholars as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff ’s 
88 MOTION for Summary Judgment; 
filed pursuant to the Court’s Order dated 
10/04/2010. (walk, ) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 126 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Brief and Brief in Support by 
Mountain States Legal Foundation. 
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, 
# 2 Amicus Brief )(Pendley, William) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 127 MOTION for Leave to File Brief 
Amicus Curiae by Pacific Legal 
Foundation. (Luther, Robert) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 128 NOTICE of Appearance by William 
Perry Pendley on behalf of Mountain 
States Legal Foundation (Pendley, 
William) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 129 Brief in Support of Commonwealth 
of Virginia filed by Americans for 
Free Choice in Medicine and Pacific 
Legal Foundation. (Luther, Robert). 
PLEASE NOTE: Received verbal 
notification from counsel Robert Luther, 
III that “Pro Hac Vice Pending” listed 
under his name on page one of the 
document is a typographical error. 
App. 217 
Mr. Luther is counsel of record and 
doesn’t have a Pro Hac Vice application 
pending before the Court. 
(walk, ). (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 130 MOTION for Leave to File Brief 
Amicus Curie [sic] in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment by Landmark Legal 
Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 
Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Brief 
Amicus Curiae)(St. George, Timothy) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 131 Brief in Support to 88 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment by Plaintiff and 
in Opposition to 90 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment by Defendant 
filed by American Civil Rights Union. 
(Rogers, Richard) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 132 REPLY to Response to Motion re 90 
MOTION for Summary Judgment 
filed by Kathleen Sebelius. (Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 133 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief by Virginia Organizing. 
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Amicus 
Brief, # 2 Affidavit Amicus Brief 
Exhibit 1)(Bennett, Leonard) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/04/2010 134 Memorandum in Support re 133 
MOTION for Leave to File Amicus 
Curiae Brief filed by Virginia 
Organizing. (Bennett, Leonard) 
(Entered: 10/04/2010) 
App. 218 
10/04/2010 135 Financial Interest Disclosure 
Statement (Local Rule 7.1) by 
Virginia Organizing. (Bennett, 
Leonard) (Entered: 10/04/2010) 
10/05/2010 136 ORDER GRANTING 126 Motion by 
Mountain States Legal Foundation 
for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief 
in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Clerk shall 
cause the proposed brief to be filed 
and entered on the docket. It is so 
ORDERED. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/04/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 137 Amicus Curiae Brief by Mountain 
States Legal Foundation in Support 
of Plaintiff ’s 88 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment; filed pursuant 
to the Court’s Order dated 10/05/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 138 ORDER GRANTING 127 Motion 
for Leave to File Amicus Curiae 
for Americans for Free Choice 
in Medicine and Pacific Legal 
Foundation and they are directed 
to file their Brief of Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Plaintiff ’s 88 Motion 
for Summary Judgment. It is so 
ORDERED. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/04/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010  Notice of Correction re: Document 
122; the filing user should have 
App. 219 
selected the filing event “Memorandum 
in Support,” instead of “Memorandum.” 
The docket text has been corrected 
and the document has been linked 
to 88 and 90 motions. (walk, ) 
(Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 139 ORDER GRANTING 133 Motion 
for Leave to File Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Virginia Organizing in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgement and Movant 
Virginia Organizing is directed to 
file its Brief of Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment. It is so 
ORDERED. Signed by District 
Judge Henry E. Hudson on 10/05/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 140 ORDER GRANTING 130 Motion of 
amicus Landmark Legal Foundation 
for leave to file a brief as amicus 
curiae supporting Plaintiff ’s motion 
for summary judgment. It is 
FURTHER ORDERED that the 
Clerk shall cause the Proposed 
Brief to be filed and entered on 
the docket. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/05/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 141 Amicus Curiae Brief of Landmark 
Legal Foundation in Support of 
Plaintiff ’s 88 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment; filed pursuant 
App. 220 
to the Court’s Order dated 10/05/2010. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010  Notice of Correction re: Document 
124; the filing user has been requested 
to file a separate Certificate of 
Service and link it to document 124. 
(walk, ). The filing user has also been 
requested to file a separate Certificate 
of Service for Document 128 which 
appears to be a duplicate of Document 
124 . (walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010  Notice of Correction re: Document 
130; the filing user’s login does not 
match the signature on the document. 
The filing user must refile the 
document with the filing user’s 
signature block, or the attorney whose 
signature block appears on the 
document must refile the document. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 142 CERTIFICATE of Service re 124 
Notice of Appearance by William 
Perry Pendley on behalf of Mountain 
States Legal Foundation (Pendley, 
William) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 143 CERTIFICATE of Service re 128 
Notice of Appearance by William 
Perry Pendley on behalf of Mountain 
States Legal Foundation (Pendley, 
William) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 144 MOTION by Eve Ellingwood to 
Intervene. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 
A, # 2 Exhibit B1, # 3 Exhibit B2, # 4 
App. 221 
Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, and # 6 
Exhibit E). (walk, ) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/05/2010 145 Amended MOTION for Leave to File 
Breif [sic] Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment by Landmark Legal 
Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 
Proposed Order, # 2 Amicus Brief )(St. 
George, Timothy) (Entered: 10/05/2010) 
10/06/2010 146 ORDER DENYING 144 Motion by 
Eve Ellington for Intervention. It is 
so ORDERED. Signed by District 
Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
10/06/2010. Copy mailed to Movant. 
(walk, ) (Entered: 10/06/2010) 
10/08/2010 147 NOTICE by Kathleen Sebelius re 90 
MOTION for Summary Judgment of 
Supplemental Authority (Attachments: 
# 1 Supplement Supplemental 
Authority)(Hambrick, Jonathan) 
(Entered: 10/08/2010) 
10/08/2010 148 MOTION for Leave to File Brief as 
Amici Curiae by William P. Barr, 
Edwin Meese, III, Richard L. 
Thornburgh. (Zurawski, Tara) 
(Entered: 10/08/2010) 
10/08/2010 149 Memorandum in Support re 148 
MOTION for Leave to File Brief as 
Amici Curiae filed by William P. 
Barr, Edwin Meese, III, Richard L. 
Thornburgh. (Attachments: # 1 
Proposed Amici Curiae Brief, # 2 
App. 222 
Proposed Order) (Zurawski, Tara) 
(Entered: 10/08/2010) 
10/08/2010 150 ORDER granting 148 Motion for 
Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae; 
the Clerk shall cause the proposed 
brief to be filed. Signed by District 
Judge Henry E. Hudson on 10/8/10. 
(jtho, ) (Entered: 10/08/2010) 
10/12/2010 151 Memorandum of Amici Curiae, Former 
United States Attorneys General 
William Barr, Edwin Meese, Dick 
Thornburgh, in Support OF 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Amici 
Curiae) . (Zurawski, Tara) Modified 
on 10/12/2010 to edit(cmcc, ). 
(Entered: 10/12/2010) 
10/13/2010 152 ORDER that, in her Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Secretary, 
at this late stage, asserts that the 
Commonwealth’s failure to join the 
Secretary of the Treasury as an 
indispensible party entitles her to 
judgment; the Court is not persuaded 
that the Secretary of the Treasury is 
a necessary party. Defendant’s request 
for judgment for failure to join the 
Secretary of the Treasury is DENIED 
(see Order for details). Signed by 
District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
10/13/2010. Copies to counsel of 
record.(cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/13/2010) 
App. 223 
10/15/2010 153 NOTICE by Commonwealth of 
Virginia, Ex Rel. Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli, II re 88 MOTION for 
Summary Judgment Plaintiff ’s 
Notice of Supplemental Authority 
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Getchell, 
Earle) (Entered: 10/15/2010) 
10/15/2010 154 ORDER granting 99 Motion for Pro 
hac vice. Timothy Sandefur appointed 
for Amici Americans for Free Choice 
in Medicine and Pacific Legal 
Foundation. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/15/2010. Copies 
to counsel. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/15/2010) 
10/15/2010 155 ORDER granting 100 Motion for 
Pro hac vice. Luke Anthony Wake 
appointed for Americans for Free 
Choice in Medicine and Pacific Legal 
Foundation. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 10/15/2010. Copies 
to counsel. (cmcc, ) (Entered: 10/15/2010) 
10/18/2010 156 Minute Entry for proceedings held 
before District Judge Henry E. Hudson 
(Court Reporter Liscio, OCR): Motion 
Hearing held on 10/18/2010 re 88 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
by Commonwealth of Virginia and 
90 Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Kathleen Sebelius. Argument 
heard. Matter taken under advisement 
by Court; Memorandum Opinion to 
enter. (rpiz) (Entered: 10/18/2010) 
App. 224 
11/07/2010 157 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held 
on October 18, 2010 before Judge 
Henry E. Hudson. Court Reporter/ 
Transcriber Krista Liscio, telephone 
number 804 916-2296. Transcript 
may be viewed at the court public 
terminal or purchased through the 
Court Reporter/Transcriber before 
the deadline for Release of Transcript 
Restriction. After that date it may be 
obtained through PACER Redaction 
Request due 12/7/2010. Redacted 
Transcript Deadline set for 1/7/2011. 
Release of Transcript Restriction 
set for 2/5/2011.(liscio, krista) 
(Entered: 11/07/2010) 
11/08/2010 158 Notice of Filing of Official 
Transcript re 157 Transcript. 
(cmcc, ) (Entered: 11/08/2010) 
11/24/2010 159 ORDER DENYING Motion by amicus 
curiae W. Spencer Connerat, III for 
leave to file the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Warrant for Arrest, 
as well as any further filings in this 
action (please see Order for 
additional information). The Clerk is 
directed to lodge the aforementioned 
document in the Clerk’s Office in 
the event that a notice of appeal if 
filed regarding this Order. It is so 
ORDERED. Signed by District Judge 
Henry E. Hudson on 11/24/2010. Copy 
mailed to Mr. Connerat. (walk, ) 
(Entered: 11/24/2010) 
App. 225 
12/03/2010 160 NOTICE by Kathleen Sebelius re 90 
MOTION for Summary Judgment of 
Supplemental Authority (Attachments: 
# 1 Supplemental Authority) (Hambrick, 
Jonathan) (Entered: 12/03/2010) 
12/13/2010 161 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed 
by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 
12/13/2010. (walk, ) (Entered: 12/13/2010) 
12/13/2010 162 ORDER that Plaintiff ’s 88 Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
as to its request for declaratory relief 
and DENIED as to its request for 
injunctive relief, and Defendant’s 
90 Motion for Summary Judgment 
is DENIED. It is so ORDERED. 
Signed by District Judge Henry E. 
Hudson on 12/13/2010. (walk, ) 
(Entered: 12/13/2010) 
01/18/2011 163 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Kathleen 
Sebelius. (Hambrick, Jonathan) 
(Entered: 01/18/2011) 
01/18/2011 164 NOTICE OF APPEAL by 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Ex Rel. 
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II. (Getchell, 
Earle) (Entered: 01/18/2011) 
01/18/2011 165 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455, 
receipt number 34683011385, re 
164 Notice of Appeal filed by 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Ex 
Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II 
(lbre, ) (Entered: 01/18/2011) 
  
App. 226 
01/19/2011 166 Transmission of Notice of Appeal to 
US Court of Appeals re 163 Notice of 
Appeal. (All case opening forms, plus 
the transcript guidelines, may be 
obtained from the Fourth Circuit’s 
website at www.ca4.uscourts.gov) 
(lbre, ) (Entered: 01/19/2011) 
01/19/2011 167 Transmission of Notice of Appeal to 
US Court of Appeals re 164 Notice of 
Appeal. (All case opening forms, plus 
the transcript guidelines, may be 
obtained from the Fourth Circuit’s 
website at www.ca4.uscourts.gov) 
(lbre, ) (Entered: 01/19/2011) 
01/20/2011  USCA Case Number 11-1057, Case 
Manager R.Warren, for 163 Notice 
of Appeal filed by Kathleen Sebelius. 
(lbre, ) (Entered: 01/20/2011) 
01/20/2011  USCA Case Number 11-1058, Case 
Manager R.Warren, for 164 Notice 
of Appeal filed by Commonwealth of 
Virginia, Ex Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, 
II. (lbre, ) (Entered: 01/20/2011) 
01/20/2011 168 ORDER of USCA as to 164 Notice of 
Appeal filed by Commonwealth of 
Virginia, Ex Rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, 
II, 163 Notice of Appeal filed by 
Kathleen Sebelius : The Court 
consolidates Case No. 11-1057(L) 
and Case No. 11-1058. (lbre, ) 
(Entered: 01/20/2011) 
 
